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A smiling Sergei Gorshkov, seated, seen here discussing the July 1968 Operation Sever with the commander of the Polish Navy, has made many public statements; but most becloud rather than clarify. The central question remains, “What role will the Soviet Navy play to further Soviet foreign policy aims by measures short of
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The major conclusion of a recent study of Soviet naval strategy held that strategy to be essentially deterrent and defensive.* While this conclusion is basically correct, the Analysis does not go far enough in that the study examines only the question of Soviet naval strategy in the event of all-out war, of either the nuclear or the conventional
Varietv.
* See R. w. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy (Annap- olh, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1968) p. 160.
This weakness of the study is rather curious in view of the author’s definition of naval strategy:
The theoretical ideas underlying the intended development and employment of naval power to further the foreign policy aims of a state as well as the actual construction, deployment, and use of naval forces that are carried out in practice, [emphasis supplied]
The question which comes to mind—one which this study neither asked nor answered
—is, what role is assigned or contemplated for the Soviet Navy in order to further Soviet foreign policy aims by measures short of allout war?
Surely no nation, including the Soviet U nion, would resort to war in order to further its foreign policy aims if those aims could be achieved by other means. In fact, most of the Soviet leaders both talk and act as if they are uncommonly afraid of war. Although the statements of Nikita Khrushchev and other leaders indicating their pacific inclinations have been received with a great deal of scepticism in the West, there is good reason to believe that they mean what they say in this regard. The destruction visited upon the Soviet Union in World War II was greater than that suffered by any other belligerent nation on either side. Twenty million lives were lost in the Soviet Union as a result of the war, over one million dying of starvation in the city of Leningrad alone. They have not forgotten this and, in fact, remind themselves of it on several anniversary occasions during each year. No matter what the party theoreticians may say, the great formative experience of the Soviet Union .was not the Revolution of 1917, but World War II. This bloody heritage, coupled with an ideological confidence in the historical inevitability of “world proletarian revolution,” leaves them
with no compulsion to further the world revolution by the active use of military force'
Apart from the ideological commitment to the furtherance of the world revolution by means short of war, the Soviet Union, like other nations, has foreign policy aims which are determined by considerations of national interest. In fact, for all practical purposes, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union since about 1921 has been determined by considerations of national interest, and not by the ideological commitment to world revolution.
The Western maritime powers have long made effective use of seapower to further their national interests by discrete applications of seapower to influence events in the international political arena by means short of war' The United States, in particular, in the postwar period, has been able on numerous occasions to influence the course of events 'n such places as Lebanon, Laos, Cuba, Greece, the Taiwan Straits, and Vietnam, to mention just a few. The Soviet Navy, on the other hand, has for most of its history lacked both the necessary elements of naval power and the operational experience required for it to act in effective support of Soviet foreign policy'
Since we have identified naval strategy with the furtherance of foreign policy aims, a brief examination of some aspects of Soviet foreign policy is in order. On 6 January 196b Premier Khrushchev delivered a widely discussed speech in which he condemned world wars because of their terrible destructiveness, attacked limited wars because they might develop into world wars, but identified a third category of wars which he called “national-liberation” wars, and which he approved. “Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with people waging liberation struggles,” he said.
This speech aroused visions in the West of a militantly revolutionary policy whereby the Soviet Union was about to embark on a course of fostering and actively supporting revolutions around the world. A careful reading of the speech and an examination of the circumstances of its delivery, however, suggest otherwise. In December 1960, Khrushchev had signed a declaration of 81 Communist parties at a meeting held in Moscow. This declaration was a compromise document, drawn up in an attempt to reshape some
Semblance of unity in the “socialist camp.” the Chinese subsequently revealed, the oviet Party was forced to make several concessions to the more militant line of the Chinese, including the rejection of the fol- owing theses proposed by the Soviet delegation:
• That peaceful coexistence and economic competition form the general line of the oreign policy of the Socialist countries;
• That the emergence of a new stage in the Soneral crisis of capitalism is the result of Peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition;
• That there is a growing possibility of Peaceful transition to Communism.
The logic of the Chinese position tended to SuPport those critics of Khrushchev, both Tthin the Party and the military, who opposed the reduction of the armed forces and certain of his economic policies.
Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet Vv’as a personal report on the conference in 'vhich he attempted to introduce by the back hoor those theses which had been rejected at Tc insistence of the Chinese. He put par- Pcular emphasis on the possibility of “peace- U1 coexistence” and the implications that this ad for greater expenditure on consumer §°ods. The key to Khrushchev’s argument for a greater expenditure of funds on consumer Industries was the defensive strength of the 1°viet military. Because of this strength, and Pe developing strength of Soviet industry, he c°ntended that other national aims need no °nger be sacrificed to the needs of defense.
