The country needs all elements of air power—land-based, carrier, and long-range—to carry out the power-projection mission, but if force trade-offs become necessary, purchasing more B-2s should take priority over a carrier wing or two.
The U.S. Air Force and Navy are embroiled in what many in each service see as an interservice fight for their lives. Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman has suggested that the Air Force could provide forward “presence,” which the Navy saw as an attempt to supplant aircraft carrier battle groups in this role. What General Fogleman really said in the Global Presence paper was that all military forces can exert presence, and it is the synergistic combination of each service’s capabilities—Air Force bombers, transports, and space systems; Navy carriers and Marine units; Army airborne brigades and for- ward-deployed heavy divisions—that provides deterrence.1 Indeed, both bombers and carrier-based air, together with land-based fighter bombers, are vital elements of U.S. power projection capability. For the Air Force, bombers—particularly B2s—are critical to its ability to project power across the globe, and the current buy of 20 is insufficient to accomplish this mission.
The Debates
The nation desperately needs to maintain the ability to project combat power over very long distances in minimum time. We no longer have the overseas basing structure to support a massive forward presence as we did during the Cold War, and barring the return of a massive international threat, the number of overseas bases probably will continue to drop. This means, of course, that the United States has fewer places, other than on aircraft carrier decks, to park its magnificent fleets of short-range fighters and attack aircraft. This results in fewer means to influence the behavior of errant nations and their leaders in a timely manner.
The U.S. Navy’s aircraft carrier battle groups present a powerful deterrent presence to the community of nations. Their presence off anyone’s coast is a visible reminder of U.S. power and the will to use it. The problem is that carrier battle groups are not always where they are most needed; anywhere from a few days to a few months may be needed to assemble enough combat power to get the attention of the Saddam Husseins of the world—the better-armed and more belligerent despots. And the “anyone” we may wish to influence may not always be conveniently situated on a coastline.
The other answer, of course, is the long-range bomber—a weapon that can be over a target virtually anywhere in the world in 20 hours or less. Advances in stealth, weapon- carrying capability, and accuracy allow the B-2 to deliver up to sixteen 2,000-pound munitions to sixteen different targets with pinpoint accuracy. Its effectiveness is further enhanced at night, when the chance of visual detection decreases as well. The capability inherent in the marriage of stealth, smart weapons, and targeting systems was demonstrated in the Gulf War. During that conflict, the F-117 stealth fighter flew only 2% of the total missions I but hit 40% of the deep targets—without losing a single airplane.2 The B-2, with a much larger payload and a 6,000-mile range, can do far more and needs few, if any forward bases for support.
The B-2, however, is hellishly expensive. Reported costs range anywhere from $500 million to $1 billion per aircraft, and then there are fly-away costs, life-cycle and support costs, and research and development. It is so expensive that Air Force leaders, while staunchly defending the existing buy, say they can’t afford any more and still do everything else the service needs to accomplish its mission. In that context, the Air Force and Department of Defense recently decided that it would be more cost-effective to use the B-2 money to buy additional advanced precision munitions.
This decision reflects the results of the congressionally chartered Heavy Bomber Force Study.3 In concentrating on the ability of various force mixes to stop a large-scale armored thrust, however, the study did not evaluate the strategic and operational levels of war where aircraft such as the B-2 and F-117 make their greatest contribution. Limited range and lack of stealth prevent standard carrier- and land-based aircraft from conducting strikes deep into defended territory without undue risk or a force package of dozens of support aircraft—EF-111 and EA-6B electronic jammers, F-15 and F/A-18 fighter escorts, and F-4G Wild Weasels to suppress enemy ground defenses. In bringing down Saddam Hussein’s command- and-control and air-defense systems, the Gulf War Coalition relied almost exclusively on the F-117 to deliver pinpoint attacks on targets in the heavily defended Baghdad area. The F-117, with its relatively small bomb load, offered both stealth (equating to survivability) and economy of force.
