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The Wasp Is Back—and More
By Commander Kendall J. King, U. S. Navy, and Lieutenant C. Scott Barbour, U. S. Navy
When the first multipurpose amphibious assault ship (LHD), the Wasp, is commissioned this month in Norfolk, Virginia, she will lead amphibious warfare into the 21st century. With her large flight deck and advanced command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) suite, the Wasp—the tenth U. S. Navy ship to bear the name—will add tactical options to surface forces and flexibility to the nation’s maritime strategy.
Wasp Characteristics: The Wasp’s design drew upon lessons learned from the five Tarawa (LHA-l)-cIass general-
purpose amphibious assault ships (LHAs). (See Tables 1 and 2.) One key change reduced the size of the island superstructure on the flight deck, relocating the command and control spaces below the deck, enabling all C3I areas to be centrally located. The relocation added a measure of security to these critical spaces and created more room topside, facilitating a 2.2-acre flight deck. The wider flight deck will be particularly helpful to AV-8B Harrier pilots, enabling them to use the length of the runway without zigzagging around the island. There are other marked improvements:
unit
support fully a Marine expeditionary (MEU)-sized assault. Ramps enable
the
INGALLS SHIPBUILDING
The amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD-1), the tenth U. S. Navy ship to be so named, will join the Atlantic Fleet later this month, bringing improvements that reflect lessons learned from the Tarawa-class LHAs and new capabilities that will help usher in a new era of amphibious warfare.
►Two deck-edge elevators operate independently of flight operations and are large enough to lift either AV-8s or the largest Marine helicopter, the CH-53E Super Stallion.
►A modified well deck can accommodate three air cushion landing craft (LCAC) vehicles.
►The cargo capacity is great enough to
rine vehicles to be moved rapidly to flight deck or well deck from stora^| areas. A sophisticated system of mon® cranes can quickly move bulk cargo the holds to waiting LCACs.
►Comfortable, protected berthing P
vides for nearly 2,000 Marines. Co ^ tive protection system enclosures ni tain air inside at a higher pressure shield Marines from the effects of c*ie cal or biological warfare as the ship proaches the beachhead. .
►Expanded medical facilities inC
laboratories, x-ray rooms, and a P ^ macy. The Wasp’s afloat capabilitieS | second only to the fleet’s two h°sP^e ships. As a forward-deployed asset’ {0- LHD could be first on the scene to P^ vide disaster relief, to support an eva ^ tion, or to deal with a terrorist at <.£e such as the 1983 Beirut bombing- Table 3.) tr0l,
In the area of command and c°c(,eS. the Wasp’s command suite has the sary technology to support tact'ca q-pe manders well beyond the year 200 ■ ^ ship’s communications, for instance- j advanced Marconi-built radios COIltrtenls. by computerized monitoring syscan The many transmitters and receiver ,r simultaneously support the corn an<J of the amphibious task force (CAT e the commander of the landing (CLF). The computer managemen^ ^ tern enables communications quickly switched as requirements c -on
In one test, more than 75 commum circuits were dropped and then t stored in minutes. ntem^
Sophisticated information and > ,oti communication systems link fla? the landing force operations cene ‘gyp- tactical air coordination center, t ^ porting arms coordination center, jn- joint intelligence center. The tac > ^ formation processing system, 1 C data display system, and tactica ^ system are available to fully supp [g|e. tactical decision maker. A two-rva^ e*' vision conference system facm of changes between the command n
—, / juiy,9S9
Table 2
LHD Comparison with CVS-18 and HMS Invincible
| LHD | CVS | HMS |
displacement (Tons) | 40,532 | 40,600 | 16,256 |
Engineering Plant | 2-600 lb. | 8-600 lb. | 4 Gas Turbines |
| 2 Shafts | 2 Shafts | 2 Shafts |
SPeed (Knots) | 70K shp | 150K shp | 94K shp |
24+ | 30+ | 28+ | |
Catapults | None | 2 | None |
Air Wing | 20 AV-8Bs 6 LAMPS | 70 A/C | 10 AV-8Bs 9 CH-53s |
*
Accommodations (w/o surge) | 2,950 | 2,917 |
Cargo Elevators | 6 | 5 |
— to Flight Deck | 3 | 0 |
Collective Protection System (CPS) | Selected | None |
Table 3 Medical Facility Comparison |
| |
LHD | LHA | TAH |
Operating Rooms | 6 | 3 | 12 |
Beds | 600 | 300 | 1,000 |
Frozen Blood (Pints) | 1,500 | 1,500 | 3,000 |
Dental Operating Rooms | 4 | 2 | 4 |
HetT ^r'e^n§ areas, such as the intelli- ,Ce center or meteorology. ter ^ t*le Wasp's combat information cen- rSc l jC) two large screens, located di- •ifid ^ 'n ^ront °f the tactical action officer i)ri *he commanding officer, can focus V|(JSUr'ace and air tactical situations pro- pi d from the ship’s own sensors or dis- ^ tactical data system information from other ships or aircraft via a data link. The ship’s integrated tactical amphibious warfare data system—for the first time incorporating carrier-type software into an amphibious ship data system program—can graphically display hundreds of targets or focus on single areas of interest. This same information can then be displayed on any of the other four large screen displays located in staff spaces.
The ship’s combat systems are equally sophisticated, easily outmatching those on board older amphibious ships. Two NATO Sea Sparrow missile launchers provide a short-range, surface-to-air missile capability. Three Phalanx close-in weapon systems provide secondary de-
fense. The system that really sets the ship apart, though, is the Wasp's automated detection and tracking system, the SYS- 2. Borrowed from the new threat upgrade technology used on board guided-missile destroyers, the system greatly expands the ship’s ability to track air targets and, more importantly, enhances the tactical commander’s ability to manage the air war.
Other revolutionary systems on board the Wasp include:
►The first long-range combat directionfinding system, which will augment tactical information provided to the embarked commander
►A new amphibious air traffic control system that will enable controllers to control, launch, and recover AV-8Bs in all weather and at night
► The position locating and reporting system, which will enable the ship to track Marines and their vehicles
Amphibious Tactical Employment: The Wasp is intended to be the Navy’s first true over-the-horizon-capable amphibious and antisubmarine/antisurface warfare (ASW/ASUW) sea-control ship. Using shipboard facilities, the CATF and the CLF would be able to fully plan, control, and execute a complex, over-the- horizon, brigade-size amphibious assault. More important, the Wasp's tactical data system will enable these commanders to manage all warfare areas in the expanded amphibious operations area (AOA), from the Marine air-ground task forces to the at-sea environment miles from the beach. As a result the LHD opens the potential for several unique tactical options.
The major difficulty in over-the-horizon assaults will be in coordinating the LCAC waves. With only line-of-sight communication for much of a 50-mile- plus transit, LCACs can quickly move out of range, particularly as they approach the landing area. This inhibits the commanders’ ability to monitor the assault’s progress and to transmit the information they collect to the assault waves. Traditional operations have used small boats to accompany assault waves for guidance, but the LCAC outruns other boats. One solution would be to use the Wasp’s LAMPS-I1I helicopters.
With their long-range air/surface radar, electronic surveillance measures (ESM) suite, and data link, LAMPS-lIIs offer the CATF the ability to manage the expanded amphibious operations area beyond the horizon. The LAMPS-1II tracks the landing craft with its radar, maintains communications with the LHD, and transmits the LCACs’ progress via data links to the Wasp’s large screen displays,
eliminating the need for waterborne boat group or wave commanders. The helicopter could also: provide an ultra-high- frequency autocat communication relay capability between the LCACs and the LHD, facilitating a direct access if needed; detect air and surface threats hostile to the LCACs and the entire amphibious group using its radar; and, perhaps, defend the LCAC wave, if armed with Penguin antiship missiles.
An LHD carrying six LAMPS-lIIs could use several to support task force ASW defense inside the AOA while allocating a few to the wave-commander role. Six LAMPS-lIIs would supplement the loadout of three frigates, certainly expanding force options in an increasingly vulnerable AOA. In addition, the Wasp’s maintenance facilities could keep the helos flying or serve as a resource pool from which surface ship helo assets might be drawn.
