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By Colonel Gerald H. Turley. U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Electronic Battlefields Are Here
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In the past ten years, three conflicts have shown that modern warfare has entered the electronic age. Precision- guided weapons have substantially changed the nature of conventional military operations. New methods must he found to operate effectively on electronic battlefields.
In March 1972, when the North Vietnamese launched their Easter Invasion across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), they revised their tactics from guerrilla to conventional warfare. The roar of communist tanks and armored vehicles was heard from the 17th Parcel in Kontum to An Loc, just 40 miles from Saigon. Throughout the tenacious battles of 1972, Soviet-made and North Vietnamese-employed armor was the focal point of the war.
However, the introduction of newly developed electronic weapon systems into the battlefield would have a far more significant impact upon the art of modern warfare.
Beneath the roar of the armor, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) began to subtly introduce two new types of precision-guided missiles (PGMs). Both were Soviet made. Although these PGMs initially were employed only sporadically, by the end of 1972 their presence was significant.
In the waning days of the Vietnam War, precision-guided weapons were massed on the ground against South Vietnamese marines operating in U. S.-made tanks and armored personnel carriers. During one 48-hour period, 25 South Vietnamese tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) were damaged or destroyed by the “Sagger” antitank wire-guided missile.
During the same period, two U. S. jet aircraft, flying close-air support missions, and one OV-10 observation aircraft were shot down by multiple barrages of SA-7 “Strella” heat-seeking antiaircraft missiles.
Because the ever-increasing threat of these guided missile systems could not be reduced, U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam imposed restrictive flight operations on U. S.- crewed helicopters and observation aircraft. The ominous threat of electronic warfare weaponry was confirmed.
Until the 1970s, all armies relied upon ballistic projectiles to strike a target. So many variables influence the trajectory of ballistic bullets that the greater the distance to the target the more inaccurate the gun system. Wind, heat, power-charge, time of flight, even the difference in the elevation from the gun to its intended target, affect the gun system's accuracy.
In contrast, the precision-guided weapon system automatically self- corrects its own flight trajectory to the designated target, enhancing its accuracy to an unprecedented 90% kill factor. Even more significant, the effective killing range of antitank missiles is twice that of an M-60 tank’s 105mm. gun. The SA-7 antiaircraft missile’s extended range enables it to rise to 10,000 feet to strike an aircraft.
Commemorative Certificates of the Sea
Neptune • Antarctic Circle • Arctic Circle • Golden Dragon • Recommissioning • Plank Owner • Golden Shellback • Round the World • Icelandic Domain Send for FREE COLOR BROCHURE! Certificate Service — U.S. Naval Institute — Annapolis, MD 21402
announcement that the Shah was wholly dependent on U. S. medical treatment. As Lawrence K. Altman pointed out, “if the U. S. Government had known of his cancer from the beginning, history would have taken a very different turn.” Certainly, the President would not have been under such extreme pressure to admit the Shah had his condition been known—and treated—since 1974. If the Shah had been treated earlier, his case history would have precluded any unfounded claims that he required medical treatment in the United States.
No Hiding Place describes the failed rescue attempt and questions the adequacy of the planning. However, lacking complete testimony by the participants, the book fails to address the question of whether the mission was superior to other alternatives.
Four hundred forty-four days after their capture, the hostages were released. They first stepped on American soil at Stewart Airport, Newburgh, New York. Americans celebrated their return with bands and crowds. They were released on President Reagan’s Inauguration Day, psychologically battered but alive.
Any explanation of the hostages’ release is likely to be inconclusive. However, speculation may shed some light on the U. S. style of foreign policy. The conduct of U. S. foreign policy has often been an attempt to reconcile humanistic goals and state goals. This struggle was played out during the hostage crisis. Carter was criticized for putting the safety of the hostages first. While he was successful in maintaining their safety, he was powerless to secure their release. President-elect Reagan’s rhetoric favored a firmer, perhaps bellicose policy. One can only guess how the Iranians would have reacted if Reagan’s stand had been policy. However, it is likely that any military intervention (or serious threat thereof) would have endangered the hostages. A good case could be made then that neither Carter’s humanistic priorities nor Reagan’s statist priorities could independently secure the hostages' safe return. However, a synthesis of the two goals did achieve a measure of success. Ironically, this synthesis of U. S. goals explains both the strength and weakness of the American foreign policy process: The hostages returned safely but America seemed impotent.
The reader feels that he is looking at a scrapbook of the hostage crisis, but does not come away with a clear idea of why events unfolded as they did. Furthermore, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from this book about ways to avoid a similar situation in the future.
