This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Contents:
We Must Be on Drugs!—14 Making Do: A Better 688—14
The NRF Has More to Offer—14
The Storis and Coastal Defense—14
Two Seats—Until Now—14
Desert Shield: The First Lessons Learned—19
Evil FitReps—20
Air Wing Commander: Warfare Commander—21
Land War Myths and Realities—22
It’s the “M” Word— MOBILIZATION—145
Damnreservists!—145
“We Must Be On Drugs!”
(See F. W. Ault, pp. 46-51, December 1990
Proceedings)
Robert A. Wehrle—Hurrah for Captain Ault! His article rightly calls our current national war on drugs a “blueprint for failure.” Whether or not Vietnam also holds that distinction, there is no doubt that the two “wars” share many common attributes—not the least of which is that neither of them was ever declared.
However, I take exception with Captain Ault’s call for mandatory treatment programs. Some studies put the recidivism rate (relapse rate) for mandatory programs as high as 80%. This is clear evidence that they don’t work. This is not to say that subsidized drug treatment programs should not be made available— they should—but forcing people into them is not the answer.
Mandatory treatment programs are the same as any other supply-side approach to a problem. Without personal demand for treatment, there is little chance for success. The individual must recognize the need for change before change can take place.
served for more than 18 years in U.S. Naval Reserve after my active duty with the Gators, I find myself in substantial agreement with Captain Carson’s comments. But I have to disagree with his contention that current LSTs can’t “beach as they are supposed to beach.” My last training platform was the Bristol County (LST-1198). The Bristol County could, and did—I have proof.
Contract models of 20th century warships. Available in 1:96 and 1:192 scale.
Specializing in WWII US Navy warships. Restoration service available. Models restored for the Naval Academy and built for private collectors.
Send lor free brochure.
John Johnsey's Steel Navy Models 2301 Lambros Ave. Midland, Ml 48640
“Making Do: A Better 688”
(See A. K. Peppe, pp. 105-106, December 1990 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William L. Evans, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Using Lieutenant Com
mander Peppe’s figures, you can start a 100-day cruise with six microwave ovens and return with only two working. What happens if one of those breaks?
Based on an average cooking time of 5 minutes per serving, it would take 7.5 hours to feed 90 men one meal. Therefore, to allow each member access to a microwave four times a day, you would need a 30-hour day.
By tradition, the submarine service has the best-fed crews in the Navy. Commander Peppe’s idea will zap that tradition right out of existence.
“The Storis and Coastal Defense”
(See S. D. Beaston, pp. 69-70, December 1990
Proceedings)
R. W. Kerr—Lieutenant Beaston’s call for a standard cutter for all mission applications, built along the lines of an “improved Storis (WHMEC-38)” has several seemingly insurmountable problems that stem from basic hydrodymanic realities.
On the surface, the idea of a standard class is appealing, especially in a time when the Coast Guard is undergoing a severe re-evaluation of missions and fiscal supply. When viewed at depth, however, the demands of the Coast Guard mission requires a sensor-packed, wellarmed, high-speed platform suitable for antisurface and antisubmarine warfare. It also would require a crew profile in high in speciality ratings who become supercargo in all but defense-related missions. Paying a combat information center crew to watch a deck crew handle buoys is not sound application of manpower.
“The NRF Has More to Offer”
(See W. D. Schubert, pp. 76-77, October 1990; G. Carson, p. 20, December 1990 Proceedings)
Chief Operations Specialist John Ginter, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Having
“Two Seats—Until Now”
(See R. F. Dunn, p. 13, January 1991
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander William C. Zobel, U.S. Navy—I was very surprised to read Admiral Dunn’s commentary on the future of radar intercept officers (RIO) in naval aviation.
The F-14A/A(Plus) will be in the fleet for another 10-15 years. It is a bit early to signal the demise of the RIO at this time. With A-12 cancellation, the F-14 and follow-on Tomcat 21 could well be the next medium-attack platforms in Naval aviation if they survive the budget crunch. In any event, the days of singlemission aircraft are numbered. The Navy
No_______________ r-------------------------- Exp------
Virginia residents please add 4.5% sales lax($3N.I per n atch).
Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF) is not solely designed to be a fighter; it will be a strike-fighter. The F-14 community is presently pushing hard for an air-to- ground capability as well. If a single-seat aircraft is Admiral Dunn’s recommendation for future fighters, why are the Marines going to a two-seat version of the F/A-18? In 12 years of flying I have never heard one pilot come out of a two- versus-many air-combat duel and complain that another pair of eyes in the cockpit caused him to get his tail shot off.
I also take exception to the statement that single seat aircraft save taxpayers’ money. The added safety margin of a two-seat cockpit is ignored in the commentary. We’d have a lot more “smoking holes” over the years without RIOs. I know of at least ten instances where the RiO’s directive commentary to the pilot saved both lives and aircraft. A lot of taxpayers’ money was saved on aircraft, not to mention replacement aircrews.
Our technology can give us a next- generation Navy fighter that is multimission and superior in performance to anything else in the air—a force multiplier with a workload that requires a dual- seated aircraft.
Colonel John Marshall, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Deputy UAV Program Manager, Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent, MD—Congratulations to Admiral Dunn for taking a step in the right direction in advocating a reduction in aircrew for the next-generation fleet-air-defense fighter. Regrettably, he did not pursue his advanced-technology arguments to the correct and logical conclusion.
Every point he makes (e.g., penalties of adding aircrew, weight for required support systems, instrumentation; training and aircrew costs, as opposed to lighter, smaller, stealthier aircraft with greater endurance) is a major point to remove the aircrew completely. Cer- lainly, no one will refute Admiral Dunn’s statement that “the most important of that (tactical) information can be sorted out by even the most rudimentary versions of artificial intelligence.” With the onset of hypervelocity weaponry, laser technology, and high-G antiair weaponry, it is time to remove the weak link from the aircraft system by remoting the man-in-the-loop to a safe distance. In the face of increasing complexity, if a case can be made for replacing the radar intercept officer with a black box, so goes the Pilot.
The case for unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) is being made in every mission area. The Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency plans increased emphasis on UAVs, and may even be out of the manned-aircraft business in the near future. The supportive arguments for UAVs, including Admiral Dunn’s are growing. One UAV-acquisition executive recently stated that cost and operationaleffectiveness analyses indicate that even if manned aircraft were “free,” UAVs would be more cost-effective.
Building such an aircraft would mean the eventual end of the fighter community as we know it. Fighter pilots will be forced to join fighter RIOs in the control stations to share the knobology and to give the RIOs a bigger share of overstressed hands at the bar. Here, significant training can be accomplished using video wargames with the potential of converting training costs to training revenues. Top Gun will become Top Knob. Career patterns to flag rank will include captaining CUAVs. All this will require a major sociological realignment within Naval aviation. The present alignment is the biggest detriment to an innovative, hi-tech Star Wars (R2D2) approach.
Our technology can give us the next- generation Navy fighter as a no-seater UAV, superior in performance to anything in the sky at a cost the taxpayer can afford, and will save many fighter pilots in future hi-tech scenarios. The Navy should bite the bullet and press on.
‘“Desert Shield’: The First Lessons Learned”
(See M. N. Pocalyko, pp. 58-59, October 1990; M. C. Braunbeck, pp. 14-20, January 1991 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Phillip B. Nelson, U.S. Navy—The initial strikes that turned Operation Desert Shield into Operation Desert Storm dramatically demonstrated the Navy’s desire to expand the submarine’s mission capability— outlined by Captain John L. Bryon, (“A New Target for the Submarine Force,” January 1990 Proceedings—and the historical significance of Captain John G. Crommelin’s wisdom in preserving the Navy’s carrier aviation force (“Saving Carrier Aviation—1945 Style,” January 1990 Proceedings).
Captain Byron eloquently described what constitutes low-intensity conflict (LIC) and stated the need for the submarine force to become involved in LIC in a big way. He further described several submarine missions currently performed and pleaded: “Tell the public exactly what submarines do now in crisis response and contingency operations.” In my opinion, he failed to make a convincing case!
CHEERS
Our finely etched glasses will be a hit at your next get- together. Featuring the Naval Institute seal and clear weighted bottoms, our glass sets are available in a 12-ounce "tumbler" or 11-ounce "rocks" size.