Another tactical option would be to alter the traditional amphibious air wing now embarked on board the Wasp. Instead of a mix of CH-46 Sea Knights, CH-53s, UH-1 Hueys, and AH-1 Cobras and six AV-8s, more AV-8s—as many as 28 Harriers—could be added. With the Wasp's day/night capability, the additional Harriers would greatly enhance Marine close air support. The large number of Marine AV-8s could free carrier aircraft from their close-air-support role and allow them to concentrate on long- range air defense and tactical air strikes. If the AV-8 loadout were reduced to 20, there would be room for the six LAMPS- III helos. The LAMPS-lII’s airborne early warning ability would assist the AV-8s in their air defense role, a factor missing from the Harrier deployment in the Falklands Conflict. Other ships in the task force could provide the helo assets the Wasp would sacrifice in any given configuration.
Tactical Sea Control: Part of the rationale for designing the LHD was her potential as a substitute for a large-deck aircraft carrier in some scenarios. The advantages of an ASW/ASUW sea- control ship have been hotly debated since the demise of the ASW carriers in the 1970s (the USS Wasp [CVS-18] was decommissioned in 1972). In the interim, surface offensive ASW has been relegated to small ships with jury-rigged C2 facilities and to aircraft carriers as a secondary mission area. The Falklands Conflict fueled the debate by supporting the value of the small aircraft carrier in an amphibious operation. Although the LHD is clearly no substitute for the carrier, the LHD has sea-control potential,
particularly in low- and medium-intensity conflicts.1 Discussions of some potentia mission areas follow: .,
► Augmenting a Carrier—An LHD cou serve as a second or third flight deck M multicarrier force. The proposed LHD at wing of 20 Harriers and six LAMPS-* ^ could free carrier assets to concentrate o antiair warfare (AAW) and strike mts^ sions by performing close-in surface a subsurface surveillance, surface com air patrol (CAP), and ASW pouncer rms sions. As the LAMPS-1II dipping son variants become operational, the / pers” could be relocated from the earn® to the LHD, creating more space ° fixed-wing assets. The LHD also c°u^ provide an alternative command platto for antisubmarine, antisurface, antia j and force over-the-horizon coordina
functions. The Wasp’s effective C sUI , could serve both battle group an squadron commanders, especially j.
tactic3*
in
the
movement phase of amphibious force operations. le
► Augmenting the Battleship Group (BBBG)—The battleship is 3 1 midable, albeit limited, weapon P form; she does not have long-range defense or over-the-horizon targe capabilities and must rely upon her corts. The LHD complements these corts and the BBBG as a whole- LHD air wing can provide organic range surface and subsurface surven ' and targeting for Tomahawk and HarPl. f missiles. The AV-8Bs could be used ^ coordinated war-at-sea missions an LAMPS-lIIs could bolster ASW detebat As mentioned, with the LHD’s com direction finding and intelligence terns, the BBBG commander coul bark on board the LHD and have ^ room and information to maintain
of all tactical scenarios. When tlK>
by the addition of an air-to-air radar ’ d
LAMPS-1I1 in its antielectronic wai
Harrier in its AAW role coupled
the with the
.rfare
ade'
role could afford the battleship an quate CAP umbrella. uat-
The LHD could complement the tleship in C2, as well. The *3a,t*e*nVert renovation was not intended to c0 the ship into a flagship. She lacks s ^ of the Wasp’s sophisticated systems- ^ eluding her six large screen
more effective arrangement might have the BBBG commander operate
be
fron1
large'
the Wasp’s flag plot (with its two sten' screen displays and many data ST gt consoles) while the AAW coor * otr°* might be located in the tactical airc<2a„J center (with its large screen display
_ space
eight data system consoles) a. 'aiair normally used for amphibious tactic ^jp. control. The LHD and the batt e
/ .Ub 1
s0rnbining sophisticated C2 aviation as- cS’ 16-inch gunnery, and long-range Ulse missiles, create the ideal tactical ^ ;i(tch for the 1990s and beyond.
1Pporting Surface Action Group
Uli)' ....... ' ~ "
Ho
Craft
ues,
6®|her bound.
he LHD’s amphibious and sea control Labilities are extremely well suited to
t py) ancj Convoy Operations—The
. > in an open ocean or low-intensity
environment, could furnish a SAG escort group the air assets needed to lj u.nter subsurface, surface, mine, and jH'ed air threats. In a Persian Gulf-type C(.Cnario, the LHD could support mine hcUnterrneasure helicopters flying from h„H'ght deck. Marine or'Army attack °pters and surface surveillance air- could be carried in large numbers, rj(WeH. AV-8s flying from a LHD could ^P'dly counter small surface threats. To Iflrv^ t*le Harrier’s time aloft, the U, s CH-53 helicopters, capable of along 170 knots, could conduct in> 8ht refueling.
I’i uPPorting an ASW Strike Group— hunter-killer groups of World War II fire organized around aircraft carriers, lll^'ast USS Wasp and the British carrier off ^ [nvtncible also formed the basis for ^ensive ASW striking forces. As dis- d ®e(i> the LHD that operated with a H^load of LAMPS-IIIs could perform a ;ir) ,l ar function. The LHD’s large size 3jrstable flight deck could support ASW sta^ra*1 launch and recovery in high sea 'Vc-6,*’ when smaller ships would be support NATO’s maritime strategy. A LHD could predeploy to Norway, for instance, landing her MEU prior to hostilities and then using her “sea control air wing” to support the ASW striking forces. Or for a larger landing, one LHD could be configured in the amphibious mode, supporting the Marines with a standard air wing and landing craft. A second LHD could be used with a sea control air wing, perhaps landing the Marine air defense batteries and then using her AV-8/LAMPS-III aircraft mix to defend the Norwegian fjords and the troops ashore.
Future Operations: The MV-22 tilt- rotor Osprey eventually will be integrated into amphibious operations on board an LHD, and such an aircraft generates the potential for both enhanced airborne assault and for a special role in a specially configured Osprey. The early-waming- equipped Osprey being planned could improve air defense and greatly expand the AV-8B’s potential. The Penguin configuration for LAMPS-III or a Harpoon- capable Osprey could provide similar versatility in ASUW. The addition of Harpoon, deleted from the initial LHD design, could boost both amphibious and sea control missions.
For the LHD-5, additional technologies are planned.2 If funded, the fifth ship of the Wasp-class would be converted from steam propulsion to gas turbine, reducing manpower while providing greater acceleration. To compensate for the lost weight (steam propulsion machinery is substantially heavier than gas turbines) and to allow room for the turbine air inlets, an extra 50 feet would be added to the ship’s length. All of this extra room would mean expanded troop spaces, greater storage capacity, and additional numbers of aircraft, enhancing the LHD’s operational potential. Another possible use of the extra space would be to install vertical missile launchers under the longer flight deck. Coupling 120 Tomahawk, Harpoon, and/or ASROC missiles with LHD C2 and aircraft may be the way to optimize surface ship flexibility across all warfare areas in times of financial constraint. Such a ship would not replace the standard aircraft carrier, but it would greatly expand the tactical options for amphibious, carrier, and BBBG commanders through the 2020s.
The Wasp is first and foremost an amphibious ship. The ten that are planned (or nine if the larger LHD-5 design is adopted for the last five ships) will augment present Marine amphibious lift capability and eventually replace the LPHs still in commission. As such, the LHDs are absolutely essential, but in the era of growing financial austerity they also offer unmatched versatility. The LHD is truly a force multiplier that will add a new dimension to any future U. S. maritime strategy.
'G. P. Tierney, “The LHD and Sea Control," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1985, p. 150. The LHD class is named after historic U. S. warships that are not named after famous battles. LHD- 2, -3, and -4 will be named the Essex, Kearsarge, and Boxer, respectively. “Hornet,” which would make an excellent name for the LHD-5, is not available because the USS Hornet (CVS-12) is still available in mothballs.
Commander King is the precommissioning operations officer in the Wasp and a frequent contributor to Proceedings. He has served in the La Salle (AGF-3), William H. Standley (CG-32), Dupont (DD-941), California (CGN-36), and Conyngham (DDG-17).
Lieutenant Barbour is the precommissioning combat systems officer in the Wasp. He served as the fire control and weapons officer in the John Hancock (DD-981) and as combat systems officer in the Stark (FFG-31). He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1980.
Over the Side______________
By Lieutenant Colonel David Henderson, U. S. Marine Corps
an
been
towhich you
left
are competing. A resume is not to as a postscript to your job interview- it instead as a calling card. ,,e]p.