Khrushchev’s justification for “peaceful coexistence” was that it creates an environment avorable to the development of national- 1 deration movements. This suggests that the Purpose of Khrushchev’s speech was not to °utline a method of fostering revolutionary uPrisings around the world, but rather to Justify inaction.
The significance of the national-liberation Question for the role of the Navy is clear. If Pe Soviet government were planning for the c°ntingency of supporting national-libera- Uon movements militarily at various places ground the world, then they would have to evelop a corresponding naval sea lift and lQgistics capability, including the construction °f aircraft carriers. But such a naval force was
not developed. The developmental emphasis continued to be given to the submarine.
This emphasis on the submarine and a kind of “new school” of naval strategy was accompanied by a reliance on strategic nuclear deterrence similar to the “new look” of the Eisenhower administration. When the Berlin crisis brought the reduction of the armed forces to an end in mid-1961, it seems extremely doubtful that Khrushchev was pleased at this development. It meant the virtual defeat of a program of arms reduction which he had been advocating for years.
In the early 1960s, the capability of the Soviet Navy to further the foreign policy aims of the Soviet Union was very limited. This fact was to be conclusively demonstrated by the Cuban missile crisis. The most glaring weakness of the Soviet Navy at this time was a lack of operational experience. Soviet naval operations were confined for the most part to designated fleet operating areas or “polygons” located close to shore. Lengthy cruises to distant waters were the exception rather than the rule, and Soviet seamen seldom saw a foreign port. In 1961, for example, the Soviet guided missile cruiser Dzerzhinski (a Sverdlov- class cruiser with SSM) travelled a total of 13,000 miles, a feat of which the commanding officer was very proud. Since lengthy cruises were rare and unaccustomed adventures, each cruise was planned carefully and meticulously executed in order to derive the maximum training benefit. Much of this training, however, was wasted, because it was not sufficiently repetitive.
The average specialist in the Soviet Navy devoted one day a week to training in his specialty. Missilemen, an elite group, were given two days a week. It would be difficult to compare this situation with that of the U. S. Navy on the basis of the limited information available, but if this includes on-the-job training, it does not seem to be enough to ensure a high level of training and readiness.
The consequences of this limited readiness for naval operations in distant waters were dramatically demonstrated by the events of the Cuban missile crisis. It is not known whether the Soviet leaders seriously considered sending a surface ship escort to accompany the missile-carrying cargo ships to Cuba. If they did, they must have quickly rejected the possibility. Khrushchev was forced to threaten naval retaliation against the quarantine by use of his submarines to sink an American ship if a Soviet ship were stopped on the high seas.
Unfortunately for Khrushchev, the submarine is a particularly inappropriate weapon to use for measured applications of naval power. A surfaced submarine is extremely vulnerable and defenseless. A submerged submarine is invisible and therefore useless for the purpose of demonstrating commitment to a particular course of action. If the Soviet leaders had wanted to raise the stakes in the confrontation off the coast of Cuba without actually firing weapons, a surface escort for the Soviet cargo vessels would have been more to the point. The evidence indicates, however, that this option was closed to the Soviet decision-makers, owing to the lack of readiness of the Soviet surface fleet.
This demonstration of the shortcomings of a submarine naval strategy in support of foreign policy objectives should have lent credence to the warnings of surface ship proponents who had opposed overreliance on the submarine. Early in 1962, this policy had come under attack from naval spokesmen, such as Admiral Prokofiev, who had warned that “the idea of a one-sided absolutization of one or another type of force is alien to Soviet naval thought.”
The Cuban missile crisis did not bring about a re-evaluation of the role of the submarine as the primary weapon of the Soviet Navy. But, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, there appeared a new formulation of the mission of the Navy which seemed to imply a recognition of the foreign policy implications of naval strategy. “The Soviet Navy,” Admiral Sergei Gorshkov stated in an interview, “by the character of her armament of highly maneuverable forces and military capabilities is obliged to be prepared at any moment and at any point of the globe to secure the protection of the interests of our state.” Gorshkov noted that this formula applied particularly to the submarine fleet.
The significance of the phrase “protection of the interests of our state” is obscure. Its recurring use in describing the role of the Soviet Navy since October 1962 is interesting, because it has not been applied to any of the
other Soviet armed forces. In the context of Admiral Gorshkov’s original use of the phrase, it is quite clear that he was rendering an apology for naval inaction at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.