$16.00 per set of six. For USNI Members Only.
To order, use the "Books of Interest" form in this issue of Proceedings. Be sure to specify which size.
5-YEAR GUARANTEE’
USS Constitution
Watch Polaris™
The USS Constitution Watch by Polaris is issued by the United States Historical Society. The face design shows the frigate USS Constitution in full sail. Launched in 1797, she is the oldest ship in the United States Navy still in commission.
The USS Constitution Watch has a fine quartz movement, sweep second hand and stitched genuine leather strap. The gold image of the frigate USS Constitution is surrounded by 12 gold stars on a navy blue background. The watch is a valuable remembrance of our heritage of the sea. Also included, a satin-lined velvet case.
'Guaranteed (or 5 Years Against Delects of Workmanship
YES! I want to reserve USS Constitution
Polaris Watch(es) at the issue price of $85, plus $2 shipping. I also will receive a flocked-velvet case to protect and display my watch.
- My check is enclosed for $
- Charge payment of $
□ VISA □ MasterCard
Name
Address-------------------- —------------------
City_______________ State-------------- Zip
United States Historical Society First and Main Streets • Richmond, VA 23219 Dept. PS3 1-800-446-7968
TEXAS, ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, WEST VIRGINIA. WASHINGTON. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS: MIDWAY. CORALSEA.FORRESTAL. SARATOGA, RANGER, INDEPENDENCE. KITTY HAWK. CONSTELLATION. ENTERPRISE, AMERICA, JOHN F. KENNEDY, NIMITZ. EISENHOWER, VINSON, ROOSEVELT. RETIRED: NAVY. MARINES, COAST GUARD, ARMY, AIR FORCE. EMBLEM: NAVY (officer), (officer retired). (C.P.O. E-7). (C.P.O. E-8), (C.P.O. E-9), (C.P.O. E-7 retired), (C.P.O. E-8 retired). (C.P.O. E-9 retired), (pilot wings), (flight officer wings), (aircrew wings), (dolphins), (seabees), (seals), MARINES, COAST GUARD. ARMY, AIR FORCE, TOP GUN and U.S. FLAG. CUSTOM: Any ship not listed above or any military unit is available as a custom cap. The minimum quantity for a custom cap is two per ship or unit (both with eggs or both without eggs). Custom caps must be ordered in even numbers. The top line is twenty spaces maximum and the bottom line is twelve spaces maximum. EMBLEMS ARE NOT AVAILABLE ON CUSTOM CAPS.
Caps are $14.00 each or $16.00 each with scrambled eggs. Add $2.50 for shipping. CA residents add 6.25%. Allow eight weeks for delivery. No CODs. HAMPTON COMPANY, Dept. R, P.0. Box 3643, Tustin, CA 92681
Ship and Aircraft
Photographs
Available
Choose from more than 35,000 photos dating back to 1883!
For order form and information write to:
Photo Service U.S. Naval Institute
Annapolis, Maryland 21402 (301) 268-6110
NAVAL, MARITIME MILITARY & AVIATION BOOKS
Our quarterly catalogs contain 48pp. and over 1500 entries of mostly out-of-print books.
Our reasonable prices and excellent service are enjoyed by people like you who use and enjoy books. Judge for yourself. Send only $4.00 for the next 4 issues.
ANTHEIL
BOOKSELLERS
2177P Isabelle Court No. Bellmore, NY 11710
v__________________ /
The submarine force can execute strike missions with Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs), insert and recover special forces, conduct clandestine intelligence missions, execute mine warfare, and control coastal waters. Undoubtably the U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) force was tasked to execute specific missions during the initial phases of Desert Storm. Unfortunately, the “ultimate stealth platform” is afflicted with many fundamental operational limitations that severely restrict its capability to execute diverse L1C tasking.