21st Annual Naval and Maritime Photo Contest Deadline 31 December 19
Ten prize-winning photos will be chosen and awarded $100 each in the U. S. Naval Institute’s 21 st Annual Naval and Maritime Photo Contest. The winning photos will be published in a 1983 issue of the Naval Institute's monthly publication, Proceedings
Entry Rules
1. Each photograph must pertain to a naval or maritime subject. (The photo is not limited to the calendar year of the contest)
2. Limit: 5 entries per person.
3. Entries must be either black and white prints, color prints or color transparencies.
4. Minimum print size is 5" x 7".
5. Minimum transparency size is 35mm. (No glass-mounted transparencies, please.)
6. Full captions and the photographer's name and address must be printed or typed on a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print, or printed on the transparency mount.
(No staples, please)
7. Entries must arrive at the U. S. Naval Institute no later than 31 December 1982.
Photographs not awarded prizes may be purchased by the U. S. Naval Institute. Those photographs not purchased will be returned to the owner if accompanied by a stamped, self addressed envelope.
Mail entries to:
Naval and Maritime Photo Contest U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE Annapolis, Maryland 21 (301)268-6110
However, No Hiding Place is a collection of accounts which the general reader and the military professional will find useful. Researchers may also find it a useful reference, particularly for its detailed chronology.
the new AGCs had on this thought process is difficult to determine. Regardless of the origin of the idea, the result was recommencement of work on a heavy cruiser that had been canceled while under construction at the end of World War II. Instead of being completed as a cruiser, however, her main armament was removed, and she was reconfigured as a light tactical command ship (CLC). Commissioned in 1953 as the USS Northampton (CLC-1), she eventually served as flagship of both the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean (1954-55) and the Second Fleet in the Atlantic (1955-61). In 1961, the Northampton's services as a fleet flagship were lost when she was redesignated CC-1 and assigned along with a converted light carrier, the USS Wright (CC-2), to act as a National Emergency Command Post Afloat (NECPA). She was decommissioned in 1970 when the NECPA concept was abandoned and was stricken in 1977.
The demise of the Northampton appears to have ended any efforts to develop a specific class of fleet commander’s flagship. At that point, the fleet commanders generally chose the remaining eight-inch gun cruisers such as the USS St. Paid (CA-73) and USS Newport News (CA-148) for their flagships. As these ships were decommissioned, flags were gradually transferred to the converted guided missile cruisers (CLGs), some of which were modified for their new roles. Four ships of the Providence class had a forward turret removed and their bridges enlarged to provide more flag spaces.
With the exception of the planning that led to the development of the Northampton, force planning for command and control of the numbered fleets does not compare well with the parallel planning for amphibious command and control that led to the building of the LCCs. Two conflicting trends were approaching a collision point, but no orderly process was under way to anticipate the impact of the collision. On one hand, surface combatants capable of acting as flagships were becoming smaller and fewer in number. On the other hand, fleet commanders were requiring increasingly larger staffs and greater amounts of sophisticated equipment to meet the increasing complexity of naval warfare. When the last of the flag-configured CLGs were retired, the fleet commanders found themselves left with a force planning problem.
The Commanding Generals of the Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific and their Navy amphibious counterparts need a ship capable of providing command, control, and communications (C3) for MAB and MAF amphibious assaults. This translates into a ship with the following characteristics:
► C3-related systems (radio, radar, computers, etc.) necessary for the
CATF to control the landing of as many as 50,000 men, coordinate the support for that landing, and coordinate all types of naval warfare including antisubmarine warfare, antiair warfare, antisurface warfare, and electronic warfare within the amphibious objective area (AOA)
► Working and living space adequate to accommodate the staffs of the CATF and the CLF while they plan and execute the amphibious operation
► Speed and other operational characteristics necessary to operate with an amphibious task force
The needs of a fleet commander, on the other hand, are similar to those of an amphibious commander, but not identical. The characteristics required in a fleet flagship would include:
► C5-related systems necessary for the fleet commander to coordinate all types of naval warfare over a large geographic area
► Working and living space to accommodate a large naval staff
► Speed and other operational characteristics necessary to operate with a carrier battle group or surface action group
► Essence—the quality of looking like a fleet commander’s flagship is supposed to look
Any short-term force planning involves allocating the use of the LCCs and minimizing any adverse operational impact. Acquiring additional assets simply takes too long to solve the immediate problem. The choices involved are three:
► Give the LCCs to the fleet commanders and require the amphibious commanders to change their ways of operating
^ Give the LCCs to the amphibious commanders and require the fleet commanders to change their ways of operating
^ Reach a compromise that makes the LCCs available to both parties
Choice one has two disadvantages with associated risks. The first disadvantage is that it takes away from an amphibious commander the ability to control adequately the landing of more than a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU). Larger landings have been conducted in peacetime exercises using LHAs and even LPHs as flagships. These landings have been made possible, however, only by resorting to artificialities that would not exist in wartime. The fact remains that the LCC ls an essential ingredient of an MAB or MAF landing. The primary risk of this choice, of course, is that we might need to conduct such a landing, but would be unable to. The second disadvantage is that, while the LCC is adequate for a fleet commander in most respects, it is not fast enough to operate With a carrier battle group or surface action group. The flagship would either have to operate alone—an unacceptable risk—or force some other formation to reduce speed with the attendant risks.
