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The relationship between the United States and the Persian Gulf nations ranges over a wide variety of issues and mutual concerns of which one major aspect is security. Thus, consistent with our foreign policy interests, and with due regard for impact on social and economic development and on arms races, the United States has entered into arrangements with several countries {principally Iran and Saudi Arabia) for the sale of defense articles and services needed to equip and operate their military forces. All of these transactions take place under the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 {subsequently amended) and are making a major contribution to strengthening the security of the region against destabilizing outside influences and thereby promoting world peace.
Preceding pages: A Carl Evers painting (courtesy of the U. S. Navy) depicts two of nine gunboats proposed to be built in this country for the Saudi Arabian Navy. The contract for their construction is expected to be awarded early this year.
T
JL he Persian Gulf: Geography and History: The Persian Gulf extends in a southeasterly direction from the Shatt-al-Arab, formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, to the Strait of Hormuz where it connects with the Gulf of Oman. Its shallow waters, 500 miles long by 200 miles wide, separate the Arabian Peninsula from Iran. This body of water, known to the peoples of the Western bank as the Arabian Gulf is, in fact, an unofficial boundary between the Arab and the Persian worlds.
In the Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula area there are more than ten countries which are related geographically, religiously, and for the most part ethnically, but they present sharp economic and political contrasts. Some have long histories as independent nations with established interests and an influence extending well beyond the immediate area. Others, which were part of the British Protectorate, achieved independence as recently as 1971. All have strong economic ties with the outside world. Several are among the world’s wealthiest in terms of per capita gross national product, while others are still among the world’s poorest. Their political systems range from absolute monarchy based on Koranic law to various gradations of parliamentary democracy. With the exception of Iraq, where the United States maintains a small diplomatic office in the Belgian Embassy, U. S. relations with the countries in the region are good. With many the depth and variety of these relations have grown significantly in recent years.1
These gulf states fall into two main groups. First, there are the capital-hungry countries which are heavily populous in relation to their area and possess other resources besides oil. Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Oman fall into this category. The second group consists of ministates which are unable to absorb their own oil income. Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai comprise this group.2 In between these two groups lies Saudi Arabia, holding the world’s largest oil reserves. The latter has a very small population and much need for an economic infrastructure.3
A decisive event in the life of the entire gulf region was Britain’s 1968 decision to terminate its protective treaty relationships in the area and to withdraw its operational military forces by the end of 1971. Thus ended 150 years of British domination. Lord George Nathaniel Curzon of Great Britain had earlier proph-
to the states involved to bear the main respon-
rfle. t^at after the withdrawal or destruction of the ritish protectorate in the Persian Gulf, "both sea and °res would lapse into the anarchical chaos from ^ lch they have so laboriously been reclaimed!”4 This e prophesy has not been fulfilled, despite continuing putes over boundaries, navigation rights, and rela- 1Qnships with great powers. Other differences include nationality—Persian versus Arab; religion— \5f/uC ^Us^m sects in Iran versus Sunni in Iraq and tea rn Saudi Arabia; and finally the political sys- s~moderate versus radical. However, the binding ^rces 0d and the Arab-Israeli dispute have served to ■ CeP ^°rd Curzon’s prediction from materializing, at east to date.
Th
C ic 6 roots °ir the present instability in the Persian uit go back to Britain’s decision to withdraw its rttcro-military support from the small gulf states— °w known as the United Arab Emirates. This step rnpted other major powers to move toward the ant'cipated political vacuum. The high stakes involved °minance over a region that supplies some 40% of e oil required by the non-Communist world have pSU|ted in a wide-ranging struggle for influence in the ersian Gulf. The United States, however, has decided ^ to assume the former British role of protector in area. It is willing to assist as necessary but
' llu>' l°r their own defense and to cooperate among tnselves to ensure regional peace and stability. The ^a jng states of the area, Iran and Saudi Arabia, are Particularly important in this respect.
here have been historic rivalries between these two 6U leaders based on ethnic, linguistic, and territorial
21
Three "Made in USA” aircraft either operating in the skies over the Middle East or on order are, left, F-14s—the Shah of Iran was given a cockpit briefing by naval officers at Andrews Air Force Base in the summer of 1973—Saudi Arabian F-5 fighters, below, and Iranian P-3s.