When Should You Seek Help- unfortunately, is more a function 0 ^ than of common sense. Because y° u reer has been successful thus [art u may feel that to seek help infers t ^c£SS are not capable of handling this P alone. You may start to believe t (0 unspeakable “Peter Principle’ aPP .(j0n you. If you try to treat career tran job like another set of orders or anot jn assignment, all the on-the-job tram \&- the world will not get you from y° vice-exit date to your job-start da ' c6 Do not be afraid to seek assi early on from friends or from other ^ have gone “over the side” wh°se get ment you trust and whose help m ^tjon you over one more hurdle in the tra process. Listen carefully to wha^ 0t\e people say, and at some point P* ^cSt person you really believe has jon’t advice. Tune out the others so y° c0ir become confused or find yourse
For most individuals, the decision to leave the military is reached after a great deal of thought and a certain amount of anxiety. By no means is this one of life’s easier decisions, and it should not be based on a snap judgment or on an unwanted set of orders. Whatever the reason, once the papers have gone in to exchange your uniform for the mufti of the civilian world, you have added a new dimension to your life: the search for a second career.
What Is Career Transition? Planning a second career is unlike receiving any set of orders to the next duty station. The harsh reality is that there will be no one to report to at the second-career location, nor will there be a guaranteed paycheck every month. Welcome to CivWorld! These are the facts of life that a majority of civilians face on a daily basis.
Career transition, in plain terms, is the process of getting from point A (your departure from the service) to point B (a second-career job). You have many of the tools necessary for career transition; you have had a successful military career. You have an education and degrees or certificates to show for it; you have skills as a result of formal military training.
How Soon Should You Start to Plan for a Second Career? You should start to explore job opportunities about two years ahead of time. You should move your transition program into high gear when you have only about a year left in the service. Do not wait until one month ahead of time to start your second-career campaign: you may find yourself in the ranks of the unemployed for three to six months, and maybe even longer.
Assuming you are cut from the same mold as those who have gone before you, be prepared to experience a brief period of anxiety after you have made your decision. This is normal. Remember, support systems are in place; friends and other acquaintances who have retired or separated are willing to assist you in activating your career-transition program.
What Will You Need to Start? Once your decision to leave is firm, you will need to pack three things in your career- transition suitcase—a marketable resume; a dark, seasonal suit, to be worn with nonmilitary shoes; and a salary figure that is the bottom line for keeping you and your family in the life-style to which you have grown accustomed.
To market your experience, you must put together a resume that highlights your qualifications. You should also open up a network of friends, relatives, and a later- to-be-identified “mentor,” all of whom can help as you move through the job- market maze. Mentors can be your best source of assistance, providing wise counsel, floating your resume within their circles of friends and business acquaintances, and helping you determine salary requirements.
How Important Is a Good Resume? Many of you may believe that creating a marketable resume is a waste of time. You have been told that most job interviews for those leaving the military are obtained through friends or family, a strong parent service network, or the interest certain government contracting firms have expressed in you. If this assumption is valid, you think, then why bother to put a lot of time and thought into writing the perfect resume?
Those of you who already have drafted a resume probably have circulated it among old friends who retired or separated during the past few years. More than likely they skillfully extracted all t ® military experience that was truly an rightfully yours, substituting those gr®a words (in their view) that worked ® them. Perhaps your “career history even reads something like this:
“Eighteen years of hands-on (or shirt sleeve) experience in a highly visi position on the cutting edge of 1 decision-making process. Proven tec ord of leadership in time-sensitive uations with an in-depth knowledge multifaceted organizations.' Proble ^ solution oriented with a conslS. l,. track record for success. Adept at ^ ited resource management in the^ of austere budgetary constraints.
Dynamite, right? Wrong. Llnfort^ nately, this type of career history is * being used in far too many resumes to ^ and says absolutely nothing about the individual is or what he or she done during a service career. >s
As is the case with most profession^ leaving the service, you probably he1 that you will be judged more on wha ) say during an interview than on any 0 .s information in your resume. may be true to some extent, you wu ^ get job interviews with a resume ^ clearly spells out your qualifications ^ experience. You want it to stand hea ^ shoulders above the others that have submitted for the position
stantly returning to square one. This per- s°n should be your second-career mentor. How Do You Negotiate Your Salary 'thout Asking for Too Much or Accept- ,nS Too Little? During the course of the 'ntcrview, the subject of salary can come UP at any time. Some employers try to Catch you off guard early in the inter- 'ew> before you have even had a chance 0 discuss the job. Others reserve the subJect for the final interview. Before you >nd yourself in the interview chair, do a 'die homework. Determine the bottom- '"e income required to support your cur- [Cr|t life-style; then you will have a decent aHpark figure on which to base your salary negotiation.
. No matter when salary comes up, there d an easy way to handle the issue that 'll not leave either side boxed in. When e Prospective employer queries you on j°Ur salary requirements, simply ask the terviewer if there is a salary range for e Position. If the employer is able to Provide one, then, based on your under- anding of the job description, you (jt°uld have a good basis for giving him r her an acceptable number within that dnge. Try not to give out any salary fig- re without first knowing their salary n§e, thus precluding any embarrass- ent should you be way over or way nder the target figure.
I ^hat Are You Worth in Civilian Dol- ^s? Actually this is not as hard to deter- '"e as it seems. See example A if you ae retiring and example B if you are sep- a''ng before 20 years service.
^ hose retiring rather than separating a °uld be able to determine how much of d^adc-off in pay their pensions will be in
^ salary-negotiation process. While fQere Is a school of thought that says fight ra “zero” offset in your retired pay,
C<Uiti**c> -f _____ _________________ *11 .-11
'hat ■
°Uer
He
some trade-off may be necessary in
to obtain gainful employment.
q ,0lv Do You Measure Success on the ^ Once You Make the Transition? j-e f'tst but not necessarily the most If f°rtant measure is in dollars and cents, hi ^k°U are Prt)duc>ng at the same or at a Pr *eve* 'han *n the service, you are Vt) ably going to be compensated for r efforts more frequently and at higher f.'centages. Salary reviews for some
"his
Nr
are semiannual, and bonuses also hr UF at more frequent intervals. A good 9v '"year raise in salary is 10-15%; an |jverage raise may only be in the cost-of- V5rv^ range and run 2-5%. Bonuses will |4r ^ from thousands to hundreds of dol- f>X ’ ahh0ugh for the most part they are a p Percentage of your base salary.
U)e ^motions are another means of asuring success, and in some cases
Table 1 Examples for Determining Salary Requirements After Separation Based on 1 January 1989 pay scales
Step 1
Step 2
___________________ Example A___________________
Navy Commander (0-5)
(retiring in the Washington, D.C., area after 20 years of Monthly Pay & Allowances Breakdown
Base Pay (Over 20 Years)
VHA (Washington, D.C.)
BAQ (w/Dependents)
BAS
Monthly Pay & Allowances x 12 =
Annual Retired Pay Survivor Benefit Program
(if applicable) =
Total
service)
$3,845.10
345.11*
654.90*
119.61*
$4,964.72
$59,576.64
23,070.60
$36,506.04
Step 3 For the purpose of this example, let’s assume you have four dependents and can claim $10,000 interest on your home and itemized deductions. If you subtract your exemptions, which are $9,750 ($1,950 x 5) and your itemized deductions ($10,000), you now have your taxable income, which is $26,391 ($46,141 — $19,750). Now take the taxable income and go into the tax schedules found in your 1988 federal income tax guide to find your taxes for this figure. Next add your taxable gross income to your annual nontaxable allowances (*) and find the tax for this combined figure in the tax schedule. Compare the difference in tax that you would pay and subtract the two tax figures. Then divide the difference by your annual nontaxable allowance figure to get your marginal tax rate (MTR).
Based on these computations, you would have a marginal tax rate of 25%. Apply this MTR to your nontaxable allowances of $13,435.44, and the result is a figure of $3,358.75 or $3,400.00 rounded off to the nearest hundred.
Step 4 Add the $3,400.00 nontaxable allowance offset to the total figure in Step 2 and you come up with your starting point for salary negotiation: $39,900.00 (rounded off).