Choice two presents no problems for the amphibious commander, but has one major disadvantage for the fleet pommander. He has no means of taking his entire staff to sea. The risk associated with this choice is that the fleet commander might be incapable of adequately controlling his fleet under certain conditions.
Choice three has a certain appeal and is, in fact, the choice that has been adopted in both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. Unfortunately, the final result almost certainly will be the same as that of choice one. Agreements between the Navy and Marine Corps to maintain landing force spaces on board the LCCs and to allocate annual training time for amphibious exercises notwithstanding, the Blue Ridge and Mount Whitney are now primarily fleet commanders’ flagships. I cannot imagine a scenario in which the situation would require an MAB or MAF amphibious assault, but, at the same time, be such that the fleet commander would agree to relinquish his flagship. On the other hand, I can imagine any number of scenarios that would require the amphibious commanders and the fleet commanders to be located at widely separated positions, an impossibility if all are sharing the same flagship. The risk here is that both parties will base their wartime plans around having the LCC but only one will be able to use her. Choice three is a peacetime compromise that does not face up to the realities of war.
Given the long time required to build a modern warship, naval commanders have little short-term influence over mismatches between operational plans and the means to implement those plans. They can choose to change their manner of operating, change their plans, or do neither and accept the associated risks. For the time being, the choice has been made to take a gamble that we will not have to conduct a large-scale amphibious assault.
In the long run, however, another option becomes available to solve the problem. Additional assets can be acquired. This will happen only as the result of an orderly force-planning process such as the one that eventually produced the Blue Ridge and Mount Whitney. That process could be continued with the aim of producing still another generation of amphibious command ships. But in view of the suitability of the LCCs for their design role, that would seem unnecessary. A better choice would be to return the LCCs to the amphibious forces and approach the problem of fleet command and control from a longterm point of view. The answer might be to build an entirely new class of ship. It might be to modify some existing one. It might even be for the fleet commanders to remain ashore. In any case, the answer should be the result of force planning, not forced choice.
1 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11: Vol. Vll, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951), p. 207.
2 U. S. Congress. House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 9637 to Authorize Appropriations During Fiscal Year 1965 for Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels, and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation for the Armed Forces, Hearings (Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1964), p. 7355.
5 Ibid., p. 7372.
An infantry officer, Colonel Gatchel's duties have included two tours in Vietnam, command of an infantry battalion, and schooling at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the Naval Post-graduate School, and the Naval War College. He has been involved with planning for the use of both LCCs as a member of the G-3 section, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, and as the G-4 ofthe 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade. He is currently a member of Strategic Studies Group.
Ticonderoga: First and Formidable
By Captain R. G. Guilbault, U. S. Navy
The Ticonderoga (CG-47) will be delivered combat ready as directed by CNO and be a deployable, war-ready ship shortly thereafter. That means that “by design” the Ticonderoga will be fully equipped with armament when she sails from Pascagoula, Mississippi, in February 1983. The motto in Pascagoula is “CG-47’s post shakedown availability (PSA) is now!” We are not waiting to be backfitted or upgraded later. We do not intend to sail with a colossal “growth margin” in weight to be corrected or filled sometime down the pike. To the contrary, we are leaving loaded with greater missile capacity than CGs-26-28, CGNs-36-38, and DDGs-993-996. We are getting two close-in weapon systems now. We are getting SLQ-32 (V3) systems now. We are getting Harpoon launchers now. We will be able to carry a group staff when we sail. We can carry two LAMPS I helicopters and have space and weight to accommodate two LAMPS Ills and the SQR- 19 tactical towed array sonar system (TACTAS) when these systems reach the operating fleet.
Consequently, the Navy is getting a well-armed ship and not a “yacht masquerading as a warship,” to borrow an expression used recently on these pages by Commander Morss*. The Ticonderoga is not another Hood, nor is she another Spruance (DD-963)/ Kidd (DDG-993) at delivery, or an-
*See “Ticonderoga: Another Hood?" by Commander Strafford Morss, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), August 1982 Proceedings, pages 116117; Captain E. L. Beach, U. S. Navy (Retired), October 1982 Proceedings, page 134.