differences. Iranians are followers of the principal minority sect of Islam, against which the regime in Saudi Arabia has been hostile and disdainful. The Iranians are very proud of their distinctive background and hold negative, stereotyped views of Arabs. In fact, the Persian language is full of colloquialisms on the boorishness of the Arabs. The Arabs, in turn, resent Iran’s sense of superiority and the uncritical support Iran has received from the United States.5
The House of Saud is one of the world’s last examples of true dynastic rule. The founding father came from a branch of one of several families that claimed the central part of Arabia, the Nejd. In 1902, Abdul- Aziz ibn-Saud conquered Riyadh, which led to the control of the Nejd. He subsequently gained control of the Eastern province along the Gulf, and then of the Hesaz, including Mecca and Jidda, the latter on the Red Sea. Joseph Kraft, writing in The New Yorker, noted that, "He supplemented the work of the sword on the nuptial couch. Before his death, in 1953, he had married more than a dozen wives, many from prominent
local families, and sired more than forty sons. The royal family of Saudi Arabia, which includes the children and other descendents of the three brothers of Abdul-Aziz, is by now uncommonly large; estimates run from two thousand to seven thousand members. The King is the head of the family, and the inner politics of Saudi Arabia are family politics.”6 The conservative Saudi kingdom is spending billions on American arms to ensure continued Saudi independence.
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi’s major objective is to make non-Arab Iran the primary military force in the Persian Gulf. Toward this end, the oil royalties have enabled the Shah to build up a massive military force by purchasing American military weapons with little regard for the cost. The Shah is concerned not only about the balance of power in the Persian Gulf but also with the status of the Indian Ocean approaches to the gulf. Plans for the Iranian Navy call for ships that can patrol the seas as far away as India. The Shah’s second goal is to counter Russian efforts to bring change to the gulf. This is being done by supplying troops to the Omanis against Soviet-backed guerillas, supporting the independence of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, promising financial aid to Afghanistan, and providing India and Israel with oil.
The other small countries making up the gulf littoral look to the Iranians or the Saudis to maintain stability in the area. These include Oman, Kuwait, and the seven conservative sheikhdoms making up the United Arab Emirates. Iraq’s socialist government relies on Soviet arms to back quarrels with Iran and Kuwait and to counter rebellion by Kurdish tribesmen.
Importance of Persian Gulf to the United States: Historically, the United States has had little political interest in the Persian Gulf. For about a century and a half, the external relations of the Arab states in the gulf were largely the responsibility of Great Britain, while Britain and Russia competed for influence in Persia, as Iran was then called. The United States had little strategic interest in the area until World War II. And until recently, this country was not dependent on the area for the oil that has been produced there in increasing abundance since the 1930s. Although American oil companies have long had a commercial interest in the area, U. S. national interests were indirect, reflecting concern about the flow of oil to our allies in Europe and Japan.
Suddenly, as a result of the energy crisis, there has been a radical increase in American concern about the future of the area. The shift in world oil market power from consumer nations to the producer countries, the application in 1973 of the oil embargo, and the quintupling of oil prices, have affected the global strategic equation. The increasing world focus on the gulf has been accompanied by a growing Soviet military presence in the adjacent Indian Ocean, especially the northern littoral states of Somalia and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Finally, since 1967, and particularly since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the major Arab oil-producing nations in the gulf area have provided the principal financial support for the confrontation.
U. S. policy objectives for the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula have been consistent since the termination of the special British role there in 1971, stressing "Support for collective security and stability in the region by the encouragement of indigenous regional cooperative efforts and orderly economic progress.”7 In this regard the U. S. provides advice on the types and quantities of military equipment and services needed to meet defense and internal security needs, and gives sympathetic consideration to requests to purchase such equipment and services.
This policy has served to provide continuing access to the region’s oil supplies in sufficient quantities to meet U. S. needs and those of its allies. It has encouraged the states in the area to resolve by peaceful means local territorial and other disputes and to widen their channels of communication. It is expanding the U. S. diplomatic, cultural, technical, commercial, and financial presence and activities. Finally, it is assisting oil exporters to employ their rapidly growing incomes in a constructive way, supportive of the international financial system.
Although the Persian Gulf area is vitally important, both economically and politically, the U. S. military presence has been limited to the Middle East Force which consists of a converted amphibious warfare ship, which serves as flagship, and two destroyers. The two smaller ships rotate from the Sixth Fleet on a frequent basis and spend most of their time patrolling the western Indian Ocean and making port visits. U. S. strategy has been aimed at building up the military muscle of the two states it regards as the major powers in the region and long-time friends and anti-Communists: Saudi Arabia and Iran.
U. S. Foreign Military Sales Program: Despite awareness of the burden which armaments impose, the United States recognizes a continuing need for international defense cooperation to maintain peace and security. Accordingly, consistent with foreign policy interests, and with due regard to impacts on social and economic development and on local arms races, the United States sells to friendly foreign countries defense articles and services needed to equip and operate their military forces. All of these sales are made under the
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provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, as ^mended. This act spells out the general policies, proce-
res, and constraints under which the program must operate.