What is clear is that the concept of “protection of state interests” is distinguished from the defense of the country as such. Writing 1963, Gorshkov stated:
The Communist Party and the Soviet government are displaying wise foresight, taking all measures to insure that the armament and organization of our fleet correspond to its growing role in the defense of the country, and in the protection of its state interests.
Whatever Gorshkov had in mind in 1962 when he used the phrase, the definition of “state interests” was perhaps purposefully left vague. In subsequent years, there have been indications that the definition was being broadened. In 1965, the concept was aS" sociated with the growing Soviet merchant fleet. A Soviet Navy Day editorial observed that “the necessity of strengthening the naval might of the U.S.S.R. is stipulated also by the rapid development of our cargo and coni' mercial fleet, and the [consequent?] broadening of state interests of our country on the seas and oceans.”
At this point, it seems worthwhile to digress to an analysis of the political position of the Soviet Navy. The picture of the political position of the Navy presented in the study cited above is somewhat as follows:
• The Party’s interest in military strategy lS primarily budgetary, with a strong interest in the reduction of military expenditures to the lowest possible level. As a consequence of the fact that military strategic formulations have budgetary implications, the Party also dominates the formulation of strategy.
• As a result of this consideration, Navy leaders have a vested interest in the success ol the campaign by military spokesmen in opp0' 1 sition to the Party’s efforts to limit defense expenditures.
• On the other hand, because of the dominance of the unified defense establishment by Army officers, and a lack of understanding on the part of Party leaders of the requirements of sea power, the development of
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°rces, to join together with what Thomas !°lfe has called the “theater forces lobby” t(J support the establishment of large conventional forces and the development of a Uiilitary strategy based upon their use.
. That this development has not taken place ls probably the result of the budgetary proCedures of the Soviet government. If the Procedure were first to define defense requirements on the basis of a comprehensive strategy formulated on rational grounds, and ^en to allocate the funds necessary to meet nese requirements, an alliance among the ^conventional” arms of the Soviet armed orces would make a great deal of sense. But > as seems to be the case, the upper level of t*efense expenditures is set arbitrarily on the asis of how much the Party leadership is filing to spare from other uses, then any Ormulation of defense requirements that enhances the position of the Ground Forces
Soviet naval strategy and allocation of funds to the naval budget have been adversely affected and will probably continue to be.
In reality, the institutional loyalties and Political positions of the Soviet military and Party leaders are considerably more complex than this. In the first place, there is no longer a single military institution in the Soviet defense establishment which can be referred to as “the Army.” The services of the Soviet armed forces are now the Ground Forces, the ^ir Defense Forces, the Long Range Air forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and die Navy. Those forces that were formerly United in the Red Army can no longer be ^tewed as sharing a community of interests. The Army” no longer speaks with one voice. This situation has undoubtedly enhanced the Position of the Party in the formulation of defense policy.
That service which has been most adversely affected by the Party’s efforts to eeonomize on defense expenditures has been die Ground Forces. For a time in 1964 and ^65, the Ground Forces command was even abolished as a separate command. Not surprisingly, the most outspoken opponents of die Party’s policies of reduction of the armed forces and defense expenditures have been Spokesmen for the Ground Forces. On the ace of it, it would seem to be logical for the
can only detract from that portion of the budget allocated to the Navy. Under these circumstances, the Navy could be expected to oppose a strategy based on theater warfare and a reliance on “multimillion-man armies.” Such has actually been the case.
It is true that in the period following Khrushchev’s speech of January 1960, on the reduction of armaments, certain naval spokesmen expressed opposition to his policies. Several statements were made by defenders of surface ships in support of a continuing requirement for a surface Navy. Khrushchev’s attack on conventional forces, it must be remembered, also extended to military aviation and, by implication, to naval aviation. It is not surprising that defenders of naval aviation also spoke out in opposition to Khrushchev’s “new look.”
It seems likely, therefore, that the overflights of U. S. aircraft carriers by Soviet naval air units beginning early in 1963 were motivated less by a desire for external propaganda than by an effort on the part of advocates of the naval air arm to demonstrate for internal consumption that naval air could still play an important role in modern warfare. If there were at the same time still a few who advocated building Soviet aircraft carriers, this demonstration would have the added effect of repudiating their arguments.
From about mid-1963, naval opposition to the defense policies of Khrushchev was less and less vocal, and leading naval spokesmen began expressing deep satisfaction with the allocation of resources to the Navy. This continued to be the case even after the fall of Khrushchev. The most plausible explanation for this fact is that by this time the decision had been made to retain naval aviation and to continue a limited program of building major surface warships. Thus, it appears that the demands of spokesmen for naval aviation and surface ships were being met. Ground Forces spokesmen, however, continued to oppose Khrushchev’s policies.