Those who questioned theTicon- deroga’s stability, must have been surprised to see her, like a world-class figure skater, performing O’s and Z’s during recent trials without falling on her fantail.
other Bainbridge (CGN-25), which was commissioned in 1963 with no Navy tactical data system (NTDS) and only SPG-55A radars and an SPS-39. That condition persisted until the 1970s when the CGN-25 was upgraded. The CG-47 will not have to wait. She is a truly formidable fighting ship now. Commander Morss should be applauding OpNav and NavSea for designing a ship that brings such operational quality and superiority to the fleet. The Ticonderoga's fighting capability is impressive and second to none, while her growth margin (from a weight standpoint) is not as impressive—and thank goodness for that!
This does not mean that the Ticonderoga has no weight growth margin. The design has sufficient weight margin to introduce into the CG-52 the vertical-launching system (VLS) and increase the missile-carrying capacity by 50% and incorporate within that system the Tomahawk missile capabilities. That is impressive growth. However, there is a tendency to focus too much on the ship’s growth margin from a weight standpoint and not address a ship’s adaptability to upgrade her capability while not increasing displacement. We should be striving to commission ships that are fully loaded from a warfighting aspect, survivable and resistant from a damage control point of view, with minimum space and weight for future systems, and good growth margin from a capability standpoint. We have succeeded in this regard in the Ticonderoga, and as the commanding officer who may be ordered to sail in harm’s way, I am thankful. Future systems and weight growth margins have never helped a commanding officer when he engages an enemy in battle. Let us then discuss exactly what our condition will be when we sail in February 1983.
We will be loaded! We will not require a four- to six-week PSA to be backfitted or upgraded which the Kidd- class needed to realize their fine fighting potential. We are planning on a six-week PSA to fix warranty and final contract trial items. “Loaded” should not be solely viewed as a numbers game. (Although in missile capacity, we exceed the ship classes noted above, and in torpedo magazine capacity, we exceed the DD-963, the battle group’s premier ASW ship.) The quality of what is on board is a major part in any readiness assessment. Side- by-side comparisons historically do not tell the story. The CG-47’s SPY-1 radar exceeds the capability and reliability of any 3-D radar in the fleet today or contemplated in the future. Thus, to simply say that the Ticonderoga has a 3-D radar and the Arkansas (CGN-41) has a 3-D radar lacks a basic appreciation of quality differences. The data base, reaction time, coverage, availability, flexibility, and electronic countermeasures (ECM) resistance of the total Aegis weapon system outshine any other combat information center combat system in the fleet today or being contemplated for upgrade. Similarly, there is a vast difference in the capabilities of NTDS ships and the Aegis cruisers. The Ticonderoga' s Aegis display system with its large screen displays and automatic status boards will provide the commanding officer and the embarked commander greater real-time tactical information display for own ship fighting or battle group antiair warfare (AAW) commander management than any other system in the fleet. With the Aegis display system design, capabilities exist through computer technology (“not weight margins for more gear” but capability growth margins) to incorporate the battle group AAW coordination (BGAAWC) scheme now in development for the mid-1980s and beyond.
TThe Aegis operational readiness tests system (ORTS), which constantly monitors the status of the Aegis Weapon System, assesses its readiness, troubleshoots any negative trend, and analyzes and locates casualties, is another readiness and availability dimension found in no other surface ship’s combat system. To achieve this, we have taken up some space and added some weight, but we have significant system readiness diagnostic capabilities now rather than empty space dedicated to future growth. The Ticonderoga also has an embedded training system, called Aegis combat training system, which permits individual, subteam, and total team training. This is an invaluable tool, the qualities and flexibility of which are not available in any other surface ship's combat information center that I am aware of, that ensures my people’s combat system readiness effectiveness remains high.
Furthermore, all these quality capabilities are available in a ship manned by only 22 officers and 319 enlisted men. As such, this is the only area where the Ticonderoga is not as or more loaded than other cruisers. These other cruisers’ manning numbers range from the 400s to more than 1,000 in crew size. Hence, the Ticonderoga will sail loaded, with quality in that load, with an impressive built-in capability growth margin, and with minimum manning numbers required.
The Ticonderoga also will be survivable. I am speaking of passive survivability or our ability to resist damage. The Ticonderoga has fire-zone boundaries divided by an electromagnetic door-closing scheme to prevent fire from spreading. These doors can be closed locally or remotely from the damage control console, quickly isolating a fire to a particular section of the ship. Similarly, refractory felt material has been installed in the superstructure to reduce the fire intensity to which aluminum might be exposed. The main engineering spaces are equipped with a Halon 1301 extinguishing system to combat any major margin of 5%. This is a reasonable margin and consistent with other classes of ships that were not delivered with significant equipment deficiencies or in need of near-term and at times far-term upgrades.
Would I prefer a larger ship? Yes. With a larger ship, we could have some increased habitability advantages and some space could have been allocated for offices for the command master chief, the career counselor, and the chief master-at-arms instead of having the executive officer wrestle with finding adequate spaces for these vital capability, then that would be an unacceptable compromise.