Among the most significant trends in arms transfers a JeCent years has been a shift to reliance upon credit cash sales, as opposed to grant aid, to supply the oeeds of our friends and allies. This is illustrated by the acr that the grant military assistance program world- W'de has been reduced from $5.7 billion worth in 1952 , . million or less in recent years. Conversely, sales, ^ ich began in 1950, have grown to a total of $8 1 'on for fiscal year 1974 and accounted for 90% of the °tal United States arms transfers that year.8
e most dramatic increase has been in the past CVen years. From $921 million in 1970, U. S. arms sales r°Se t° $3.8 billion in fiscal 1973, to $8.2 billion in year 1974, and in fiscal year 1975 to $9.3 billion. °St °/ these U. S. arms sales have been to a handful of °Untries in the Persian Gulf. Specifically, they accounted for $4 4 billion of the fiscal year 1974 total /^) and for $4.3 billion in fiscal year 1975 (46%).9 he field of arms sales is extremely complex. Many sell muSt considered in making a decision to or not to sell. These include recognition of the ^pressed desires of another sovereign state, an evalua- °n of the defense needs of that state, the economic mpact of the purchase on that state, the overall rela- °nship of the U. S. and the nation in question, and e anbcipated reaction of other states. These are all _e evant considerations and are combined in making a • §ment of what would best serve the long-term lnterests of the United States.
One official statement concerning the guidelines
which go into the decision to approve a specific sale and which apply across the board to all countries specifies that:
"Sales are only made when they will further the foreign policy objectives and serve the best interests of the United States. Whenever practicable, foreign countries are encouraged to purchase directly from U. S. commercial sources rather than through the Department of Defense. We discourage the purchase
of items we believe the foreign country does not need or cannot afford.” 10
In addition to these general criteria, there are some special considerations which apply to the Persian Gulf area. The United States has continuing strong security interests in the maintenance of important defense facilities in the area and in the independence and security of all countries, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia. Our foreign policy and security interests relative to Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates have also become important to the Free World. The stability of, and access to, the Persian Gulf area, with its tremendous oil reserve, is essential. The U. S. foreign military sales program has become one of the key elements in maintaining U. S. security interests in this critical area. With respect to the smaller countries on the Arabian Peninsula, security assistance is considered to be, primarily, a regional matter. Moreover, the United States has viewed with favor efforts at regional cooperation among the smaller countries.
Prior to approval, each proposed military sale to the countries of the gulf area is weighed against a composite of the above policies and criteria. Additionally, it is further reviewed by the Middle East Task Group in the
Department of Defense. Membership of the group includes representation from the Office of Secretary of Defense, National Security Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force.11
Arms Supply: Military exports to the gulf region can be seen only in the broader context of a policy which combines important political, economic, financial, and technical assistance with cooperation on a regional basis. Within this framework, military exports are an important factor in the ability of the United States to maintain close and productive relations with the gulf region. Those states view their military supply relationship with this country as an inseparable part of a total relationship which has important benefits for America as well as for them. An unwillingness to respond to requests for military equipment and services which they perceive as reasonable in their circumstances could raise doubts about the constancy of that relationship and jeopardize this nation’s larger political and economic objectives, without necessarily affecting the flow of military equipment to those states. The United States cannot claim friendship and interest in one breath and deny goods or services which have life-or- death importance with the other.
U. S. military supply policy concerning the Persian Gulf region is not the result of a series of improvisations prompted by a suddenly discovered energy problem. This nation has had long-standing military aid programs in the area, centered in Iran and Saudi Arabia and going back as far as World War II. Today, these countries are moving from a position of weakness to one of strength and independence. The major U. S. role today can be that of selling equipment and providing necessary military and technical advice.
Iran is the largest purchaser of defense equipment from the U. S. Government under the Foreign Military Sales Act. From fiscal year 1965 through 1974, Iran bought about $7.3 billion in defense articles and defense services. These purchases have been based on the desire to modernize her armed forces on a long-term basis in order to meet defense requirements into the 1980s. Delivered, or under order are F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers, F-5E Tiger fighters, P-3 Orion patrol planes, and 80 of the U. S. Navy’s newest jet fighter, the F-i4 Tomcat. Also ordered are C-130 Hercules cargo planes and aerial tankers.