The Tomahawk missile is the high-tech strike weapon carried by our submarine (and surface) forces. In Desert Storm the Tomahawk is proving to be an extremely reliable, accurate weapon, effectively destroying vital Iraqi air defense systems, thereby enhancing fighter/strike aircraft survivability. Nominally, an attack submarine might carry 6 to 15 Tomahawks because of space restrictions and other mission requirements. While this loadout gives the SSN a strike capability, it does not represent “maximum ordnance on target” and, once expended, requires the submarine to retire from the theater of operations to be replenished. In addition, real-time targeting limitations necessitates employing the Tomahawks against specific fixed targets, while unanticipated targeting requirements, as experienced in the Gulf, may preclude the missiles’ utility until reprogrammed. So far, most of the estimated 200 Tomahawk engagements have been executed by surface combatants. These units possess the space and volume to carry useful loadouts of missiles and can replenish in-theater while under way. Thus, submarines are limited in sustained LIC operations. No LIC has ever been halted because the warring factions “thought” there was a U.S. submarine lurking off their coast.
Captain Byron let slip the true reason for advocating submarine warfare expansion when he stated, “Potentially, our modern submarines can also make a significant contribution in LIC. We must exploit that potential much more fully and quickly than we have to avoid having the funding rug pulled out from under the submarine force.” Simple translation: Protect the new Seawolf (SSN-21) at all cost!
While Captain Byron made a parochial and belated effort to thrust the U.S. submarine force into LIC mission scenarios, naval aviation is replete with events historically detailing its extensive involvement in LIC. There have been more than 250 international crises since 1945 and carrier battle groups (CBVGs), more than any other asset, have been sent to the scene. An aircraft carrier’s inherent power projection capability can be manipulated across the spectrum of simply influencing events to actual engagements. Not surprisingly, CVBGs provided the initial response of Operation Desert Shield, buying the time for the State Department to secure basing rights for U.S Air Force and U.S. Army units. Those same CVBGs are now providing a significant portion of the sorties necessary to sustain the Coalition’s integrated air war operations for Desert Storm.
Challenges to naval aviation’s missions have come from many sources in the past. One, the carrier/B-36 debate of 1949, referred to as the “Air Admirals Revolt,” focused on an attempt to consolidate naval air into the Air Force under the National Security Act of 1949. Fortunately, Navy Captain Crommelin articulated the facts and shrewdly maneuvered the sequence of events to the Navy’s advantage. His stand cost him his career, but his reasoning and vision have been etched in LIC events over the past 45 years.
By design, the U.S. submarine force is a highly trained and extremely professional mission-specific community. Current events have not changed this requirement. Obviously, the Gulf War has pointed out the need to maintain a highly trained and professional Air Force and Army. Equally obvious, the real LIC experts have been, are graphically demonstrating today, and must remain tomorrow—those who wear the “Wings of Gold.”
“Evil FitReps”
(See J. L. Byron, p. 90, December 1990
Proceedings)
Commander Brendan J. O' Donnell, U.S. Navy—Captain Byron has—provocatively—highlighted the ethical dilemma inherent in our fitness report system, but I believe the ethical conflicts in our daily routines are even more pervasive.
For example, a new pilot beginning an initial squadron tour (or perhaps even while undergoing flight training) will most likely be exposed to “padding” of flight time by other pilots who are trying to build their total flight hours more quickly than normal. This usually amounts to only one or two tenths of an hour per flight, but sometimes it can involve falsifying records for entire flights. Some required training-flight maneuvers may be written off without being performed because weather, the flight profile, or aircraft problems precluded them and the instructor does not want to delay the new pilot’s training progress (or perhaps because the squadron really needs to have that flight completed). Personnel qualification standards (PQS) training hems might be signed off without verifying that the new pilot mastered the required knowledge or actually performed the required task. Training and readiness Sports sometimes reflect levels of individual and crew qualifications that have not yet been attained, but which are expected to be reached in the near future. Qualification renewals might be backdated to indicate that the old qualifications had not really expired or, in the extreme, they might be completely '‘gundecked” (documented even though they did not happen).
During Combined Federal Campaigns and Navy Relief Fund Drives, the new officer may feel pressure to meet 100% unit-participation goals—even if it means donating money in the name of unit members who do not want to participate. Safety department officers at some point during their assignment will probably be Pressured by other segments of the squadron to not report minor incidents that will make the squadron look bad.