The Ticonderoga brings a new dimension of combat system excellence to the fleet, which makes her invaluable for battle group and surface action group effectiveness and survivability. The CG-47 has weight growth built in for LAMPS III, SQR-19 TAC- TAS, and VLS. With the Aegis display system and the Aegis weapon system flexibility to accept the BGAAWC upgrade, SLQ-32 integration, and eventually ASW upgrades, the Ticonderoga has significant ca-
machinery space fire that might occur. By design, the Ticonderoga'% topside cables have been installed within the mast or in aluminum-plated reinforced cableways. High-strength aluminum and steel have been installed around key combat system spaces and magazine areas to minimize damage from warhead fragmentation and impact. The watertight compartmentation has been increased because of the raising of the V lines. Also, the Aegis weapon system proper has been designed to resist effects of electromagnetic interference and to survive in the environment which such interference would cause. Several other features, such as the Ticonderoga's fire main and damage control console arrangements, Were developed to support the Ticonderoga' s survivability posture should she be hit. Thus, the Ticonderoga can resist damage and keep fighting.
At sail away, the Ticonderoga is expected to have a service-life growth
tasks. In the Ticonderoga, there is only one captain’s cabin—an all-purpose small cabin near the bridge. The space used by the commanding officer as an inport cabin on the DD-963 and DDG- 993 was converted to an embarked commander’s cabin on the CG-47. In addition, the 06 pantry facility found on other cruisers and captain-commanded ships has been omitted. A larger general mess where a separate first class petty officers’ mess could have been adequately provided would also have been a positive factor and one which would make the senior petty officers’ situation more socially and professionally inviting. On the Ticonderoga, we simply have insufficient room for a first class mess. From a social, managerial, and flexibility standpoint, some additional space would have been beneficial. However, as a fighting ship, if the only alternative to achieve these benefits was to reduce the Ticonderoga's fighting pability growth margins. After damage, the Ticonderoga also would have good survivability features. The Ticonderoga will sail loaded and be seaworthy as well when she joins the fleet in 1983.
Would 1 prefer more weapons? Yes. I wish that we could be sailing with 32 to 64 Tomahawk missiles loaded in armored box launchers until the VLS is ready to be installed.
By any combat standard, however, the Navy can chalk up the Ticonderoga as a true success. 1 am very pleased to be the first to take this formidable ship to sea!
Captain Guilbault has served in the USS Huzi7- wood (DD-531), USS Bainbridge (CGN-25), and USS Dale (CG-19) and commanded the USS Tattnell (DDG-19). He also has been assigned to many billets ashore associated with combat and missile systems. Prior to reporting to Pascagoula, Mississippi, in October 1981 as Prospective Commanding Officer of the Ticonderoga, he served on the staff of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare.
The Light Battleship (BBL)
By Gene Anderson
Several of OpNav’s options for the Phase II modernization of the Iowa- class battleships propose removing the aft 16-inch turret and replacing it with either a vertical missile launching system or a hangar-flight deck for V/STOL aircraft. If these turrets should be removed, these valuable weapons still can be sent to sea for the U. S. Navy by installing them on light battleships (BBLs).
Many articles in the Proceedings have complained of the lack of conventional firepower in the fleet for shore bombardment missions. The requirement for such firepower was demonstrated in the Falklands War. The lo- H’as and BBLs can fill this void for the U. S. Navy.
As I envision her, the BBL would be relatively small with an overall length of slightly more than 400 feet, a broad beam of about 84 feet and a draft of 22 feet. Her displacement would be slightly less than a pre-World War II German pocket battleship and of about 9,000 tons. This new class of warship would have a high, fully flared and rounded cruise ship-type bow to keep her forecastle dry to protect the Mk-26 missile launcher located there. Drawing on merchant fleet experience, a large bulbous bow would be added to reduce bow wave for increased fuel efficiency and speed. For better maneuverability for anchoring, berthing, and during shore bombardment, bow and stern thrusters are included. Assisting these thrusters are two large semi-balance rudders. The armor box, including the conning tower, covers all vital spaces, including the steering compartment. Damage to this compartment led to the sinking of the German battleship Bismarck early in World War II by the British Navy. To resist torpedo and mine damage, the BBL would have side blisters, voids, fuel and water tanks, and a triple bottom.
The officers and enlisted personnel will be quartered in her hull. The wardroom, both flag and captain’s quarters, are located in the main superstructure. The forward section of this structure is angled back so as to allow the main battery turret to rotate 270° in train, or to permit it to shoot aft. In front of this structure is the armored conning tower with steering, protection for the flag, and sighting periscopes. Above this tower are the bridge and pilothouse. Above the pilothouse is an armored visual lookout compartment, and above that is an open control station with the range fire tower in the center. This tower is a heavy duty carrier-type foremast to support whatever type of electronic sensing gear the Navy wishes to use. The same applies to the main mast aft of the stack. The superstructure is somewhat like that of the USS South Dakota (BB-57)-class battleship to give a strong military image while “showing the flag” in trouble spots of the world.