For example, after the intensification of direct American involvement in the Vietnamese war in February 1965, the military leadership opened a new phase in the strategic debate. In March, an Army spokesman, Colonel Larionov, wrote an article attacking excessive reliance on missile forces, even in nuclear war. He noted that the United States was building up forces appropriate for a prolonged war and made a strong case that the Soviet Union should do likewise. In the same month, General Rotmistrov, Assistant Defense Minister, published an article opposing economizing on defense. In what was clearly intended as an admonition to the Soviet political leadership, Rotmistrov observed, “the aggressiveness of imperialism forces the Communist Party and the whole Soviet people to raise constantly the military might of the Soviet homeland, to develop the national economy and all other branches of state construction in the U.S.S.R. in the interest of raising its defense capability.”
A few months later a reserve lieutenant colonel, G. Miftiev, presented an elaborate case for the necessity of multimillion-man armies, even in the nuclear age. He opposed the concept that the increased firepower of modern weapons could replace manpower in warfare, for three reasons:
• Soviet military doctrine envisages general war covering large areas of the globe in theater warfare;
• Modern weapons technology allows fewer men to cause more damage, but the use of nuclear arms will be accompanied by large losses of personnel whose replacement will be difficult. For this reason, the personnel on hand at the beginning of the war must be prepared to conduct active military operations, independent of mobilization measures;
• The technological revolution has expanded the requirement for maintenance personnel and reduced the relative weight of combat forces in the total of military personnel.
Despite the fact that such arguments could also be used to support an increase in the size of the Navy, naval leaders did not lend their support to these dissident Army elements. A Navy Day editorial in Krasnaya ^vezda asserted that, “thanks to the attention and concern of the Party, the government, and the whole Soviet people, our Navy has developed in full accordance with the aims and missions of a great naval power and plays an important role in the defense capability of the fatherland.” The article went on to claim that the Soviet Navy had everything required in co-ordination with the other services to defend the state interests of the Soviet Union. Admiral
Vladimir Afanasievich Kasatonov, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy also made the claim that the Navy now has everything necessary to repel any aggressor m co-ordination with the other services. Thus, by implication, the other services must also have all that is required. This opinion was definitely not shared by such ground forces spokesmen as Larionov, Rotmistrov, and Miftiev.
Although it is generally true that the Soviet Navy is subordinated to a high command staffed entirely by Army officers, there have been in recent years some interesting indications that the Navy is enjoying increased prestige among the Soviet military establishment. When Admiral Gorshkov was named Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, he was at first only a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, although his predecessor, Admiral Nikolay Kuznetsov, had been a full member. He remained in candidate status at the Twenty- first Party Congress in 1959. At the Twenty- second Congress in November 1961, however, both Admiral Gorshkov and his First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Vitalii Fokin, were elected to full membership. This was a good indication that the influence of the Soviet Navy had increased greatly between the two congresses.
When Admiral Fokin died in January 1964, his successor, Admiral Kasatonov, did not assume Fokin’s place on the Central Committee. Kasatonov is, however, a member of the Central Committee of the Communis1 Party of the Ukraine. At the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU in April 1966, two Soviet Admirals, Admiral Amel’ko, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Lobov, Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Fleet, were elected to candidate membership in the Central Committee. The only other military officers whose positions were improved at the Twenty-third Congress were the district commanders of five of the most important military districts, who were elected to candidate membership. This suggests the possibility that in many respects the Soviet Navy was in a stronger political position than it had been when it was organized into a separate ministry.
Other indications of increased naval in-
fluence include the promotion of Gorshkov to lhe rank of Fleet Admiral in 1962, a rank which had not been filled since Kuznetsov’s forced retirement in 1955. At the same time, Gorshkov was promoted to the position of deputy Defense Minister in addition to his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet ^avy. In 1965, Admiral Kasatonov was also Promoted to the rank of Fleet Admiral.
On the basis of protocol, there are other discernable signs of the growing prestige of the Navy. When Admiral Fokin died in 1964, Admiral Gorshkov’s signature to the obituary appeared directly below the signatures °f the First Deputy Secretaries of Defense, and above those of any other service chief. This same pattern was observed in the signatures to the obituary on the death of Marshal Malinovsky, Minister of Defense, in 1967. This indicates the probability that the Soviet Navy currently enjoys higher prestige Nothin the military hierarchy than even the Strategic Rocket Forces.