Iran already has the world’s largest fleet of military hovercraft, bought from the British, and soon may become the largest owner of military helicopters. Other items, either delivered or on order from the United States, include an air-defense network, antitank missiles, air-to-ground and surface-to-air missiles and four
tyruance-c\iss guided missile destroyers which are to be U1 c in an antiair warfare configuration.12 Sales programs to Saudi Arabia cover a fairly broad The Saudis have bought F-5 jet fighters to replace
0 er aircraft. Since 1972, the United States has been assisting the Saudis to expand their small Navy by the proposed ac^ltlon about 20 small ships, construction
s ore installations, and training programs. America is ^ so helping them modernize the Saudi National Guard an mternal security force). American companies are continuing to assist in improving Saudi Arabia’s air th CnSe CaPak^lt:*es and, in addition, have been assisting ^ ^13^ Army 10 its mobility modernization pro-
Kuwait became eligible for sales under the Foreign uitary Sales Act on 17 June 1971. The United States,
1 the request of the Kuwait Government has sent fen^^ Sma^ military teams to study that nation’s de-
se requirements and make suitable recommendations tr'1 ,rno<^ernizati°n efforts. The United States has not ^le t0 Pressure the Kuwaitis into buying U. S. equip... ’ ln Part because of the long tradition of British 1 ltary assistance to that sheikhdom. Hopefully, this °sture will generate trust and respect.14 ^ rnan, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Jan113^5 kecame eligible for U. S. military sales in gibl^is Their purchases, to date, have been negli-
derived From Foreign Military Sales: "The MVUSt ^onS'range problem facing the U. S. in the East,” a Pentagon official noted in 1973, "is *ng a way to get the Arabs to spend their dollars ord °Ut tkem get control of our economy.”16 In
to meet this challenge, the Nixon administration pted the strategy of promoting substantial arms sales t0,|he Persian Gulf.
e sales strategy was implemented against the back- ble skyrockctlng °il prices which were responsi-
0r an unprecedented shift in money and economic er to the oil-exporting countries, primarily, the countries of the Persian Gulf. To quote George Aff ' ^Ce’ a ^ormcr Under Secretary of State for Political «^airs who has spent a lifetime in the oil business: othing this drastic has occurred before in modern ”^es, if ever. Through the Marshall Plan after World ^ar II, the U. S. transferred 14 billion dollars in aid to estern European nations over a period of years. The ctro-dollar transfers we are now seeing are many times at arnount in one year alone.”17 oth Western Europe and Japan have built up a j CavY dependence on Arab oil. Although historically ess dependent on Persian Gulf oil, U. S. demand indi- at°rs have been pointing to the need for drastically
increased crude oil imports in the future. In a paper prepared for the International Institute for Strategic Studies 16th Annual Conference held at Brighton, Sussex, in September 1974, Geoffry Kemp noted that, in terms of the oil-rich countries, "it is beyond the bounds of credibility to think that Britain, France, the U. S. or even the Soviet Union would turn down billion dollar arms deals which guaranteed future oil supplies.”18
In addition to solving the problem of how to recycle the Persian Gulf’s new-found wealth of petro-dollars, the U. S. foreign military sales program has many other favorable aspects when looked at from the national security point of view. These include: standardization of equipment, doctrine and training; development of close military and political relations between the United States and Persian Gulf states; assistance with the maintenance of base and overflight rights; support for U. S. production and technology; aiding the U. S. balance of payments; providing a broader U. S. logistics support base through cooperative logistics arrangements; expanding the job market in the United States; lower unit costs for military items because of increased quantity production and increased amortization of research and development expenses.
Perhaps most important of all is the fact that the new military capability of these states resulting from our security assistance programs could reduce the likelihood of direct U. S. military involvement in the area and provide the President and the Secretary of State with an effective tool for the conduct of U. S. foreign policy.
Conclusions: In summary, then, our military exports to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian peninsula serve the U. S. national interest in several important ways:
► Support for the vital interests of the nations of the region is an integral part of the overall U. S. policy of encouraging friendly and mutually productive relations with those nations. Such a policy will also help the United States influence the postures of these countries in other areas of interest.
► To the degree that these nations are able and willing to assume responsibility for their own security, and for the stability of the gulf and peninsula, through the development of appropriate force structures, our own worldwide security posture is strengthened because we and they share many of the same strategic goals.
► Conversely, our refusal to meet requests for assistance in the vital area of national defense, when the nations concerned clearly prefer U. S. assistance to that of other countries, would seriously jeopardize our larger political and economic objectives in the region.
► Finally, such exports do bring economic benefit to the United States. Their cessation would be damaging
to the domestic economy in terms of unemployment, the cost of military supplies for U. S. forces, and our own level of military preparedness.