In spite of a broad beam and short- length ratio, it appears that 20,000 to 25,000 horsepower should give this light battleship more than sufficient speed to escort a 20-knot convoy, possibly up to 25 knots. Four to six medium- speed diesels could provide this power through twin or triple screws. Possibly a pair of high-horsepower-per-cyl- inder, slow-turning, direct-drive fuel- efficient diesels now available could be considered. For redundancy in the event of battle damage, the main propulsion units are in two separate engine rooms separated by triple bulkheads. The same would apply to the diesel generator rooms as well. The main engines are directly controlled with reverse and ahead throttles located on the bridge wings, pilothouse, armored conning tower, and the engine room control center. The throttles are located on control panels with engine instruments, helm, and thruster control levers.
Her main battery naturally consists of the turreted three 16-inch/50 cal. rifles. Her secondary batteries could be a variety of weapons, starting possibly with three or five Mk-45, 4-inch/ 54 cal. mounts with the odd weapon mounted aft on center line. Possibly two or four of these weapons could be mounted on the side with a single Mk-48 eight-inch gun in the center line position aft. This array would give the gunnery department a great selection of projectiles to be used on a specific target. Possibly three or five of the new vertical loading gun mounts
(VLGM) 155-mm/.50-cal. weapon pould be installed. Logistically speak- ln8, it appears that this could be an e*cellent selection, because the VLGM fires U. S. Army and Marine Corps standard 155-mm. ballistic and guided projectiles, as well as NATO ballistic ammunition. For sea-to-air defense, a Pair of Mk-26 missile launchers are ■ncluded in the design, as well as a pair °f Vulcan/Phalanx 20- or 30-mm. Weapons systems for close-in protection. Even torpedo tubes could be considered for installation in the large bulbous bow. A passive or attack sonar system could also be mounted there.
The fire control system for the 16- mch rifles could be optical range finders, optical-electric, radar, or even laser. Two helicopters could be hang- ared, and launched from the broad stern as “spotters” to back up this fire control system. These helicopters could also be used for logistic support, personnel transfer, or ASW missions.
Because much of the weaponry and Propulsion machinery will be automatic, requiring only a small maintenance crew, the size of the overall crew Would be 100 or so more than the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. Much of the BBL’s crew would be assigned to man the main battery turret. This is a great change from the past, when battleship crews numbered in the thousands at great cost to the taxpayers.
The primary mission of the light battleships is shore bombardment with both heavy and medium caliber weapons. However, these are designed to be highly successful multimission Warships. They have the speed, armament, endurance, flag quarters, and communications to provide surface and air protection, and act as a command ship of a 20-knot convoy consisting of the latest LSTs, LSDs, LHAs, RO/ RO cargo ships, converted cruise ships, etc. Screened by the latest class of frigates, these BBLs could be used on aggressive search-and-destroy missions after enemy convoys and shore installations. There appears to be nothing in the Soviet fleet that could take on these BBLs in a conventional sea battle. Because of their shallow draft, they could lay closer to shore than the bigger Iowas in a down-the- tube heavy-caliber shootout at extremely tough enemy bunkers and fortifications. By the same token, in an exceptionally high-risk missions requiring an armored ship of heavy caliber firepower, it would be more logical to use a BBL than an /mru-class battleship because the risk to men and material would be substantially less. In an all-out invasion requiring hundreds of thousands of troops, the BBLs could add heavy firepower along with the bigger Iowas. With their 16- inch guns equipped with rocket-assisted projectiles, they could lob 6,000 pounds of high explosives upon an enemy 50 miles away.
The BBLs could play many roles during peacetime. As mentioned earlier, their massive military appearance with the 16-inch turret would make an excellent “flag shower” for trouble spots and diplomatic missions. They would make an excellent training vessel for big-gun/big-ship handling of midshipmen and reserves. Their broad decks would have plenty of room for personnel formations and exercises. They could play a substitute role for the Iowas during war games, while these larger BBs are away on other duties or in for their yard availabilities.
If no 16-inch turrets should become available from the Iowas, a serious study should be made to develop this class of warship by using less expensive and highly effective 14- or 12-inch weapons. To overcome the high cost of modern weaponry, the smaller BBLs may be the warship of the future. Using off-the-shelf equipment, the cost of BBLs would probably fall somewhere between that of the Spruance- class destroyers and the Oliver Hazard /V ivy-class frigates.