The sources of the increased prestige of the Soviet Navy with the political leadership are not known. In a negative sense, it appears that ~*e naval hierarchy never challenged the leadership and judgement of the Politburo to dje extent that many “Army” leaders did. f he consequent establishment of friendly relations with those persons located at the center °f political power may have helped the Navy achieve its more moderate aims in rebuilding Ihe fleet. The connection between the Navy’s r°le and the growing importance of the Soviet Merchant marine has already been cited. Admiral Kasatonov has identified the power °f the Soviet Navy with the “power of our 9rst class industry,” suggesting that some ties ^th industrial managers may have helped cuhance the Navy’s position. If this is so, ties would probably be with the more glamorous and fashionable industries as- s°ciated with missile and space programs, ^Uch as electronics and the chemical industry. °Uch ties might go far toward explaining the overwhelming missile orientation of the Soviet Navy of the 1960s.
From this examination of politico-military Nations in the Soviet Union, it can be seen lFat, in the first place, the “Army” does not T>eak with one voice, and, moreover, the Navy does not always speak with one voice on
matters of naval strategy. Furthermore, it can be seen that the Navy does not ally itself with other “conventional” forces to demand that more consideration be given to the allocation of funds to a kind of “theater forces” lobby. It only remains to be shown that even the Party does not speak with one voice in defense matters.
A recent example of the divisions within the Party hierarchy over questions of defense expenditure took place during the strategic debate of 1965. The crux of the debate was the question of whether to increase defense expenditure or increase expenditure for consumer goods production.
Speaking at the anniversary celebration of the October Revolution in 1964, Leonid Brezhnev stressed the importance of contacts with the West and opposed the continuation of the arms race. In February 1965, Alexander Shelepin headed a party delegation to Mongolia. During the course of his visit, he related that the party plans for 1965 were to give attention to an “increase in the tempo of those branches of industry which make consumer goods, and with the problem of developing agriculture.” He drew the logical consequences of this emphasis for Soviet foreign policy, pointing out that the success of the program “demands favorable external conditions.” “We need peace,” he said, “and
in our foreign policy we, as always, shall consistently and unflaggingly fight for the realization of the principles of peaceful coexistence.” This position seems to represent the consensus of the political leadership at the beginning of 1965.
The increased tempo of the Vietnamese war, however, prompted further thoughts on the issue. Speaking in Baku in May 1965, N. V. Podgorny, the Soviet head of state, commented:
There was a time when the Soviet people deliberately accepted certain material restrictions in the interests of the priority development of heavy industry and the strengthening of our defense capability. This was fully justified, because ... a defensive socialist state would have been inevitably crushed by imperialism.
He went on to conclude that such ideas are no longer correct. That this viewpoint was not shared by the whole Party hierarchy was revealed a few days later, when Mikhail A. Suslov spoke out in opposition to Podgorny. Speaking in Bulgaria, Suslov observed:
In conditions where imperialist powers pursue an arms race and unleash military aggression in various parts of the world, our party and government must maintain the defense of the country on the highest level .... All this, of course, demands from the Soviet people considerable material sacrifices, expenditures of a significant portion of the national income.
By mid-July, Premier Kosygin, who had pre-
viously straddled the fence on the issue, came out against “economizing on defense.”
The issue had not yet been settled, however. The next round of discussion took place on Navy Day 1965. On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the defeat of Germany m Europe in World War II, it was decided to award each of the four Soviet fleets the Order of the Red Banner for exploits in World War II. These awards were presented by four members of the Presidium: Kosygin, Podgorny! Kirilenko, and Shelepin. Each of these men took the occasion to express his views on the question of defense.
Speaking before the Northern Fleet, Shelepin reviewed the terrible destruction of World War II and implied that the destruction brought about by a nuclear war would be vastly greater. This was an implicit case for a policy of peaceful coexistence. He praised the decision of the March Plenum to improve the development of agriculture and explained that the Party was currently searching for ways to raise the standard of living of the Soviet people. “To the Central Committee and to the government,” he said, “there is not at this time a more important task than to improve the lives of the Soviet people.”
Podgorny’s position on defense was also similar to the views he had expressed in May. Kosygin, on the other hand, pointed out that “aggressive forces” headed by the United States were conducting provocations against peace-loving peoples. “In these conditions,” he asserted, “the Communist Party, her Central Committee, and the Soviet Government consider care for the strengthening of the defensive might of the country their primary duty.” Kirilenko, speaking to the Pacific Fleet, took a position which was similar to that of Kosygin.