The stealth activity constituted only a small portion of the overall air effort during the war, but arguably it produced the greatest effect: blinding the central leadership, ensuring air superiority, and cutting command links to field forces. True, the force would have been inadequate to stop a massive armored thrust, but a substantial force of B-2 bombers, with their far greater range and massive payload, could have produced effects greatly out of proportion to resources expended in such a scenario—and within a few hours of the initial tasking.
This leads to a dilemma. Are 20 B-2s really enough? The Air Force—officially, at least—says yes. The Navy agrees enthusiastically that 20 is plenty. Media pundits daily assault the B-2 as a relic of the Cold War, saying that it was designed to vaporize Soviets with nuclear fireballs and has no relevance in the post-Cold War era.4
What is not being considered? No other weapon—either planned or existing—has the same capability of projecting global conventional firepower on short notice as the land-based heavy bomber: B-52, B-1, and B-2. Twenty S-2s simply are not enough to carry the load the nation expects into the 21st century, especially as the B-52 fleet ages and no option to expand the B-l fleet exists.
Seven former Secretaries of Defense sent a letter to President Bill Clinton asking him to purchase more of the high-tech bombers, saying that the B-2 remains the most cost-effective means of rapidly projecting force over great distances. Its range will enable it to reach any point on earth within hours after launch, while being deployed at only three secure bases around the world. Its payload and array of munitions will permit it to destroy numerous time-sensitive targets in a single sortie. And perhaps most important, its low-observable characteristics will allow it to reach intended targets without fear of interception.5
The Navy tends to see the issue as an either/or debate—more B-2s means fewer carrier battle groups—and is fighting additional acquisition. Its rationale centers on the visible presence argument: ships offer visible, sustained presence, thus they deter better than planes, and once on station, they respond faster than planes that must be deployed.6 The Air Force argues that it can have its bombers on scene in a matter of hours and entire fighter wings (given bases to operate from) in a few days. If carriers are not present when and exactly where they are needed, it takes time to get them in position, and even then 50% or more of the aircraft and all of the escort ships are dedicated to just protecting and supporting the battle group.
The Compromise
The continuing ability of the United States to meet its global responsibilities hinges on a credible long-range steel-on-target capability, and that capability is best provided by a combination of land-based fighter/attack aircraft, long-range bombers, and carrier-based air. Rapid, global-range attack can be provided best by bombers, supplemented by carrier air. Reinforcement comes from deployed land-based strike aircraft and carrier air. Long-term, sustained operations and quick turnaround are provided by land-based and carrier aviation. Bombers are quick to respond over vast distances to deliver very large bomb loads to an increasing variety of targets, but they are not as responsive to quick turnaround requirements. Carrier air provides a visible presence and does not need anyone’s permission to “be there,” but it has limited assets and potentially long deployment times. Theater-based attack air has the potential to provide quick turnaround in high numbers and can deploy relatively quickly but is dependent on a dwindling number of forward bases.
In short, each element has strengths and weaknesses. To shortchange any one area is to hamstring the nation’s overall ability to protect its global interests. Two historical examples, the Falklands Conflict and Desert Storm, illustrate this point.
During their 1983 struggle to retake the remote Falkland Islands from Argentina, the British desperately needed to apply force early to prevent their adversary from reinforcing and consolidating its initial position. Nothing was available. They had all but retired their intermediate-range, nuclear-only Vulcan bombers; there were no sites to base fighters and attack planes; and the Navy (with only minimal carrier air) was weeks away. As a result, by the time British fleet elements arrived 27 days later, they were met by an in-place force that required significant blood and treasure to dislodge.7
A long-range bomber force most likely would not have been able to solve the Falklands crisis. “It cannot land troops, supply them, and then occupy the islands. However ... it can deliver the crucial early blows at consolidating land and sea forces and supporting airfields.”8 Then, after the arrival of naval elements, it can act to reinforce carrier-based air under direction of the theater commander. If the United States had been facing Argentina, we would have had only bombers and carrier air to accomplish the task. If carriers were not immediately available in the South Atlantic, the job would have fallen to the bombers until naval forces arrived and then to a joint task force thereafter.
