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Why should the Soviets wait in their bastions for NATO’s attack? Even a few subs slipping into the vast Atlantic could rush the U. S. coast and paralyze the 600-ship Navy in port. The Navy and Coast Guard can build a layered defense to safeguard U. S. ports—and the supply lines to NATO.
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will not be deployed when hostilities start, gjvjn^ u ti
carrier groups time to reach their positions rcia“ " ('eC| in hindered. NATO’s sound surveillance systems p a ^ any strategic choke points would almost certainly de ^ ^uS large Soviet movements toward the open sea, a c0viets signal NATO battle groups to deploy. But if the ^-orCeS. prelude an attack by gradually deploying their ^ numerous platforms could slip through and l°se
selves in the vastness of the Atlantic.
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ven
Current literature on the Maritime Defense Zone concept defines it as a strategic plan for defending the U. S. coastline in wartime. But “defending the coastline” is a broad task: What exactly will we be defending against? What are our capabilities to do so? And is this really necessary in the first place?
Many theorists have tried to predict how the next war will start. Nearly every one envisions a Soviet invasion of Europe as the worst case occurrence. NATO strategy and defensive plans, accordingly, have focused on the need to defeat a Warsaw Pact offensive.1 The plans call for seaborne merchant convoys to transport U. S. combat troops and supplies from the United States into the European battle zones. The number of shipments required to meet the Soviet offensive is staggering—more than 2,000 per month.2 The mere volume of the supply, in addition to the nature of the hardware, precludes transporting it by air. The Soviets realize that delaying these supplies and men from reaching the battle zones by even a day will enormously strengthen the Soviet offensive.
A major goal of the U. S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy is to prevent this interdiction. To threaten the U. S. merchant convoys, Soviet forces must pass through choke points in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (G-I-UK) Gap; the Navy’s plan is to forward-deploy several carrier battle groups to blockade the G-I-UK Gap and prevent enemy ships and submarines from passing through.3
This plan suffers from one weakness. The Maritime Strategy assumes that most of the Soviets’ naval assets
Most of these platforms would be submarines- r£p- a small number deployed into the Atlantic they w°u resent a considerable threat, and not necessari y ^ blockading force. Since the U. S. carrier batte ,
| J be loS
have extensive antisubmarine capabilities, it w_ u0its.
ical for the Soviets to leave their destruction
to other i
to
such as land-based aircraft. If the Soviets’ °bje<^lV^uppiy further the land offensive by destroying the effort, they could find the greatest number of targ source—the U. S. coast from which they sail- -yjnS The Soviets would have persuasive incentives 0riu2 to strangle the NATO supply effort in U. S. PortSnlber both the first and second world wars, a small nu sUp- German U-boats did enormous damage to the A ^ ply effort, through torpedo attacks alone.5 If 1 jji,. were used today, modem weapons could do * damage to ships and shore facilities. Moreover, t way to nullify a great many ships is to strike in Port’ s afe they are most defenseless. Port facilities thenisc ^fjety difficult to defend because they offer such a wi CjeStivic' of targets (docks, fuel dumps, channels) wh°segS tion could prevent ships from deploying.6 Subma ot attack ports using cruise missiles, which -hf ^ to their several-hundred-mile range—give the su ^ up escape counterattack; torpedoes, which have ranS . ^ to 50 miles, can be guided or home in independen
being wakeless, are difficult to detect nonacoustica (0f-
mines, which submarines can deliver covertly tnr - pedo launchers. Naval planners have neglected 1111 fare in the past, but are giving it increasing atten 1 quit®5 Among its virtues is that the mere threat of mines
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with the threat at the earliest possible time. " w .^gptn at sea can also work along the coast—the defense ene1”' tactic can be used within the MDZ, based on oa$t'
. thec°a ■ submarine’s range to the coastline. In this case, j, a*
line (or specifically, land targets of opportunity- ports) is the “high value unit” to be protected- .^g de' Figure 2 illustrates a tactical model for emPL°Yie ^The fense in depth within the Maritime Defense Z° model divides the area assigned to the MDZ int0 ^ the layers. It reaches roughly 200 miles out to seaboundary of the economic exclusionary zone. ^ fof The hypothetical zones represent operating ^apj)itieS different types of units, based on the units r
capaD_ j to signed
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mine countermeasures. This takes time, and can further delay the supply convoys.7
All these weapons can be employed beyond visual range of the port, meaning that a submarine could effectively block a harbor from miles out to sea.
In addition to launching weapons, submarines can deploy covert operation teams to damage port facilities and shipping through sabotage. Soviet tactical doctrine emphasizes using “behind-the-lines” teams to attack rear areas. (See Figure 1.)