Recommendations: The gulf region’s oil wealth and resultant political clout are recognized facts of the day. Clearly, whoever controls the Persian Gulf controls the industrial lifeblood of Western civilization, at least until alternative sources of abundant cheap energy can be developed and marketed on a global scale. There is little the United States can do in the next decade to change the growing dependence on Mid-East oil. A continuing and orderly flow of oil from the area is essential in terms of our national security, as well as our economic well-being.
Fortunately, the U. S. has developed friendly and mutually rewarding relations with most of the gulf states. This is important. As noted by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, U. S. State Department, the Arab world "seeks American technology and managerial know-how for their development programs. Moderate Arab leaders also look to military assistance from the United States as a buttress to their modernization and as a means of protecting themselves against more radical forces in the ^'Current Policy: Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula.” Department of State Publication 8821, #2, p. 1. Released June 1975 by the Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services.
2The United Arab Emirates, a loose confederation of seven independent states—Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras Al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm Al-Qaiwain—was constituted in 1971 and 1972.
3 Elizabeth Monroe, "The Changing Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf" The Report of an International Seminar at the Center for Mediterranean Studies, (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1972), p. 27.
* Ibid., p. 15.
5U. S. House of Representatives. U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee' on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
6Joseph Kraft, "Letter from Saudi Arabia,” The New Yorker, 20 October 1975, p. 119.
7 Department of State Publication 8821, #2, op. cit. p. 3.
8Lt. Gen. H. M. Fish, USAF, Director Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Foreign Military Sales,” Commanders Digest, 29 May 1975.
9Edward M. Kennedy, "The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or Arms Control?”, Foreign Affairs, October 1975, p. 14. Congress appears on the verge of phasing out gift military aid around the world—a mainstay of U. S. foreign policy since World War II —in favor of selling weapons on credit. As noted in The Virginian-Pilot of 28 October 1975, the Senate voted in 1974 to phase out military aid over a period of three years and House International Relations Committee Chairman Thomas E. Morgan said he believes the House will now agree although details have yet to be worked out. Some
Our relationship, therefore, is based on a mutuality of interests. The United States stands ready to suppott regional efforts at cooperation, to expand trading relationships, and to provide advice and technology where needed and wanted. These states have the will, financial resources, and growing capability to assure their security. This aspect of our relationship should, therefore, remain one geared to encouraging regional security. Toward this end, it is essential that the United States continue to respond positively to reasonable requests for arms and training needed for self-defense.
H Commissioned in 1944 through the midshipman school of the University of Notre Dame, Commander Remick received his B.A. in business administration from the College of William and Mary and his M.A. in international politics and economics from the University of Detroit. He is a graduate of the Defense International Logistics Management Course. While on active duty, his assignments included command of USS LST-692, LST-991, and the U. S. Naval Reserve Training Center, Pontiac, Michigan. He also served as executive officer, Office of Naval Research, New York and head, Planning Division, Staff of the Commandant, Fifth Naval District. At the dose of World War II, be was assigned as acting U. S. Naval Representative (Afloat) Hong Kong, British Crown Colony. Since retirement in 1970, Commander Remick has worked as a training systems specialist and is now program analyst/manager for the International Logistics Office of the Naval Education and Training Support Center, Atlantic, in Norfolk, Virginia.
exceptions will probably be made in phasing out military aid with it being continued to a few countries as payment for U. S. base rights.
10 Fish, op. cit.
11 Richard R. Violette, Director, Sales Negotiations, DSA. "DoD Security Relationships with Persian Gulf States,” Commanders Digest, 12 September 1974.
12 "Persian Gulf: Where Big Powers are Playing a Risky Game”. U. S. News and World Report. 10 Mar 1975, p 50.
13U. S. House of Representatives. The Persian Gulf, 1974: Money, Politics, Arms, and Power. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1975.
uIbid.
15 Ibid.
16Quoted in Michael T. Klare. "The Political Economy of Arms Sales,” Society, September/October 1974, p. 48.
17Avalanche of Oil Money—Beyond All Expectations”, U.S. News and World Report, 24 Mat 1975, p. 51.
18Geoffry Kemp. "The Military Build-up: Arms Control or Arms Trade?” The Middle East and the International System.
19"The United States and the Middle East,” an address by Alfred L Atherton, Jr., made before the 108th Annual Convention Installation Banquet of B’nai B'rith, District 6, at Omaha, Nebraska on 30 June 1976. Department of State Bulletin, 2 August 1976, p. 174.