---------------------------------------- Example B____________________________
Navy Lieutenant (Naval Aviator) without Dependents (separating in the Norfolk, Virginia, area after seven years of service) Step 1 Monthly Pay & Allowances Breakdown
Base Pay (Over 6 Years) $2,451.00
Flight Pay (Over 6 Years) 400.00
VHA (no Dependents) 131.83*
BAQ (Single) 402.60*
BAS 119.61*
Total $3,505.04
Step 2 Base Pay and Flight Pay x 12 = $34,212.00
Nontaxable Allowances x 12 = 7,848.48
Total $42,060.48
Step 3 Assume one exemption and the standard deduction for the purpose of tax schedules, which then makes taxable income $29,262.00 with taxes of $5,877.00.
Step 4 Add nontaxable allowances to the taxable income, which brings total income to $37,110.00 with taxes of $8,075.00.
Step 5 Subtract two tax figures—$5,877 - $8,075 = $2,198. Then divide $2,198 by nontaxable allowance figure of $7,848 to get the MTR of
28%.
Step 6 Multiply the MTR x $7,848 to get the offset: $2,198. Then add offset of $2,198 to base pay and allowances figure of $42,060.48 and round off to nearest $100 to get starting point for salary negotiation: $46,500.00.
*nontaxable allowances.
they may be more significant than salary increases. They often have a double effect, though, since they normally include raises or bonuses. Unlike the military, promotions do not necessarily occur at set intervals and in some cases they may come more than once in a given year.
Is That All There Is to Career Transition? Not necessarily, but these are the kinds of things that you need to be thinking about and doing if you are contemplating a move to the civilian sector. Success can be measured in how well you implement a sound career-transition program using the tools and resources available to you.
Colonel Henderson and a fellow retired o 1C formed Upper Brackets, Inc., in 1985; they those preparing for a second career. He retired the Marine Corps in 1981 after 20 years of scr^of and then spent six years as a government contra and career-transition consultant.
The USCG’s Mission Impossible
By Lieutenant Commander John B. Moore, U. S. Coast Guard
traveling abroad are well acquain e ^ the lines and checkpoints that per
“Good morning, Mr. Phelps. Numerous organizations and individuals are in the business of smuggling illegal narcotics into this country. As you know, these drugs, particularly cocaine, are responsible for $110 billion of economic loss, thousands of deaths, and unimaginable human suffering.' Your mission, should you decide to accept it, is to stop this flow of narcotics, and end the reign of terror it creates. As always, should any member of your IM force be caught or killed, the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of your actions. This recording will self de- struct in five seconds.”
After an introduction like the one above, television’s Mr. Phelps would gravely watch the hissing smoke as the tape recording self-destructed. Later, he would select his impossible mission force from a collection of secret dossiers. Then, with the aid of an intricate plan, he would go about accomplishing his “impossible mission” using his trained team and their high-tech gadgetry.
In real-life, however, this very real impossible mission rests in the hands of more conventional forces, such as the U. S. Coast Guard, the Customs Department, and, lately, the Navy—services that are often freely tasked and frugally funded. Estimates place the current narcotics interdiction rate—the result of massive federal, state, and local efforts— at a figure approaching 15%.2 This translates into a virtual free-flow of drugs, whose volume is limited only by the numbers and appetites of the users. Statistics indicate that both are growing by leaps and bounds. In fact, 1988 news reports suggest that the street price of drugs in the last few years has dropped substantially—i.e., available quantity is up, and the purity of narcotics has improved so much that it represents an additional danger to the users.
The media have inundated us with profiles of the growing narcotics problem, from the pathos of the lives of the consumers to even the perspectives of the peasant coca growers in South American countries. They have followed the narcotics path from the local Columbian drug lords, to the smugglers, to the U. S. distributors, and to local dealers (including amoral, violent drug gangs, which George Will has described in Newsweek as “a rapidly expanding class of semisociopaths”).3 In all of these steps, the flow of narcotics produces staggering wealth and new-found power for all involved except the consumer.
A standing joke in Coast Guard drug interdiction years ago was that we didn’t stop the drug trade, we just kept the prices up. Today, raising the street price of drugs to the point where the common street user cannot afford to support a continuing drug habit may be the best way to topple the entire drug pyramid. Sharply higher prices would also curtail experimental use by the country’s youth, and recreational use by the average wage- earner.
Assuming a drug habit costs $100 a day when the narcotic interdiction rate is 15%, supply and demand mathematics indicates that the same habit would cost $800 a day with an interdiction rate of around 90%. As the journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step, the country must define its objectives in this area, then implement realistic steps toward meeting those objectives. If the interdiction rate is raised to 60%, the street price for drugs will approximately double, and at 90% the street price can be expected to double twice more. A 6090% interdiction rate is the realistic range that must be reached to stop the flood of narcotics in this country. The Coast Guard proposed a 75% interdiction rate target for marijuana, using similar reasoning, some time ago.4
As a Coast Guard HH-65A Dolphin helicopter pilot flying medical evacuation missions in the Gulf of Mexico this past year, I was particularly impressed by some of the larger oil and gas production platforms, which serve as hubs of commerce and communication for the off
shore community. Vermillion Block - (V245) is the grid location for one su<^ platform. This platform, impressive eve^ by oil production standards, sports four-story building for living and w°^n ing spaces, a helo pad on the roof that c accommodate up to three helos at on > and massive catwalks that connect it another satellite platform about 100 ya^ away, which also has its own helo p ^ While refueling at V245 one nig ^ began thinking how nice it would be instead of operating from a pitching s ’ the Coast Guard had a platform like in the middle of the Yucatan Chanty one of the war zones of drug interdic efforts. Even a modest electronics s could easily command the 90-mile c ^ nel 24 hours a day in any weather- would serve as a perfect base for P . helicopters, navigation signals, s ^ range, high-speed patrol craft, an<3 f|oon munication relays. A tethered ba could even be operated from a ne “satellite” platform to raise the o s ^ er’s height-of-eye. The possibility ^ this platform would also be importa (S maritime defense zone (MDZ) P*anI)reat Such a platform would provide a £ na advantage in the Windward and _ passages, as well, and on other n used smuggling routes. . ce,
In the Yucatan Channel, for ins(|lC traffic could be compared to that concourse of a major airport, witn ^ sands of travelers passing throug day. Under current operations, drU^rs6, terdiction agents roam the conC°rtjCU' stopping individuals who meet a Pa ^ lar profile, or who are identified aS^cf_ pects by intelligence reports. Ho even people who are known drug c ^ frequently slip through, hidden jS
crowd. Even when a known cour^ ^ stopped, it is not always possible ^ agent to conduct, in the concours . ^ type of detailed search needed to cunningly concealed contraband. ^urjsts Today, airline travelers and ^jt)i
/ Jub 1
^ U. S. COAST GU>
^ategically placed platforms like those used in the offshore oilpatch could nav.e as bases for patrol helos and surface craft, and as communications and Vlgation hubs, in peacetime drug interdiction and in wartime MDZ efforts.
.^ovidcd that aid be funded,
finr» rloxi V
erly and systematic searches. There are v>sual inspections, as done by Customs, e|ectronic searches by metal detectors, ^ X-ray machines to examine luggage. Uch a system of mandatory checkpoints °r vessels and aircraft en route to the nited States enforced by legislation and reaties could be a positive step toward Rising the drug interdiction rate. These caeckpoints could be supported, for both aiPs and aircraft, by required entry |°utes. Vessels and aircraft not conform- ,ng to entry procedures could be liable to Perception and possible destruction.
the platform proposal the following operations . oe observed in progress
und a Yucatan-based platform: ll Cenario One—At 0618 local time, a \ tvv‘n~engine aircraft takes off from a i0jq airstrip somewhere outside Lagar- fie °n the north shore of the Yucatan ,^'nsula. The pilot is carrying 150 kilo- H,- 'ns °f cocaine. His plan is to wave hop QnJVayt0 a remote spot in south Florida, (Q. ditch his plane next to a drainage era[. has done this successfully sev- ,lrnes before. This time, however, the
electronic devices on the Yucatan platform pick him up at 50 feet. As soon as he fails to cross the reporting point at position 24 North, 84 West, the controller on the Yucatan platform notifies the fighter! interceptors at Homestead Air Force Base and Coast Guard HH-3F Pelican helicopters based in Clearwater, Florida. These aircraft scramble to intercept the smuggler. The smuggler is quickly jumped by the fighters, who signal him toward a pre-selected landing area. The smuggler decides to cooperate, because he knows that they are authorized to
| L. * |
(B o | M COAST"GL/Ar • • B •__ |
shoot if necessary. The HH-3F lands a Customs team at the airstrip ahead of the smuggler; they seize the aircraft immediately after it lands.