Aircraft readiness figures provide fertile ground for creative number crunching, and new unit commanders who demand improvements in these statistics frequently get their wish. My favorite aircraft readiness story—apocryphal or not —concerns a squadron with two aircraft that each needed an engine. Unfortunately, there was only one replacement engine on base. The squadron’s solution was to park both aircraft in the hangar and place the engine on a stand between them. Since either one of the aircraft could be brought to full-mission-capable (FMC) status in a few hours, the squadron reported both engine-less aircraft as FMC.
This list of ethical conflicts that a new pilot might face or observe is by no means all-inclusive, but it illustrates the magnitude of the problem. As naval officers we may pride ourselves on our standards of conduct, but we are constantly faced with situations that challenge our code of ethics. Small lies in our daily routine might be viewed as relatively harmless, but we should ask ourselves whether a climate that fosters small lies does not lay the foundation for bigger lies—say, like the recent A-12 scandal.
“Air Wing Commander: Warfare
Commander”
(See J. D. Norris, pp. 99-103, December 1990
Proceedings)
Lieutenant FezaS. Koprucu, U.S.Navy— Captain Norris makes an excellent argument for integration of the carrier air wing commander (CAG) into the composite warfare commander (CWC) organization. Utilizing the expertise and resources of the CAG, with an expanded staff, to fulfill the duties of the antisurface warfare commander (ASUWC) brings the warfare knowledge of different aviation communities (fighter, attack, airborne electronic warfare) to a sharper focus on this subject. His suggestion to temporarily assign a surface warfare officer to the CAG staff as a watch captain further enhances this pool of knowledge.
However, I must take exception with Captain Norris’s treatment to the problem of “Where is Blue?” A war of attrition is an unacceptable scenario for carrier battle groups, considering limited numbers of available aircraft and distant theaters of operation. A Blue-on-Blue engagement produces a victory for the enemy force without forcing him to risk his own assets. The confusion and stress of combat
Operational Depth
AAV
vv/f
^manned vehicles for undersea missions — Applied Remote r6chnology (ART) has the development team with operational ^Pth.
Depth of Experience
Our technical staff applies a total of 300 years of lessons learned through the development of over thirty types of operational undersea vehicle systems.
^6Pth of Resources — As a General Dynamics company, draws upon the full range of GD’s technology and Sources to accelerate UUV advanced development.
Depth of Commitment Our intense commitment to meeting our customers’ need of cost-effective UUV system develop ment has produced ART’s record of continuous growth in size, capacity and accomplishment.
When you look below the surface, you’ll want to work witti ART.
APPLIED R=iil©l= 1=
A GENERAL DYNAMICS COMPANY
9950 Scripps Lake Drive, Suite 106, San Diego, CA92131 Tel: (619)695-9411 • Fax: (619)695-9414
See us at Sea-Air-Space 91—Booth # 1502
PRESTON’S
188-M Main St Wharf, Greenport, NY 11944
You could shop for months and never find the hundreds of decorative nautical ideas illustrated in Preston's new catalog:
112 pages teeming with ship models, marine paintings, nautical lamps and clocks, ships' wheels, figureheads and scores of other nautical ideas for the Home.
'MIPS
^and
\EA
’TREE 112 Page Catalog for Lovers of
QHTPS %
THE SHIP OF YOUR CHOICE
r
&
PATROL CRAFT PRINTS do JIM KENNEDY 12180 S.W. DOUGLAS ST. PORTLAND, OR 97225 Full Color Brochure Available Upon Request.
Any One of Three Prints..................... $40.00
All Three Prints...................................... $100.00
ORIGINAL OIL PAINTINGS OF
A uniquely beautiful ship portrait painted expressly for you, and your heritage.
Deal directly with one of America’s Foremost Marine Artists and save up to 60% over retail.
PRICED FROM $550.
HERB HEWITT 10-R Druid Hill Ave., Dept. P Wakefield, MA 01880 (617) 245-5242 TOLL FREE: 800-323-9370
will undoubtedly increase the chance of friendlies mistakenly engaging other friendlies. Captain Norris points to the Navstar global positioning system and ring laser gyros as solutions to navigational inaccuracies that are blamed for Blue-on-Blue engagements. Technology increases the capability of naval forces to accomplish their missions, but does not compensate for the human errors that can lead to Blue-on-Blue.