The prospect of neutralizing the U. S. supply effort before the 600-ship Navy can even deploy is one that is simply too lucrative for the Soviets to ignore.8 Furthermore, their submarine force is well-equipped to take the war to U. S. shores. The Soviets have both modern fast-
attack submarines capable of fighting U. S. carr1.^ m0d- groups, and older classes that cannot compete w1v6 ern ASW ships.9 But if these older subs are me ,nst against the battle groups, they would be potent agai , aS U. S. coastline. When using covert techniques * Qf minelaying or landing special operations teams, t these submarines would not matter. Perhaps this i ^ the Soviets have been up to in Swedish coastal wa ^ ^ training for inshore operations they plan to con from the coasts of Europe. r the
In fact, it was because of growing concern o threat to the U. S. coastline that the governinen y lished the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ)—a J°inc(jves: and Coast Guard command.10 It has two broad o J® ^0[)1 to allow merchant and naval forces to transitsa e y p0rt coastal ports to the open sea; and to actively de e and coastal facilities. The specific missions of1 e inin the coastal battle include antisubmarine war a ^ shore undersea warfare, mine countermeasur > jn. security and safety, reconnaissance and surven intelligence gathering, interdiction, vessel-moveme^ trol and naval control of shipping, and maintain o to navigation.11 jgfea1
The Tactical Model: How are U. S. forces 0 Soviet submarines attacking our home shores • ^
Defense of ships at sea has always worked premise that the most capable unit available sho woflcS and the missions assigned to each area. Units .Lsd>rS; the MDZ will include Navy frigates, Coast <^ua.()I.ceiTi1’11 shore-based aircraft, and shore-based law en P teams (Coast Guard, National Guard, and civi i uSiti?
The Maritime Defense Zone is a joint commaUj^vVl Coast Guard and Navy assets.14 Ideally, MDZ ^,gC3f rarely operate alone. We should examine each urn asse1' bilities in view of this coordination of all the M ^.sClJs!>' into one strike force. This is especially true y ba'e
ing ASW: a surface ship assigned to the MDZ lf’ neither the weapons nor the sensors of her c°unce, the task force; but unlike the oceangoing task ^ l1’ enjoys almost constant support from the nearby - ^ pO light of this, deep-water task force capabilhieS really needed. ..
According to our model, the MDZ units cou in the three defense zones as follows. th® °utt.
Outer defense zone: For all practical purposes, ^ defense zone is blue water. ASW will be con a using normal surface action unit (SAU) tactics.
lo func
data, the Sat" 3S-a bunter-killer” group for established to the h i a*so escort outgoing merchant vessels Agates °U| ary °f the MDZ. The unit consists of Navy Cutters tvvu ^°ast Guard high- and medium-endurance ters- Wh anc* WMECs) with embarked helicop-
c°ntrol e? Prosecuting submarines, the SAU has tactical *aunchcd°A Jan<Tbased P-3 Orion aircraft and ship- enemy s ^ ^ helos. These enable the SAU to strike lhe surf-,3 S bebore they can get within torpedo range of p- iace force.
Cut'on vv ^ !l,Ustrates h°w an ideal “layered” ASW prose- It wj|i°U ^ Worh >n the outer MDZ defense zone.
Ullique th!!.0t a)Ways work this neatly, of course. But the esPecian Cornmander can call up additional assets
pi . ° uno , ui tuuist. uut u
that tpeln^ ahout the Maritime Defense Zone’s SAU rcraft-
IS
0nga,ly estimated.
-if the threat proves to be greater than
> P-3C QaPab'lities of the SAU include:
^WnV"r The P-3 is an outstanding long-range air a>r-clep| 0riT1’ with extensive electronic search gear and ^rged son°buoys for detecting and prosecuting sub- Pc(]°es ^ehniarines. The Orion carries Mark-46 ASW tor- hice a(fr subsurface attack and Harpoon missiles for sur- °n"See ’’ .^eing land based, the P-3 has limited ^ Shipp32 hme (although this time is considerable). shorter °arc* helicopters: Although the helicopters have 'veap0nraa8es than the P-3 and carry fewer sensors and reUrrn ;t| ”ecause they are ship based they can refuel and
le SAU will use the Navy LAMPS-II1 and '%e m ,lllc Coast Guard HH-65 Dolphin. The French the Dolphin for ASW, and the Coast Guard is , Ptiga^ at^ding the helo to its fleet.15 •°rrriecl kS ** tbe enemy submarine penetrates the zone the i\jay ASW aircraft, the SAU’s ships will take over. Startd0ff ^ br'§ate will conduct the initial prosecution and N a . attack, using long-range sonar detection systems * ^ig|/pUbrnar'ne rockets.
' nhurance Cutters: The Coast Guard’s Hamilton
lb|y the
M!
frigates. This is logical. Since the frigates are more capable in long-range ASW, they should serve in the outer zone. But the inner zone will not be defenseless. The beauty of the MDZ plan is that the inner zone can commandeer support from shore. Coast Guard WHECs will act as command-and-control platforms, coordinating shore-based air assets such as the S-3 Viking aircraft. WMECs will use their shipboard helos in the ASW battle. In addition, they will have duties similar to those they perform in peacetime—interdicting covert operations teams and weapons smugglers.
Coastal Defense Zone: In the coastal zone—from the shore to two miles out to sea-—the principal threat will be covert operations teams. Since the targets are located along the shore—and many are only accessible by sea— shore teams and sea units will work in tandem to counter covert operations. The assets will consist of:
- Medium-Endurance Cutters: These will have tasks similar to their peacetime missions; in addition, they can provide immediate firepower to defend a port.