Scenario Two—Customs intelligence information indicates that the fishing boat Cokentoke has departed Columbia with 500 kilograms of cocaine in hidden compartments. The master of the boat has elected to follow the entry channel and risk inspection at the Yucatan platform checkpoint. When he is about 50 nautical miles south of the platform, he observes on his radar that several craft are apparently in hot pursuit of a crew boat that tried to get lost in the traffic along the Mexican coast. Although in the past this would have provided a beautiful diversion for him to make an end run the other way, the captain knows that deviation from the entry channel will immediately get him noticed.
As soon as the Cokentoke is tied up at the platform’s inspection dock, a Coast Guard boarding team comes on board. After all hands are escorted off the boat, specialists conduct a rapid, efficient search using ultrasound, X-ray, and fiber optic inspection equipment to check the sealed and void spaces. The team locates the cocaine shipment encased in fiberglas capsules suspended inside the boat’s fuel tanks. The Cokentoke is placed in a seized-vessel holding area, and her captain and his crew are turned over to the platform’s administrative and legal staff for arrest and processing. Further search of the Cokentoke reveals rendezvous information on hidden charts, which leads to the seizure of two other vessels later in the week.
This essay offers some ideas on ways to reduce the flow of narcotics into the country. There are certainly many others. Educating school children, for one, has already proved an effective preventive measure against the rising tide of drug abuse. The bottom line is that the United States must define realistic, possible objectives and commit the resources necessary to achieve those objectives if it hopes to beat the “semi-sociopaths” who are making war on us with drugs.
'Capt. G. Stephen Duca, USCG (Ret.), “The Ad Hoc Drug War," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. December 1987, p. 85.
2Ibid.
’George Will, Newsweek, 28 March 1988, p. 76. 4Duca, p. 87.
Commander Moore, a HH-65A Dolphin helicopter pilot, recently retired after a successful deployment with the USCGC Harriet Lane (WMEC-703). He has served with Coast Guard Air Stations Miami, Houston, and Mobile. Commander Moore is a 1974 graduate of the University of Texas at Austin.
!^vy Medicine: No Points for Second Best
lei»enant Commander Stephen W. Kaja, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Navy
or„.ecades before health maintenance Of J^tions were the rage, the mission ■ho medicine was to keep the fight- i>e(j °^ces healthy rather than hospital- Pi[v ' Today, the Navy medical commu- as a wealth of talent and a capacity
for greatness matched by few organizations. Navy medicine has never failed to provide superior quality medicine. But recently it has failed to provide the quantity of superior medicine demanded by its consumers.
The changing composition of the armed forces ushered in by the all-volunteer force and the competing demands of operational readiness and availability of resources simply outpaced Navy medicine’s ability to plan and react quickly to
inn0'
for
ary 1988, at the annual Lewis E. An? Navy Day Symposium of the Amer College of Health Care Execu
Admiral Zimble expressed his desire
base0
cep1
was expanded in October 1988 w't ’ c establishment of the Federal Health Innovation Network, which involves ^ Defense Department, Veterans A ^ and the Public Health Service. B 'V1
of
north
a rapidly changing market. Trying to cope with a bad present distracted it from setting its sights on the future. Losing sight of the future, it has failed to exploit the collective potential of its people and the innovative spirit and commitment to excellence that it possesses.
As the Navy’s current Surgeon General, Vice Admiral James A. Zimble, clearly stated in his first annual report, Navy medicine needs people with ideas who are not afraid to take risks. But more than that, Navy medicine needs to develop a strategic planning process and a consistent strategy to meet its mission. This process, however, will fail if centralized in Washington, D.C. For any strategic process to be successful, it must start at the local level, where innovations can work their way up the system, undiluted, so that those in Washington get a true dose of operational reality. And it must for the first time commit people and resources to the development of timely innovations in health care delivery. Creating a command devoted to unconventional thinking on the delivery of health care—not the day-to-day practice of medicine—can do this.
A Strategic Planning System: For Navy medicine, strategic planning is critical. If it does not implement a simple, yet effective, planning process this fiscal year, its future is indeed questionable, regardless of any changes in command and control. The strategic planning system should be organized as follows: The command structure should consist of a flag-level billet for a Deputy Commander for Strategic Planning at the Naval Medical Command (NavMedCom) or at the “new” Bureau of Medcine and Surgery (MuMed). This billet would be supported at the type command (TyCom) level by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Planning, and at the medical/dental treatment facility (MTF/DFT) level by Plans and Operations Departments. The Naval Medical Command would guide policy. Echelon three and four would be responsible for policy input and plan execution. The planning system must drive the budget formulation, not the reverse. The entire plan must be integrated with the Navy’s Surgeon General (OP-093) in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic planning system.
A Medical Service Model: A hierarchy of medical services—not the historic concern for operating beds—should be the foundation of the strategic planning system. NavMedCom would provide policy guidance on a model of basic health care services that would be integrated from clinic level through a tertiary center.
NavMedCom Instruction 5450 and the Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System comparison groups already form an acceptable framework. The concept of bed levels would be a relevant consideration only during armed conflict and would be only a logistical consideration under the authority of the TyComs. Once proficiency is achieved at the basic service level, the MTF commanding officers would have the latitude
Line officers have now joined forces with the Navy Medical Corps (here, Vice Admiral James A. Zimble, the Navy Surgeon General, and Admiral Leon A. Edney, the Vice CNO, at the USNI-sponsored Navy medicine seminar in February) to attack the Navy’s problems in medical care.
to increase their range of services as part of their strategic plan.
The Planning Process: The echelon four MTF/DTF is the system’s cornerstone. MTF commanding officers would have the ability to formulate their commands’ futures. How the commands achieve basic-level proficiency would depend on local demands and resources available from both the military and private sectors. TyComs would review, approve, and consolidate local plans. NavMedCom would repeat the process with the TyComs’ plans. TyComs and MTFs would execute the plans at the direction of the fleet commanders after a NavMedCom review. Reporting would be kept to an absolute minimum, according to a command’s ability to meet its milestones. Assistance or corrective action would be provided by the TyComs. TyComs should truly command their re
gions, and this would include having the power to retain or remove MTF/D1 commanding officers based on their per formance. .
Support Systems: A sophisticated )n frastructure must be established to sup port the planning system. The elemen’ should include:
► Management information networks
► Education and training (echelon t°ur
► Health services model
► Planning tools (echelon four) ,
► Management performance stands (quality and quantity)
► Provider incentives . ,
Support systems can be developed sim ^ taneously with the planning process self, similar to a fast-track construct' project. Work has already begun on ^ major elements. The most critical supP elements are the health services m° ^ management performance standards t ^ to be confused with the decision supP matrix), and management informs networks. . u
A Health Care Innovation Ins,l,."n (HCII): An energetic yet realistic F|V intelligently communicated throug the command structure, is critical. that will not address the problem 0f veloping innovative ways to de ^
any good idea, large or small- Jn
fics"
lives, create a similar Navy organization out of Washington, D.C. This con1
located in San Antonio, Texas. T 1 f ganization is significant, for dcsp11^ trajn- the concern for expanding medical ^ ing programs, the Navy has never ^ had a quality problem. It has, ho^ ^ js had a quality delivery problem, w 'j fe. more a leadership, management, a ^ source issue than one of medic3tgCj Navy Medicine does need a de i ^ HCII to address the health care de ^ issue—and it should be located i ^ Chicago area. The testing laboratory^ the center should be Naval Hospitu
Lakes.
Great Lakes is located just ^ Chicago, which is the headquarte virtually every national health care nization. In the Chicago metr°P .^s area there are more than 100 0^,ne<J and numerous internationally ren
/ Jub 1
Universities and medical schools. Chi- c.a8° is also the headquarters for some of e world’s largest health care corpora- '®ns- Failing to capitalize on this wealth resources would be a tremendous aste- Distinguished experts from all reas of the health care industry could be ailed upon to form an advisory group to e HCII and the Surgeon General. And e HCII could, in turn, cooperate fully ‘jh the Air Force, Army, and all other eueral health systems.