Author's Note: Many Institute
members and others who read this proposal for BBLs may wonder what my sources were. The answer is the Proceedings. With the exception of time spent in the Navy daring World War II, I have read nearly every issue of the Proceedings published in the past 45 years and have researched copies before World War I. Before becoming a member of the Institute, a quarter of a century ago, I used to read this magazine in the Main Seattle Library. I was given my first copy to read by then ensign, now retired Captain Bruce Ross (Class of '35) in the tiny junior officers’ mess on board the battleship Arizona (BB-39) while this ship was having her 1936 annual availability at Bremerton Navy Yard. The first article I read in the Proceedings was about using high-speed, railroad-type diesel electric propulsion units to drive BBs.
Mr. Anderson is a naval architect who lives in Los Angeles, California. During World War II. he served as an intelligence specialist on the staff of Admiral Nimitz.
An Old-Fashioned Modern War
Lieutenant Commander T. J. McKearney, U. S. Navy
Volumes will be written on the conflict in the Falklands. The analysis we have witnessed daily on the nightly news will broaden as the actual details °f the Falklands War emerge. Before the “think tanks” draft scores of bar graphs and Congress generates tomes °f testimony, the following thoughts are offered as simple “lessons learned” from an old-fashioned modern war.
Naval forces belong at sea. The Argentine Navy’s failure to pose a serious threat to the British task force almost ensured English success in the campaign. Had the Argentine fleet, particularly the carrier Veinticinco de Mayo, presented even a hint of a blue- water threat, the resulting defensive precautions which the British would have had to take would have expended significant and limited British resources. Given the oncoming poor winter weather, any pause for second- guessing Argentine naval intentions could have been fatal to the British assault. While the Argentine Navy’s poor showing will be much debated, at this point it appears that the sinking of the General Belgrano was the turning point for English victory in the South Atlantic. Intimidated by this action, the Argentine Navy refused to chance further losses to the British and allowed the Argentine cause to face the consequences. By hugging the coast (or otherwise remaining indisposed), the Argentine fleet took a course out of harm’s way. A major clash at sea would have probably resulted in a British victory, but the chance of such an encounter would have complicated British plans.
Naval support in the amphibious objective area (AOA) is a difficult compromise. Using a practice established by our forces as well, the British assigned support missions (specifically, naval gunfire support) for forces ashore to surface escorts. On several occasions, this employment appears to have stripped British area air defense to the point that Argentine pilots were able to penetrate AOA airspace and conduct successful raids on landing ships. A simple solution to this problem would seem to be the deployment of more escort forces within the AOA. However, the British had a large contingent of destroyers and frigates but the threat of attack on British naval forces was sporadic at all times, even though the actual air raids were intense. Perhaps this particular problem results from the conflicting missions assigned to naval forces within the AOA. The landing force commander, struggling to get a foothold ashore, sees nearby ships as mobile artillery batteries; the amphibious task force commander must defend the force and maintain a usually fragile margin of maritime and air superiority. Both appreciate the problems of the other, but each commander may place different priorities on the actual assignment of units to specific missions. By doctrine, the task force commander has the final say on defending the AOA, but it takes time to shift formations and reposition escorts—time that may not be available during an emergent attack.
Airborne early warning <AEW) aircraft are vital resources. It is apparent that Argentine pilots penetrated British air surveillance around the Falk- lands several times. This shortcoming in British defenses—in addition to the subsequent success of the Israelis’ employment of their E-2Cs in Lebanon—demonstrates the requirement for airborne surveillance in modern warfare. Had the British task force possessed such integral support: Would the Sheffield have been lost? Would
No doubt influenced by the loss of the General Belgrano, the Argentine Navy neither ventured, nor gained, but simply stayed in port throughout the Falkland Crisis. There are reports, however, that the “Type 209” submarine (right) did attempt to take the battle to the British, but failed.
one other destroyer and two frigates have been sunk in Falkland Sound? Would the Argentines have surprised the largely administrative landing staged in the vicinity of Port Stanley? The English no doubt could compile a more complete list, but the ultimate response is the same: the most serious British losses in the Falklands campaign can be attributed to their inability to provide the quality area surveillance that an AEW aircraft could have supplied.
Today's warship crews must be organized to respond to an attack on short notice. Modern technology has given the warship under attack only seconds to respond. The standard approach to this problem in the U. S. Navy has been to provide a Condition III watch organization which provides for a portion of the ship’s battery to be manned under the direction of a tactical action officer with the authority to shoot if necessary. Condition III requirements place weapons and combat information center personnel in “port and starboard” two-section watches which create obvious strains if maintained over extended periods of time. For this reason, commanding officers are understandably reluctant to maintain their crews at Condition
III for long periods and tend to relax increased readiness conditions as soon as the tactical situation allows. “Standing down” from increased air defense conditions seems to have been a contributing factor to several Argentine successes in the Falklands. Obviously, men cannot be kept at battle stations indefinitely. Conversely, the rapidly developing threats of modern warfare make it imperative that we organize and train our ships’ companies to maintain maximum readiness for extended periods. Moreover, the aversion many commanders have to the peacetime exercising of increased conditions of readiness must be overcome in favor of regular drilling of integral combat systems teams.