There is certainly a wide disparity between Shelepin’s position that the Central Committee and the government have no more important task than to improve the lives of the Soviet people and Kosygin’s simultaneous statement that the Party and the government consider strengthening the defensive might of the country their primary duty. The dispute ultimately was resolved in favor of a slight increase in the Soviet defense budget, the first increase in the overt defense budget in three years. This was not to be the last time that
lhe issue was to arise, but this round in the debate over defense expenditures is a good ^lustration of the fact that there are cracks lri the monolithic facade of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
As a result of the evidence examined above, 11 is proposed that a better description of the Political situation of the Soviet Navy would So somewhat as follows:
• The interest of the Party in questions of military and naval strategy is primarily, but not entirely, budgetary. The budgetary Questions relate not only to the question of how much money should be allocated to defense, but also to the implications of defense strategy for investment in associated industries. The Navy, the Air Defense Forces, and the Strategic Rocket Forces could be expected to have advocates within the electronics and missile-associated industries, whereas the Ground Forces would have ad- v°cates associated with the more traditional heavy industries. Partly as a result of this, and partly as a result of genuine differences
opinion on the dangers of war inherent in the international situation, the Party is divided over questions of military strategy in Seneral and the adequacy of current defense eXpenditures.
• As a result of Soviet budgetary procedures, the Navy does not have a vested interest in
| supporting the claims of the Ground Forces advocates to more defense expenditures, because an increase in the allocation of resources to the Ground Forces would in all likelihood take place at the expense of the other ser- vfees.
• Even though the Soviet High Command is dominated by officers with an Army background, this does not necessarily diminish the Position of the Navy in defense policy formu- tation. The Navy also has its advocates within the Politburo and Secretariat of the tarty. It would otherwise be difficult to explain the recent indications of increased naval Prestige. This increased prestige has coinCided with an increase in the level of Soviet naval activity.
It has been pointed out that, at the time °I the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Navy Vvas not an operationally ready force. From fhe public discussion of naval affairs early ltl 1963, it becomes clear that the decision had
been made to break loose from the confines of the regions close to shore where the Soviet Navy had traditionally operated. This was not a decision which could be easily implemented, owing to shortcomings in the training of Soviet naval personnel.
It would be tempting to conclude that the increase in naval activity was a result of a desire to project Soviet power abroad in support of nefarious political enterprises of Soviet foreign policy. This does not, however, seem to be the case. The decision appears to have been based rather on the necessity of operating their defensive naval forces further at sea than in the past in order to counter the increased range of Western naval weapons. The weapons of greatest concern were the fast carrier strike force and the Polaris submarine.
Admiral Gorshkov expressed pleasure at the results of the first ventures into the open sea. “In a series of instances,” he claimed, “our ships and naval aviation have demonstrated operational and active actions as a result of which some foreign governments became convinced that they could not consider their aircraft carriers and submarines ‘invisible,’ ‘untouchable,’ and in the event of war ‘invulnerable’ in whatever areas they may be located.” He informed naval personnel that they must be capable of going wherever the orders of the fatherland send them to carry out their missions in support of the state interests of the Soviet Union and to remain there as long as necessary. “For the Soviet Navy,” he asserted, “1964 is the year of the routine long cruise.” This juxtaposition of naval actions intended to demonstrate the vulnerability of Western naval forces with the concept of support of the state interests of the Soviet Union suggests that the latter concept might include the idea of deterrence as distinguished from defense.
Not long after the United States began deploying Polaris submarines to the Mediterranean as Jupiter and Thor missiles were withdrawn from Turkey, Italy, and Great Britain, Soviet naval vessels began to appear more frequently in that sea. By the summer of 1964, Soviet naval units were a frequent sight in the Mediterranean. In the Pacific, at about the same time, Soviet naval forces began to make sporadic appearances in the Philippine
Sea. These small task forces were quite often engaged in exercises seemingly associated with antisubmarine warfare. This development took place not long after the establishment of a Polaris submarine support facility at the island of Guam on the eastern edge of the Philippine Sea.
The circumstances of this broadened naval activity, as well as public statements of Soviet naval and political leaders, indicate that the primary purpose of these patrols in the Pacific and in the Mediterranean was originally to develop a “counterforce” or “damage-limiting” capability against Polaris submarines and carrier task forces. This accords well with the statement that the Soviet Navy is essentially a defensive and deterrent force. There seems little doubt that at the beginning of this surge of naval activity the emphasis was on developing a capability useful in all-out war. “Proceeding from the positions of our military doctrine, and Soviet naval thought,” Gorshkov wrote in 1963, “unified views on the role and place of the Navy in conditions of nuclear-missile war have been worked out.”