The Navy’s HCII could be located in . e spaces occupied by the current Nav- edCom, Northeast Region Great
Lakes. This could be done for relatively minimal cost, if coordinated with the other command and control studies currently ordered by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Leon A. Edney. Naval Hospital Great Lakes, rather than Bethesda, should be the center from which new ideas reach the rest of the system. This is based on the hospital’s prime location and the fact that previous Nav- MedCom staffing policies have placed more experience in alternative delivery systems and innovative thinking at Great Lakes than at Bethesda, which is now undergoing yet another command realignment.
These opportunities to invest in Navy medicine’s future should not slip away untapped. The Navy family needs it and Navy medicine owes it to itself, now.
Commander Kaja is a 13-year Navy veteran, with numerous medical administrative tours in both the United States and Iceland. He is assistant to the Medical Director, Naval Hospital Great Lakes. Commander Kaja holds a master’s degree in health care administration from Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, and is a member and fellowship candidate in the American College of Health Care Executives.
^JVaval Manned Space Program
h — ia • i c ' »‘ ,.i V ii c* \i: ■
I
' Commander Daniel S. .lunik. Medical ‘Corps, U. S’. Naval Reserve
<•*
vive
*i)d
colonization of interplanetary space.
den Past t0 protect existing trade ^Al°pcd nations have turned to colonial'011 when faced with diminishing natu- resources and markets and soaring , ts- Today the world is on the verge of 1^, yet strikingly familiar era. To sur- economically, nations will soon ■ressively compete in the exploitation
j Rationale for a Naval Manned u Ce Program: The exploitation of 'lap demand an unprecedented cap- C(Jlnvestment, which in turn will require fiaf Parable degrees of protection. As ihfjl0ns compete to establish spheres of ll()Uence, demands for military protec- Spa °f launch and landing corridors, taCe'based transit stations, interplane- L, ' corridors, and colonization sites will jfeat.
t0 ^forically, navies have been linked tra ,ne Preservation of peacetime national ^IcL lnterests- Naval presence has been tj0ls Presently being used by many na- eS(ss to project and defend national inter, and such presence is usually not re- (jned as a technical act of war. ^'tanned terrestrial or space-based tjc Poary, as well as the presence of tac- y oriented armed forces such as air forces or armies, are traditionally viewed as more aggressive and warlike. Intervention by such forces is commonly seen as intolerable threats to national security and, in some cases, as overt acts of war. Because of such perceptions, the U. S. Navy has played the principal and often pivotal role of preserving and protecting U. S. investments, markets, resources, and the interconnecting sea lines of communication during peacetime.
To respond appropriately to the anticipated demand for space protection, a naval manned space program will be required with Navy (manned) space vessels roughly analogous to present surface ships and submarines.
Present Status of the Program: The U. S. joint military space program is currently acquiring the tools and expertise necessary to determine future strategic and tactical activities in space, as well as implementing space-related aspects of the strategic defense initiative. These efforts rely heavily on Air Force direction and leadership, and emphasize development, acquisition, and support of enabling rocketry. Since the ill-fated Naval Vanguard program of the 1950s, the Navy has been unable to participate equally in this arena, effectively keeping sailors from manning future space ships. Although a naval manned space program, per se, does not currently exist, the need for such a program remains hotly debated. Naval unmanned space communication, navigation, remote sensing, and surveillance interests are thriving, but the Navy is clearly unprepared to respond to a call to protect U. S. economic interests with manpower in space.
Some elements of a naval manned space program, however, already do exist. Active and reserve line, specialty, and postgraduate space-oriented programs are now available. Space command experience is being acquired by active duty and Naval Reserve personnel participating in the civilian astronaut program. Indeed, the Navy has a “proud tradition” of manned space participation: In 1969, Navy captains A. Bean, C. Conrad, and R. Gordon flew the first naval “interplanetary” cruise on board the Apollo 12; and in 1973 Navy captains C. Conrad, J. Kerwin and P. Weitz held the first naval space base duty station assignments on board the Sky lab.
The Program’s Future: Given current political and interservice exigencies, a
Pursuing an expertise in space ^ an important factor in responding 10
the of<*
naval manned space program seems unlikely in the near future. Nonetheless, economic pressures and historical precedence indicate an urgent, though as yet obfuscated, need. Situations of this nature are frequently resolved only by a crisis. However, there are a number of things that can be done in preparation for an anticipated turn toward a Navy manned space program.
► Encourage Open Discussions: An information and discussion vacuum exists regarding the need for a naval manned space program. Motivating young naval officers and enlisted personnel to start thinking about space will undoubtedly help establish a framework for legitimizing the program, and will facilitate a progression to the form and function such a program will require.
► Increase Naval Presence Within the Space Community: An Air Force presence is clearly visible at almost every NASA center. Naval presence, on the other hand, when existent, is virtually invisible. In most issues, whether civilian or military, presence determines precedence. Developing a highly visible, continuous, uniformed naval presence within the civilian space community at every NASA center is a very important step toward realizing a naval manned space program. But first, naval expertise must be developed in the following areas:
Space Operations and Command— Naval operations and command structures closely resemble those necessary for successful space station and future long- duration missions. This concept—lirmly entrenched in the popular “Star Trek television series—is much more widely acknowledged than many think. Naval interest in and commitment to acquiring space command expertise is evident by the presence of a Naval Space Command, a “space track” at the U. S. Naval Academy, a Naval Postgraduate School space curriculum, and, as mentioned, by the selection of naval astronauts. Terrestrial naval operations and command expertise and experience could prove highly valuable to civilian space efforts now in the planning stages. Moreover, naval presence within this area could also generate unparalleled opportunities for naval line officers to acquire space operations and command expertise and experience.
Habitat and Life Support Systems— Rocket technology has been, traditionally, the primary limiting factor in space exploration. Life-support capabilities, however, are the principal limiting factors in manned space exploration. U. S. and Soviet space programs are working on spacecraft habitability, but since space shuttles clearly resemble airplanes, habitability models have been and remain aircraft-type designs. In the United States, much of the habitat development under way has been conducted in association with the Air Force.
Naval ships and submarines are closer terrestrial analogs for space stations and longer-duration, larger-crewed spacecraft. But habitat development for these efforts continues within NASA largely without uniformed naval presence. Attempts to acquaint NASA scientists with submarine technology, and naval submarine research personnel with spacecraft, have been sporadic, cursory, and limited because of security concerns. Naval specialty corps and technicians could be of invaluable service, provided a uniformed naval research presence within the NASA habitation program was encouraged.
A similar situation exists with regard to manned life-support research and development. Naval interest in closed environmental life-support systems (for example, the development of effective “citadel-” type nuclear, biological, and chemical life-support systems for ships) may have immediate terrestrial applications. If the key to manned space programs is indeed life support, then perhaps the greatest task required of the naval manned space program is supporting a strong and im
mediate uniformed naval presence with111 the NASA life-support development pr° gram. .
Logistics—Future spacecraft vv
likely resemble naval ships and subn'J rines more than aircraft. But these plal forms will be similar in more than struc ture, command, operations, habitat, an life-support systems. A long-durati° manned space exploration effort requ>r an immense logistic support apparata ’ covering everything from supply to >a ily services. Naval logistics are unique' suited to support both civilian and 1111 ^ tary manned space efforts. Again, a na presence within NASA logistic opel^ tions is largely invisible today, and require a sustained, long-term effort
cultivate. ,
con1'
mand, operations, and logistics would
expected call for naval protection vilian space exploration and exploits111 Only then, after increasing its Part’cljj,e tion in the civilian space effort, can Navy secure a higher level of parttc'P tion in the joint military space effort-
Editor’s Note: For information on ^ manned Navy participation in spuce’ f F. J. Glasser, ‘ ‘Space: A New Dinu’llSl in Naval Warfare, ” U. S. Naval Inst'" Proceedings, May 1987.
0.yC'tf
Commander Janik recently completed a 1 ^
NASA postdoctoral research associateship at ^ Johnson Space and NASA-Ames Research Currently, he is an associate professor of fa*111 ^ icine at the University of Alabama, Huntsville of Primary Medical Care Space Life Sciences^ ^ sortium; a volunteer clinical assistant prole 0f family and preventive medicine at the Univer Utah, Rocky Mountain Center for Occupation^^ Environmental Health; and the director and c ' tejjiS entist at Cetus Research, a division of Cetus r -s 3 Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah. Commander JaI|' ] 0f graduate of the Loma Linda University nd
Medicine; the University of California, Berke er ^ the University of Utah, Rocky Mountain Cen^ j> Occupational and Environmental Health- ^tli- Board-certified in preventive medicine/pubhc
Remembering the Diesel
By Commander Richard T. Ackley, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Diesel-electric (conventional) submarines are in the fleets of 42 navies of the world, with the Soviet Union operating some 138 conventional boats. Today there are about 538 conventional submarines worldwide. Numbers this large cannot be ignored. This is particularly true when calculating the demands of a major sea war fought worldwide, where large numbers of deployed diesel-electrics would greatly dilute the coverage and scope of enemy antisubmarine warfare efforts—making the operations of nuclear-powered submarines (now operated by five nations) more effective.