The first line of defense must be strict compliance to procedures designed to prevent such foulups. Naval Warfare Publications delineate methods for identifying Blue forces, and knowing their locations. Captain Norris mentions procedures for retum-to-force profiles and avoidance of missile-engagement zones in the context of being a surface warrior’s justification for screaming at the “hapless aviators” who disregard them. Lack of an operable Mode IV identification- friend-or-foe (IFF) system is placed in the same category. There is no scorecard to update when a violation of these procedures is observed and the applicable unit is notified. Using similar procedures in an antisubmarine warfare scenario may be the only method for preventing subsurface Blue-on-Blue engagements. Instead of waiting for technology to provide solutions, we can prevent such mistakes by following written procedures, based on countless fleet exercises and operational experience.
Land War Myths and Realities
John M. Collins, Senior Specialist in National Defense, Library of Congress— What might justify U.S. and allied ground-combat operations against Iraqi armed forces? Four reasons often advanced during early February 1991 seem to have little validity. Four others could be reasonable.
- General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Norman Schwartzkopf, Central Command’s Commander-in-Chief, both want the U.S. Army in the act. Forget it. President George Bush and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney have repeatedly identified large-scale ground-combat operations as an undesirable option to be exercised only if other means fail to produce required results in an acceptable time frame.
- It is imperative that the war be over by mid-March, when Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, begins. False. Islamic forces have fought many wars during Ramadan.
- It is imperative that the war be over
before the Hadj (annual pilgrimage to Mecca in June). False. Participants almost certainly will include transnational terrorists and subversives. That might even be true if the shooting war ended today, however, because political, psychological, and unconventional conflicts will likely continue indefinitely thereafter.
- It is imperative that the war terminate before hot weather returns. Rubbish. The Middle East has experienced wars in hot weather since the Stone Age. U.S. armed forces can perform effectively in hot weather.
- Civilians in Kuwait will run out of food and water well before the Iraqi occupation force does. Ground-combat operations to rescue the Kuwaiti people from decimation therefore might be justifiable for humanitarian reasons.
- Kuwait produces about 12% of all Persian Gulf petroleum (15%, discounting , Iraq). Saddam Hussein promises to destroy surface installations if he faces defeat. Replacement would be an immensely costly and time-consuming process. Ground-combat operations to avoid that eventuality might be desirable.
- Saddam Hussein might choose to unleash an additional oil spill in the Persian Gulf, set it on fire, or otherwise retaliate in ways that surely would have adverse military as well as monstrous ecological implications. Ground-combat operations could prove the best preventive.
- Undesirable side effects, such as rifts in the U.S. alliance, might accompany prolonged air campaigns that many Muslims believe take undue advantage of brothers unable to strike back in kind. When the law of diminishing returns takes over, U.S. decision makers might determine that casualties incurred by ground-combat operations would be preferable to a lengthy stalemate.
President Bush and his top political- military advisers in any such instance must make a determination after consultation with U.S. allies and the Congress. Favorable public opinion also is important. Failure to present a united front could invite serious but avoidable dissent.
Editor’s Note: These observations are drawn from remarks Mr. Collins made during a seminar concerning ground- combat operations conducted for members of Congress and staff on 6 February 1991. Mr. Collins’s “Options in the Middle East” was published in the October 1990 Proceedings, pages 119-122.
Comment and Discussion
NEWLY
COMMISSIONED?
let us introduce you to membership in your professional organization with 3 FREE issues of Proceedings.
All newly commissioned officers and warrant officers in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are eligible.
For information and sign up, contact:
Membership Services U.S. Naval Institute Annapolis, MD 21402 301/268-6110
“Damnreservists! ’ ’
(See S; L. Blanton, pp. 83-86, October 1990;
S. Groteboer, pp. 27-30, December 1990; C. P.
Briem, p. 31, January 1991; J. P. Tilbury,
pp. 23-24, February 1991 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Brent P. Jenkins, U.S. Navy— Lieutenant Groteboer writes, “I decided to leave active duty primarily because I was a carrier-bred surface warfare officer who, had 1 stayed on active duty, was facing transfer to a frigate or destroyer. ’ ’ I remind Lieutenant Groteboer that, no matter how much more sophisticated he thinks his Nimitz (CVN-68)-class carrier tour would be compared to a frigate or destroyer, as a junior surface warfare officer he is in a training pipeline that ultimately produces commanding officers of frigates and destroyers, not aircraft carriers. It would be in his professional interest, then, to serve on the type of combatants that he may one day be assigned to command.