- Patrol Boats: These Coast Guard craft will probably be the “workhorses” of inner coastal defense. They will transport law enforcement teams, and provide antipersonnel weapons to counter covert operations.
- Buoy Tenders: These will protect aids to navigation. Nothing would frustrate merchant forces more than being unable to navigate their way out of U. S. waters. The navigation aids will be especially critical for allied ships unfamiliar with the U. S. coastline. Disrupting U. S. buoy systems would be a nuisance tactic, but it could further the larger Soviet aim of delaying the flow of supplies.
- Coast Guard Reserve Port Security Teams: These teams are trained to provide both security and investigative services. They enjoy close cooperation with local law enforcement agencies, which will also be trained to counter covert operations teams.16 Army Reserve transportation units will also be active in this role.
Covert operations teams will have one advantage— numerous targets from which to select. But they also operate far from their parent submarines, and that gives MDZ forces the home-field advantage.
The Coast Guard will play the lead role in the coastal zone, because of the excellent command-and-communica- tions system it has established for peacetime operations with shore-based law enforcement agencies. The Coast Guard also thoroughly knows the area it will defend.17
This tactical model for defending the U. S. coastline takes an established defensive concept and applies it to a
C-
ey^)-class cutters carry “over-the-side” antisub- "e shin°-Te^0es tbat can on>y be launched directly from . Iat0 tbe sea- This limits the cutter to close-in "^ASVV °U^b tb's *S mucb more dungerous than stand- "Vely ,. ’ high-resolution sonar gives these cutters a rela- r:Hige tp'^h probability of success. In addition, at short fitter nSu,brnafine has limited avenues of escape.
'v*ll be^refense Zone: SAU operations in the inner zone "tnlar to those in the outer zone, without the Navy
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174-176. 5jem.
8Vice Admiral J. Costello, USCG, “Guarding the Coast—An Old r
strategic plan: the Maritime Defense Zone. The ASW battle may or may not evolve along these lines, and existing war plans may or may not support this model. But—given the threat, and the units that will counter it—this model presents a logical approach by which these units could meet this threat.
We can draw several immediate conclusions:
- Defending the MDZ will be a joint service effort, and cooperation is essential.
- Joint operations will strengthen the individual MDZ units. This is especially true of the Coast Guard units.
- Defending the coastline is by no means limited to traditional antisubmarine warfare. The submarine operating close to shore presents a wide variety of threats. In this case, ASW means more than sinking the sub—it means defeating all the threats the submarine can levy against the coastline, from missiles to sabotage teams.
The MDZ plan is a comfortable one for the Coast Guard: it assigns to the service in wartime modified versions of the missions the Coast Guard routinely performs today. These range from interdicting a covert operation to launching a Mark-46 torpedo over the side—at either extreme, these are wartime functions for which the Coast
Guard is well trained. , ^
There are hundreds of possibilities the Navy an Guard must consider to ready our defense of our coastline. Whether we will do so through practlCcertaiu- cises is a matter of speculation; that we need lo
i A the Ws'ern ^
Paul Nitze, Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge ana i
ance Options (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 3. ^ »5p4en
2Robert French, “The Decline in NATO’s Merchant Fleet, 01 Weekly, 21 March 1987, p. 487. ••
3Nitze, p. 189. Wa,^°
4Captain R. F. Delany, USN (Retired), “Fighting the War on t Armed Forces Journal International, April 1986, p. 74. \n\\o^
5Commander Wayne Young, USCG, “Maritime Defense—A revo cept,” The Alumni Bulletin, January 1986, p. 26.
6Delany, p. 74.
7H. F. Scott, Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder CO: Westview
Approach,” The Alumni Bulletin, October 1985, p. 23. j^p:
9Rear Admiral J. R. Hill, RN, Anti-Submarine Warfare (Annapo i ’
Institute Press, 1985), pp. 24-29.
10Costello, p. 20. -4.
“Hud., p. 26. 172"1
12James Dunnigan, How to Make War (New York: Quill, 1983), P Also, Hill, p. 100 and Nitze. ,, Olr
13Vice Admiral J. Costello, USCG, “80s Give Birth to the MDZ,
November 1985, p. 28.
'4lbid- „so<
15Ibid., p. 27. eCo&e
l6Rear Admiral Bennett S. Sparks, USCGR, “Joint Coastal De e Age,” Naval Reserve Association newsletter, March 1986, p- '
17Costello, The Officer, p. 27.
d ^
Lieutenant Watts graduated from the U. S. Coast Guard A ^oard’jj, 1985 with a B.S. degree in government. He has served 0 USCGC Dallas (WHEC-716) as intelligence officer, electrtion officer, underway officer of the deck, and combat inform j prie .. officer. He has attended several Navy schools. He was asSyor|Ci as Chief of Reserve Readiness, Governor’s Island, New currently assigned to Atlantic Area plans and exercises.
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