As a corollary to the Soviet Navy’s increased operations Soviet vessels commenced to call more frequently at foreign ports. In 1964, “the year of the routine long cruise,” Soviet naval vessels called at ports in Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, England, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, The Netherlands, and Ethiopia, among others. In the next three years, France, the United Arab Republic, and Algeria were added to the list. In recent years, Soviet Navy Day statements have repeatedly called attention to the usefulness of these visits for the purpose of “strengthening friendly relations” between the Soviet Union and other countries.
The increasing frequency of Soviet naval visits to U.A.R. ports is of particular interest. In September 1965, a group of destroyers and submarines called at Port Said. In March 1966, five more ships, including a guided missile cruiser and two submarines, moored at Port Said for a five-day visit. In July, Egyptian naval units visited Sevastopol on the Black Sea, and in August, five Soviet naval vessels called at Alexandria. In November, five Soviet vessels, including two submarines and a guided missile destroyer, visited Algiers. Each visit included three or
four combatant ships which were accompanied by one or two support ships.
This increased activity in the Mediterranean was accompanied by rumors that the Soviets were attempting to establish naval bases in Egypt and possibly Algeria. Such rumors have been a recurrent theme ever since the Russians began playing a more active role in world affairs as early as 1955- They have yet to be supported by fact. In the Mediterranean, the Soviet Navy still relies upon anchorage areas in international waters for replenishment of fuel and provisions, aS well as for minor repairs. It would have to be said that the privilege of calling at Egyptian and Algerian ports has probably eased the task of supporting the ships of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron, but the facilitieS provided are considerably less than would be provided by a naval base.
It would also be easy to exaggerate the foreign policy benefits accruing to the Soviet Union by virtue of these visits. They do not> for example, demonstrate the ascendancy the Soviet Union over the foreign policy °f those nations whose ports are frequently visited. They do, however, provide the Soviet Union with a simple, inexpensive, and relatively effective way of demonstrating the friendly sentiments of the Soviet government to the governments of countries which are important to the foreign policy objectives °f | the Soviet Union.
When the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967 increased in intensity, the Soviet Union sen1 ten additional naval ships through the Dardanelles to augment the force of 15 or 20 ships already operating in the Mediterranean- Even after this force was augmented, however, it still confronted a vastly superior U. S- Sixth Fleet which, at that time, included three attack aircraft carriers and a number of cruisers. From this standpoint, the Soviet action raised more of a diplomatic than 3 military problem.
This action did, however, mark a watershed in the use of Soviet naval power. For the first time, Soviet naval units were used t0 demonstrate a foreign policy commitment during a crisis. The significance of this move was somewhat diluted by the fact that only after it was quite clear that the United States was not going to come to the aid of Israel) I
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A graduate of the University of Mississippi in 1958, Lieutenant Commander Cox served in the USS Cabildo (LSD-16) from 1958 to 1961. He completed a 47-week Russian language course at the U. S. Army Language School, Monterey, California, in 1962, and was assigned for one year to the U. S. Naval Communication Station, Adak, Alaska. After attending the U. S. tjaval Destroyer School, he served in the USS Higbee (DD-806) from 1964 to 1966. Since 1966, he has been jtttending Tufts University, Medford, Mass., where he is now a Ph D. candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
®nd after it was clear that Israel was not go- lng to advance beyond Suez, did Russian ships again visit Egyptian ports. A more dar- lng use of naval visits for the purpose of demonstrating Soviet commitment to Egypt took place in October following the sinking °f the Israeli destroyer Elath by Egyptian PT boats armed with the Russian Styx missile, fn this case, the Soviet presence may well have averted an attack on Suez by Israeli forces.
There is no evidence to indicate that the Soviet political leaders perceived the possible Political benefits of the increased operational activity of Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean and other areas when it was first Undertaken. Since about 1965, however, Jfaval leaders have stressed the political utility of friendly visits to foreign countries, f’here have also been some indications that the political leaders are more and more aWare of the benefits of “showing the flag.”
It is only since the Arab-Israeli war in 967 that the usefulness of such activities has been described in terms indicating a sharped awareness of their utility in projecting Soviet power abroad. Writing for the miliary press on Navy Day, 1967. Fleet Admiral t^asatonov observed: “ship visits facilitate the development and strengthening of friendly relations between the Soviet people and the Peoples of foreign countries, and they strengthen . authority and influence of our homeland in the lnternational arena.'"