In addition, as a nonnuclear-trained surface warfare officer on a nuclear- powered ship, Lieutenant Groteboer was unable to obtain a thorough understanding for the conventional propulsion Plants, steam or gas turbine, found in those surface ships he would be qualified to command.
Finally, because aircraft carriers are owned by Naval Air Forces Atlantic and Pacific, Lieutenant Groteboer was not exposed to the way business is done in Surface Forces Atlantic and Pacific. These are two entirely different worlds to operate in, and a junior surface warfare officer needs to know the differences.
“It’s the ‘M’ Word— MOBILIZATION”
(See J. R. Avella, pp. 41-45, January 1991 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Sankey L. Blanton, U.S. Naval Reserve—Captain Avella missed a critical point on the whole business of involuntary recall, and the four basic factors he outlined are just Plain wrong. Reservists are volunteers! Some may be conveniently between jobs lor spouses) when the need arises, but all volunteered to be ready when called ttpon.
The first “military factor” outlined— that of duration—should not be a consideration. The primary factor must be the needs of the service. A properly structured reserve force would have an identified cadre, or entire units of specialists, trained and ready for a specialized mission on a unique platform. The prime example is the Naval Reserve Force mine countermeasures program. Minesweeping is a very special mission, but not often called for. To trust this to a miscellaneous group of scattered volunteers, who have not trained together as a team with their active duty counterparts, runs counter to the concept of a trained and ready reserve.
Regardless of duration, the men who should have deployed on Operation Earnest Will (Persian Gulf, convoy duty) with the minesweepers (MSOs) should have been the designated, trained, and ready MSO detachments. If reserves are worth the funds it takes to train and maintain, then they must be used when needed—whether for weeks or years! The President has recall authority, and I personally trust him to use it wisely. If my country needs my skills, I consider it an honor, not a disruption, to be recalled. Failing to recall a unit because of political timidity is a failure of leadership.
Captain Avella’s second military factor concerned the number of reservists needed. Once again I question this as a consideration. If qualified individual specialists are so designated, then they should be individually recalled. If a unit is the trained and ready force, then the unit should be recalled. If everyone on a recalled unit’s payroll is not needed, then trim the fat and restructure the unit after it has completed its duty. If domestic political sensitivity against recall of 200 trained, ready, and paid-for-by-my-tax- dollars specialists is the primary issue, then maybe the whole operation should be scrubbed.
A significant military consideration, second only to needs of the service, is quality of the reserve component. Presidential recall should not be viewed as a “silver bullet.” A properly utilized reserve must be likened to the choice of the appropriate tool for the job. If you want to clear the whole garden, use a roto- tiller; if you want to clear weeds from the garden, use the hoe. Neither tool should be silver-plated, nor allowed to rust between uses.
Involuntary recall is not mobilization and—if done whenever required—would eventually be understood by the American public, the international community, the media, the active military, and the reserve forces themselves. It will build the total force, provide a realistic evaluation of reserve needs and capabilities, and work as a useful winnowing fork of ‘good ole boys’ who just show up for coffee and camaraderie. When recall of reserve assets becomes a standard operating procedure for a budget-conscious U.S. military, then both domestic and international political concerns will become minimal. Gone will be the media hype of teary- eyed parents and whining students who claim they didn’t know “they’d hafta go.”
If the services want to know that they can count on the reserve component, then they must expect to use it based on only one rule of thumb: needs of the service! Reservists are an all-volunteer force and have a right to be used as designed and trained, and to serve their country with honor. Operation Desert Shield/Storm can be the turning point in a very poor history of integrating the reserve and active teams into a total force. The President has taken the best possible step in making the U.S. military a lean, mean, fighting machine in this respect. With luck, the next time this country needs trained and ready specialists, no one will bat an eye at doing what has to be done— selective recall.