I had the pleasure of serving on board two nuclear submarines, the USS Tunny (SSN-682) and the USS Helena (SSN-725), both stationed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. I was a quartermaster second class qualified in submarines. Quartermasters in the Navy are navigators, not supply clerks as in the Army. As such, I was responsible for determining the vessel's position. I worked closely with other members of the control room team to make sure every evolution was executed safely and according to procedure.
The sinking of the Ehime Maru is a tragedy. The press is speculating that the civilian visitors may have distracted the crew from their duties or that the commanding officer was negligent. There has even been a retired submarine skipper, Captain Jim Bush, on more than one television news program, volunteering his opinion that the accident was caused by "human error." It is not that simple.
First, the emergency blow system is designed to save a sinking submarine by rapidly bringing her to the surface before the incoming seawater can tip the scales against her forever. This system was created after the loss the USS Thresher (SSN-593) in April 1963. Testing the emergency blow system frequently is required to ensure its integrity. Testing the system while guests are on board would pose no risks that would not exist in their absence.
U.S. submarines follow written procedures born of experience and combat. The conditions required to surface a submarine are so exacting that on board my two boats, we frequently could not find a free spot to come up in. You can bet that if the Greeneville's captain had any concerns about safety, he would have kept his submarine submerged.
Having guests "drive" the submarine is in no way dangerous. In fact, these two positions normally are manned by the most junior sailors in the crew. The level of supervision is intense, and there are plenty of old hands ready to reach over a nervous shoulder.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) stated that all the submarine's sensors were working properly and its investigator implied human error. The NTSB has plenty of experience with aircraft but none with submarines. There are many variables involved in detecting a surface ship from a submarine. It is possible that the Ehime Maru, which was low in profile, was outside the visual range of the Greeneville's periscope during the visual search. It is possible that her propellers went unheard because they were not turning fast enough to be distinguishable from background noise, or that a thermal layer of cold water created a barrier through which the Greeneville's sonar could not hear. I believe there were mistakes, but they were not mistakes of judgment or diligence on the part of the Greeneville's captain or crew.
Submarines, ships, and aircraft are commanded by highly trained and motivated officers. The procedures, regulations, and rules of engagement they are required to follow are produced at the squadron level or higher. The Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet (Rear Admiral Albert Konetzni), has the ultimate authority for determining policy regarding safety and training for his submarines. He has the capability to ensure that submarines testing their emergency blow systems be supported by aircraft or surface ships, which can better protect innocent ships. He can decree that such evolutions take place only in geographically isolated places, not within sight of the busiest harbor for 2,000 miles in each direction.
Unfortunately, the Navy has a long history of hanging commanding officers out to dry when they are simply doing their best or when their senior officers fail to provide adequate guidance and support. The commanding officers of the USS Helena (CL-50) and the USS Indianapolis (CA-35) during World War II and the USS Pueblo (AGER-2) during the Cold War suffered this fate.
The Greeneville will be added to the list, but it should not be so.