In such a scenario, countries operating conventional submarines could effectively deploy them to various remote areas that might be important but not high enough in priority to be covered by limited numbers of nuclear submarines- sense of alarm created by any subm11^.^ operating in an area of maritime c°nfl(j can cause major tactical disrupti°n^^/ draw considerable expenditures of ,s effort. A case in point is the in°rc amount of British ASW or dropped on false contacts during the ^
Falklands Conflict in response to^
presence of an Argentine Type-2u
lesel-electric submarine. None of the Pended ordnance ever seriously threat- the submarine.
Conventional submarines present sig- ant threats to large and small navies *e- But while many navies place great
Tee? The primary reason is one of reach.” Post-World War II assessment
jjjriated that the U. S. Navy be structured
Project power and a forward defense to
'•op,
^St
're limited and diverse priorities that
cupon an ability to fight at a level jPaiensurate with their local or regional
■tical goals. Sea power is not an end in
World War II, conventional boats surface speeds of up to 20 knots and
“'fid
alik<
siIance on their potential roles and mis- °ns> the United States eschews their ajPloyment in the future sea wars it vis- Pzes. Why are conventional subma- ^ es considered “conventional wisdom”
every submarine force but the U. S.
•Off 'Pe with the Soviet threat. A force size Pi? m‘x ,0 accomplish this objective took s0rity, although it has not always i^ed the United States well in Third p °rld conflicts and in areas such as the ^»an Gulf.
uther navies, on the other hand, have
Pol;
$elf- A nation uses the seas for its ad- ligj. aSe ashore, and most navies seem to Sljleve the diesel-electric submarine can ^P°rt their national objectives. ^Qpabilities: During and immediately
"ad
p;n -'stu spccus ui no muic man auuui
‘o C. kn°ts maximum for 30 minutes (the H rl^our” rate)- They could travel Ohe^0 m*'es’ mostly on the surface, at 'third speed on one main diesel en- ’ and no more than 100 miles sub- Ufcd on their batteries for about 24 evrs- Batteries were charged daily and (e]n more frequently with periodic snor- 3ri(jnP- Active sonars were short ranged blit ^ass*ve sonars were only a bit better, aBlicted by water flow noise created
by irregular hull shapes as the submarine moved through the water. Navigation by sextant was barely adequate for warfare needs, and dead-reckoning techniques caused large position errors, particularly after several days of no sun or star sights. Communications were tenuous, tedious, highly overt, and for the German submarines, an Achilles’ heel. U. S. fleet boats were double-hulled and demonstrated good survivability against enemy ASW weapons. But for the most part, their torpedoes were limited to a range of about 5,000 yards, while theiffire control was not very accurate, necessitating spreads of several torpedoes to ensure hits in a salvo.
As with nuclear-powered submarines, few examples of conventional submarine performance in actual combat situations since World War II are available. However, those that have been reported suggest potential roles for conventional submarines in the future.
► In the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, a Pakistani conventional submarine sank an Indian destroyer and damaged another with torpedo fire in much the same manner as diesel-electric submarines operated in World War II.
► The Oberon-class submarine HMS Onyx served in the South Atlantic during the 1982 Falklands Conflict on periscope beach reconnaissance operations, and was used for landing special forces.
► The Argentine German-built Type-209 submarine San Luis made three unsuccessful torpedo attacks on British task force ships in the Falklands Conflict. Despite the torpedo misses, considerable British ship and aircraft resources were tied up trying to find her.1
► It has been alleged that the Soviets have used their Whiskey-class submarines to examine Swedish harbor defenses for several years, and that they may also be deploying diving teams and small tracked submersibles on reconnaissance- type missions.2
Today, with the exception of speed and endurance, the advanced technology for improving submarine performance found on board nuclear submarines is transferra- ble to conventional submarines. Even the speed and submerged endurance of modem diesel-electrics have been greatly improved over that of World War II-era submarines. The maximum submerged speed of the U. S. Barbel-class is about 25 knots, while the latest German diesel- electrics can make 21.5 knots for a few minutes and the Soviet Kilo and Italian Nazario Sauro approximate 20 knots at a one-hour rate. Their hulls are shaped much like that of the experimental submarine Albacore (AGSS-569) with ratios of length to diameter of about 8:1, which produce less turbulence and reduce drag by 20% when moving through the water. Submerged endurance of more than six days is accrued from an increased battery capacity that is 4.5 times greater than World War II fleet submarine batteries. Satellite navigation plus inertial naviga-
Argentina’s Type-209 diesel submarine San Luis (sister Salta shown, top) tied up British ASW forces during the Falklands Conflict, while the British Oberon-class diesel boat HMS Onyx (sister Opossum shown, bottom) provided beach reconnais- ance and landed special operations forces against the Argentines.
tion systems now give precise positioning information 24 hours a day. Communications via satellite are rapid, reliable, and more secure. And while air and surface ship acoustic detection of submarines has improved, it is more than offset by submarine quieting—including even snorkel operations.
Of course, submarines don’t sink ships—weapons do. New and available “smart” weapons provide relief from the agonizing issue of maintaining accurate target motion analysis and closing the target within World War II torpedo-firing range. Retired Royal Navy Captain Richard Sharpe used the analogy that the diesel-powered submarine was a formidable type of “advanced, mobile, intelligent floating mine.” The diesel-electric submarine required the target to cooperate by sailing into the “mine field,” thereby making the conventional submarine weapon system primarily one of defense and attrition, not one of offense and initiative.3 A cruise-missile capability,
tional; 1,115 feet, maximum)
narinC'
The British Upholder-class subma
■ cti° ,-cla55
The Soviets’ most recent series production diesel sub class, the Kilo (bottom), greatly resembles the USS Barbel (SS-580, top), one of four remaining U. S. Navy diesel subs.
however, permits the diesel-electric submarine to function in a more aggressive role than as an “intelligent mine field,” or in a narrowly defined coastal sea- denial role. Smart missiles and torpedoes have ranges well beyond an enemy surface ship’s ASW detection range, along with characteristics that optimize the element of surprise in attack.
In this regard, Third World navies figure prominently in a recent intelligence report prepared by the then-Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral William O. Studeman. He stated, in part, that main combat fleets are now up against mounting dangers from smaller powers. This problem, according to Admiral Studeman, results from mounting arms sales to Third World nations.4 Cruise missiles are a case in point, since they are the modern-day, international weapon of choice. The low-cost cruise missile is small, powerful, accurate, and plentiful. Nearly 50 navies stock such weapons in ground-, air-, or submarine- launched versions.
The sea-skimming cruise missile may be the most difficult to counter; its radar return is hard to distinguish from sea clutter, thereby reducing response time to only seconds between detection and impact.5 Weapons such as the Exocet, the Harpoon, the antiship Tomahawk, and the Soviet SS-N-21 surface-launched cruise missile (SLCM) will find their way into more and more small navy submarine weapon inventories.
Smaller navies are also beginning to address the issues of target acquisition, navigation, and rapid reliable communications in a responsible manner. For example, on 19 September 1988, Israel launched a Horizon-I test satellite into orbit from a three-stage rocket; the satellite reportedly carried surveillance equipment to monitor its Arab neighbors. With that launch, Israel became the eighth nation to place a satellite into space.6 Space-based surveillance and communications capabilities provide the more advanced Third World countries the wherewithal to increase the threat level to small and large navies alike.