During the Gulf War, all three elements—carrier air, bombers, and land-based attack/fighters—eventually were available for tasking. All were seen as necessary in defeating the Iraqi forces, although the vast majority of sorties flown were by theater-range, land-based (primarily U.S. Air Force) aircraft.9 The bulk of the task of bringing down Saddam’s air-defense system and destroying his central command and control was performed by fewer than 50 F-117s assigned to the theater. The B-52s did attack large-area targets such as Republican Guard formations, but they played a relatively minor role—an aircraft with the radar signature of Mount McKinley and relatively slow speed is not going to survive for long in a direct attack role. Had B-2s been available, they could have attacked at night and ranged over the entire Iraqi/Kuwaiti theater, including downtown Baghdad. In addition, they could have brought far more weapons to bear than the F-117. (The F-117 carried two 2,000-pound weapons; the B-2 can carry sixteen.)
As one author suggested recently, not only are both Air Force B-l bombers and Navy carriers necessary to carry out the nation’s defense policy, but direct cooperation between the two elements also is quite advantageous to both. Bombers could add their heavy bomb loads to carrier air’s forward presence. Using the Navy’s EA-6s and F-14s for jamming and escort, they could forge a potent combination of carrier air attack and long-range bomber strike. Both Navy and Air Force senior officers described exercises where the two elements were used together as highly successful.10
The use of B-2s in such joint Navy-Air Force operations would take this synergy even further. The B-2 could range to the same targets from as far away as the United States but, because of its stealth, would not require anywhere near the large force of supporting naval aircraft. These forces—e.g., jammers, fighter escort—then could be used to accompany strike packages of Navy or Air Force fighter bombers and the B-ls.
The Bottom Line
Rather than continue the either/or debate, the Air Force and Navy should be seeking ways to enhance the synergy of the air power triad of long-range force projection. The bomber force should be strengthened, but—of course—the crux of the problem is money. If we buy more B-2s, no matter what their contribution, somebody, somewhere is going to lose. And the Navy sees its carriers as the prime loser. If the budget ax must fall, it should not place the burden exclusively on any single force element, but if and when total force trade-offs become necessary, the nation will be in need of an expanded global-range bomber fleet—particularly B-2s—more than a carrier wing or two.
1 See Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, and Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnal, Global Presence 1995, Department of the Air Force, 1995.
2 See mission summaries in vol. 5 of Gulf War Air Power Survey, Washington. D.C., Government Printing Office, 1993.
3 See the DoD-Institute for Defense Analysis Heavy Bomber Force Study.
4 For example, Robert Scheer wrote that “the B-2, like its predecessor, the B-1, was designed for a specific Cold War strategic purpose—fighting a nuclear war. . . This weapon from hell made little sense then and makes none at all now.” Sec “Why Worry? Learn to Love the Bomber,” Los Angeles Times, 11 July 1995.
5 Former Secretaries of Defense Melvin Laird, James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Harold Brown, Caspar Weinberger, Frank Carlucci, and Dick Cheney, quoted in John T. Correll, “A Message from Seven Secretaries,” Air Force Magazine March 1995, p. 2.
6 For a more in-depth discussion of the Navy view, see Cdr. Christopher M. Wode. USN, "Beyond Bombers vs Carriers,” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1995, pp. 29-30.
7 For a complete account of the Falklands battle, see Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York, London: W. W. Norton, 1983).
8 Maj. Grover E. Myers, USAF, Aerospace Power: the Case for Indivisible Application (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1986), p. 65.
9 During the war, of 36,717 strategic attack and interdiction sorties flown by Coalition forces, 23,756 (64.7%) were flown by U.S. Air Force crews. For offensive counterair, it was 6,433 of 10,670 sorties. Gulf War Air Power Survey.
10 Capt. James W. Fryer, USAF, "Flying with the Bone,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1995, pp. 49-52.
Colonel Myers is a doctrine analyst with the Air Force Doctrine Center at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. Before his retirement from the Air Force, he was an air-rescue helicopter pilot and B-52 pilot. He also served as a politico-military affairs officer at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command; as a research fellow at the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education; and at Headquarters, U.S. European Command, where he was involved with nuclear policy, ballistic missile defense system requirements, and arms-control issues.