There is some fear in the United States that recent Soviet naval developments indicate that they “plan to put themselves in a position where they could, if necessary, land forces to support friendly governments against attempted coups d’etat, as the U.S.A. and Britain did for the Lebanese and Jordanian regimes a decade ago.” Although such fears are not unreasonable, they are probably misplaced. There is little evidence to support the existence of such a plan. If the Russian naval or political leaders were planning for such operations, it seems unlikely that the question of limited war would be as little discussed in the military press as it is.
It is true that the Soviet Navy reactivated its marine force or “naval infantry” in 1964 and has been engaged in a program of training for amphibious warfare. This is, however, a limited force of about 6,000 marines and the evidence indicates the primary concern is training for operations in general warfare conditions along the periphery of the Soviet Union. It is also true that the Soviet Union has recently constructed three helicopter carriers. The purpose of these ships is not known for certain, but Soviet writers have long shown an interest in the use of helicopter carriers for antisubmarine warfare purposes. It seems most likely that this is the intended employment of these ships.
Thus, the picture of Soviet naval thought that emerges is that its primary attention is given to the question of general war, but an increasing amount of attention is being given to the use of sea power to further foreign policy objectives by non-belligerent demonstrations. The whole spectrum of possible military action that comes under the category of “limited warfare” has not been seriously examined by Soviet naval strategists.
This suggests that the danger of Soviet “adventurism,” if it exists, comes not from carefully planned and executed actions in support of client governments or revolutionary movements, but rather from possible miscalculation as to the danger involved in a particular action. With the possible exception of the Cuban missile crisis, the Russians have always been careful to avoid a direct confrontation of the United States at sea. The pattern of operations during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 fits in with this history. With all of the increased Soviet naval activity, including visits to foreign ports, it seems significant that naval excursions in the Pacific have been to the Philippine Sea, and not to the South China Sea. No Soviet naval ship has visited a North Vietnamese port since the outbreak of war in the north.
Although naval leaders have given some attention to the political uses of naval power in the last year, their attention still seems to be directed to the peaceful occasion for such use. For the foreseeable future, it seems unlikely that the Soviet government will use its developing sea power to support political action in opposition to what is perceived by them to be an important national interest of the United States. Whatever the term “protection of the state interests” means to the leaders of the Soviet Union, it can be said with reasonable assurance that it does not mean taking any undue risk of war with the United States. This has so far been true even in the case of so-called “wars of national- liberation.” Khrushchev and his successors have talked loudly about supporting such wars, but they have been careful to render such support in a manner which does not incur the risk of involving the Soviet Union directly in a widening war.
It is not necessary to perceive the Soviet Union as a malevolent dictatorship bent on world conquest by subversion or, where possible, by direct armed action, to perceive that the United States and the Soviet Union have very real conflicts of national interest. Such conflicts of interest abound in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. It is in these areas that the increasing operational mobility of the Soviet fleet presents the clearest danger.
While general war will probably continue to be the primary concern of the Soviet Navy, as well as the other armed services, the increased mobility and readiness of the Soviet fleet has already reaped political dividends in the Middle East. As the options of using naval power for political ends become more apparent and better understood by both naval and political leaders, the possibility of the Navy being used for such purposes will increase. The Cuban missile crisis demonstrated, among other things, that no matter how cautious the Soviet leaders have been in the past, and no matter how conscious they are of the “balance of forces,” they can and do make mistaken evaluations of what the United States will perceive as a matter of vital national interest. In the future, the possibilities for such miscalculations on the high seas will increase.
On the whole, the Soviet Navy is a potent force, second only to the U.S. Navy. It is, however, a poor second even for use in general war conditions for which it has been designed. It is even more poorly equipped and prepared for limited or local warfare. As we have seen, however, it has become more active recently as an instrument for the projection of Soviet power and influence abroad in the international arena. This is the area currently subject to the most uncertainties and where the possibility of a direct Soviet- American confrontation is most apparent- Such a confrontation would very likely result not from a carefully calculated move by the Soviet Union, but rather from a miscalculation. It is for such an eventuality that American naval thinking should be prepared.
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Unusual Academic Qualifications
While attached to the NROTG Unit, University of California, I had the honor of sitting next to the University’s president at one of the football games. During half-time, the band passed by us with its strutting, twisting and almost-horizontal leader in the van. To make conversation, I said to the president,
“Dr. Blank, I’ve often wondered what becomes of band leaders after they leave college.”
“I don’t know about the others,” replied Dr. Blank modestly, “but I became a college president.”
------------------------------------------------- Contributed by Captain Joel Newsom, U. S. Navy (Ret.)