A small navy with a few conventional submarines can maintain sea control over a limited area for a short time—time enough to collect intelligence, patrol key choke-points, embark special forces, lay mines, or resupply or reinforce troops
ashore. Stealth—the greatest conven tional submarine attribute—assists su in avoiding ASW detection from the atn while increased submerged enduranc (shorter and less frequent snorkel per' ods) provides more security from mode surface and subsurface platforms an bottom-mounted arrays. ,
In large measure, modem convention submarines operated by Third Wo countries are built in England, France, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic ^ Germany, and the Soviet Union. The. employ new technologies and, in gener ' are smaller and quieter than their nucl° powered counterparts, thereby creati r an advantage for shallow-water op# tions inside the continental shelf- SotU
of the more notable characteristics Third World conventional submaru1 follow.
The French Agosta class:
► Rapid-reload pneumatic ramming b torpedo tubes that can launch weap0^ with a minimal noise signature down
maximum operational depth ..
► Equipped with the subsurta launched Exocet antiship missile
The British Oberon class: ^
► Soundproofed equipment allots
silent running .er
► High-grade-steel hull allows a £re‘r.,, maximum diving depth (656 feet, °P ► Incorporates advanced noise reduct'0 making it quieter than the Oberon-0
‘tub ..erf'0
The German Type 209-class (oP in 11 navies):
► Hull constructed of high-tensile-
magnetic steel .jei
► Equipped to carry and fire wire-gu
torpedoes ujd
► Equipped to fire submarine-laun0
Harpoon or Exocet missiles sj<
► Submerged endurance of more than ^ days while covering nearly 1,000 m' six knots on the battery
► Operates at depths of more than meters
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^ The Dutch Zeeleeuw class:
Carries 20 torpedoes or Harpoon
JLCMs
Noisy machinery is mounted on a false eck with spring suspension . The Italian Nazario Sauro class:
. Carries 12 torpedoes Operates at depths of more than 250 ^ters
^ The Soviet Foxtrot class:
Can carry and fire as many as four I'andard Soviet 15-kiloton yield antiship “rpedoes from the bow tubes , Submerged endurance of nearly a week • '°w speeds before needing to recharge batteries
Patrol duration of as many as 70 days, ^niited by supplies and fuel v. ^ill remain in service with the Soviet
INi
avy into the 1990s W for,
^ ^ill remain in slow series production
^ export
More than 62 units built since the late l950s
a new dispute over the Beagle Channel? What might the Libyans be expected to do with their Foxtrots?
If the United States elected to “write off’ diesel-electric submarines, the decision would be a miscalculation greater than permitting attrition of the U. S. Navy’s minesweeper force before the recent Persian Gulf escort operations. Indeed, if either belligerent in the Persian Gulf War had operated conventional submarines, allied escort operations in the Gulf would have taken on a whole new character.
Many military decision makers have been hypnotized by the potential revolution at sea created by the advent of the nuclear-powered submarine. They have failed to see how the quality of conventional submarines has changed over the past several decades. A few of the improved capabilities of today’s diesel- electric boats have been mentioned, but they only suggest important advances being made, particularly in the area of
SsaPablc of torpedo-tube launch of the ^ N-15 ASW missile, with a nuclear ("head, equivalent to the U. S. SubRoc ^marine rocket)
^ he Soviet Kilo class:
^ a series production °t)e ^merged endurance of more than re , Week at low speeds before needing to aarge its batteries7
Th
ae employment of conventional sub-
riarjlnes in modem warfare will be sce- Hat ° t*r'ven anci a product of the imagi- |\l ’°a- What, for example, might the if .a Koreans do with their submarines Involved in a conflict with the South djereans? Or how might Chile use its e -electric boats against Argentina in
increased submerged endurance. Soviet conventional submarines are credited with more than a week’s submerged endurance, and other modem conventionals benefit in the same way from their greatly increased battery capacities. More important, at least three new types of underwater propulsion systems are expected to be operational shortly that may enable totally submerged operations for 20 days or more (they are: the Swedish closed-cycle Stirling engine; the German fuel-cell power system; and the Italian Maritalia closed-cycle diesel engine). What these new capabilities represent still needs to be assessed, but they may facilitate under-the-ice operations, make port area
The Swedish A-I7, powered by a closed-cycle Stirling engine, will be capable of extended submerged operations. Shown are: the control room (top), torpedo-tube room (left), and propulsion control room (right).
blockades more effective, or enhance the conventional submarine’s ability to protect advance bases.
Conventional submarines might also serve as effective mining platforms. The small, German diesel-electric, for example, can carry an external mine belt of 40 gravity-launched bottom mines. Such a capability could permit the covert mining of harbors, water ways, and choke points. In addition, conventional subs could place mine fields to “herd” maritime traffic into areas where other subma-
N>c
craft.
,182'
rines might lie in wait. Submarine- launched, self-propelled mines and SLCMs give the conventional submarine an extended reach into enemy harbors and port facilities. The political consequences of such clandestine mining could have a more profound impact than even the actual damage the mines might inflict. Iran’s “primitive” attempts at mining the Persian Gulf in recent years highlight this concept.
In a global conflict, conventional submarines heading to remote bases would likely overtax available ASW assets. For instance, basing diesel-electric boats in Cam Ranh Bay could seriously threaten merchant ship traffic between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, as well as inject caution into U. S. carrier operations in the area. U. S. carrier battle groups may not have the “free ride” many would expect in attacking enemy advance bases. Similarly, amphibious operations will face more covert conventional submarine mining efforts and a stepped-up submarine defense of targeted coastal areas.
Large and small powers alike are beginning to recognize that modern conventional submarines—better than ever before—can hold their own against air and surface ASW units. And perhaps they can do reasonably well against nuclear- powered attack submarines (SSNs) in
shallow waters near their own shores.
With modem signal processing equipment, advanced towed-array sonars, longer submerged endurance, and smart weapons, the diesel-electric submarine becomes a factor in barrier operations. Assuredly it is not a competitor with the SSN, but it may be a force of consequence in opposing naval and merchant shipping—and, at the same time, a force to tie up major ASW assets. An international maritime strategy emphasizing forward deployment for a war at sea with the Soviet Union is, and should be, the U. S. Navy’s major concern. However, lesser navies have lesser priorities that may be brought into conflict with one another or with those of the United States. The diesel-electric submarine is important in protecting those priorities.
Without doubt, the Soviet Navy understands that “quantity” is a “quality” in itself, or it would not make such heavy investments in conventional submarines. Even with increasing capabilities becoming available to the conventional submarines, they will never become as capable as the SSN. However, the diesel-electric boats are a growing and proliferating threat to all kinds of conflicts at sea. And, more important, the conventional submarine—unlike its nuclear counterpart—is considered to be more expendable in war.
Thus certain high-risk missions will e assigned to the conventional submafln because of its far lower cost, small crew, and greater ease of replaccnit’11 • 'An unfriendly submarine known to be at sca,'redesignated operating area can tie up inordinate assets. For example, it has been calculated *^at f ,|,e German U-boat at sea in World War II consume efforts of 25 U. S. and British warships and 10° 2See War Machine, Vol. 8, Issue 95, pp- >■
1.889.
3Capt. Richard Sharpe, RN (Ret.), "The Fore*0'^ Jane’s Fighting Ships 1988-89,” cited in SeaP°“ June 1988, p. 68. . t0„
4Rear Admiral Studeman cited in “Washing Watch,” Air Force Magazine, May 1988, P- 5Ibid; Charlotte B. Adams, ‘‘Sleek, Fast, and $
rate: The NATO Connection RAM Program p.
into Firing Position,” Sea Power, August 19 ’ 35. into
6Masha Hamilton, ‘‘Israel Rockets Spy SatcU1 Orbit,” The Sun (San Bernardino, CA.), 20 Sep ber 1988, p. A-3. ,g2-
7See War Machine, Vol. 8, Issue 95, pp- ’
1.889.
Commander Ackley currently is a professor0 ^ jn cal science and director of the graduate prog*1*^, national security studies at the California State versity, San Bernardino, and is a consultant to ^ ence Applications International, Inc., and An ^j|C Assessment Corporation of Washington, D. C on active duty he commanded the USS Brea,n 243) and Submarine Division 31.
icember 31, 1989. r,, irchased
Photographs not awarded prizes may possibly pctia5ed y the U.S. Naval Institute. Those photographs not P di will be returned to the owner if accompanied y
28th ANNUAL NAVAL & MARITIME PHOTO CONTEST
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Mail entnes to: & MARITIME PHOTO CONTEST
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DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 1989
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contest.)
2. Limit: 5 entries per person. rintSi
3. Entries must be either black and white prints, color p or color transparencies.
4. Minimum print size is 5” x 7. nted
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