VISTOL proves itself, but. . . . The Harrier V/STOL aircraft performed well in the Falklands both in attack and fighter missions. In the attack role, the Harrier gave a good accounting of itself operating from carrier decks and relatively unimproved airfields hastily established ashore. This flexibility in close-in air support vindicates the U. S. Marine Corps’ decade-old decision to employ Harriers with amphibious assault forces. As a fighter, however, the success of the Harrier in the Falklands must be examined closely. AdI. R. DOS SANTOS
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mittedly, the Harriers compiled an impressive score against superior—at •east on the drawing board—conven- l|onal aircraft. Nonetheless, the Argentine Skyhawk and Mirage attack- eonfigured aircraft were operating at •he limits of their combat radii. Had •he Argentines been able to provide rPore sophisticated fighter cover over •he Falklands, the clear-cut superi- °rity established by British naval air Power would have been far more tenuous. While the Harrier certainly deserves a place in our Marine Amphib- '°us Units (MAUs), those who say its Performance in the Falklands proves "'e could use smaller V/STOL-ori- er>ted carriers in place of our large deck earners should reconsider the consequences of pitting the Harrier against •he high-grade air threat that most adversaries are capable of launching.
Embarking amphibious troops is a Procedure that cannot be taken for granted. Although the Royal Navy Possesses several well deck-configured transports similar to U. S. LPD- LSD types, the majority of the troop e(nbarkations in the Falklands appeared to be by embarkation nets into ulongside landing craft. Climbing down embarkation nets is uncomfortable at best and dangerous at its worst. With •he ballast system employed on the modern LPDs and LSDs, it takes the same amount of time to ballast down, ground out” two LCM-8s, load them •° capacity with troops, and ballast down again for launching as it would for the same number of troops to handover-hand their way into the bouncing boats held alongside. Loading in the well deck is made more attractive by rough seas and enemy attack. Helicopters played a large role in the English ship-to-shore movement, and one can only speculate that this more efficient method of transporting troops was not employed more often because of shortages of helicopters and poor weather.
EMCON strikes again! A most disturbing revelation from the initial postwar “wash-up” is that HMS Sheffield was operating with her radars secured when struck by the Ex- ocet missile that doomed her. The use of emission control (EMCON) to hide from enemy detection is, of course, logical and necessary during some phases of any naval battle. EMCON, however, remains the most overrated of our defensive measures, and we continually delude ourselves as to its tactical effectiveness. Although the control of unnecessary electronic noise can make an enemy’s offensive task more difficult, the trade-off is the loss of the surveillance and communications systems that must be secured. True enough, radars, sonars, radios, etc., can give a significant amount of information to an opponent. This realization, however, has led us to the notion that we can sneak around the ocean indiscriminately by turning our electronics off. The loss of the Sheffield may be the final retort to this reasoning. While most of our EMCON exercises concentrate on shutting down equipment, they should explore the effective minimum use of sensors and communications systems.
In addition to its other naval roles,
Despite the proximity of the frigate Arrow, left, all the Queen’s hoses and all the Queen’s men couldn’t put the Sheffield together again once the fires started; she sank two days later, a victim of damage that the Royal Navy seemed unable to control.
the helicopter can be a viable attack vehicle. Besides the more familiar missions of ASW and amphibious assault, British helicopters proved to be successful in attack roles against ships and in ground support. Faced with increasingly smaller platforms for basing naval aviation, many of our allies have adapted the helicopter to an attack mission, a move generally ignored by our naval planners, who have lived with the luxury of the fixed-wing attack planes launched from large-deck carriers. The British experience in the Falklands gives us an excellent reason to reconsider this tactical oversight. The attack helicopter would be a welcome addition to our cruiser-destroyer task groups, and we should examine the benefits such integral support would offer our non-carrier forces which are becoming increasingly offense oriented.
The importance of damage control is demonstrated again. Both Argentine and British losses at sea reflect questionable proficiency at damage control (DC). The sinking of the highly compartmentalized General Belgrano within a relatively short time and the British inability to fight shipboard fires should be causes of concern for all naval professionals. The efficiency of
modern weapons is not an excuse for poor DC but a reason for increased attention in this area. A particular concern is the devastation caused to two English frigates with aluminum superstructures. Although the U. S. Navy is gradually working its way back to steel upperdecks, the vast majority of our current combatants are aluminum above the main deck. The only offsets available to overcome this built- in weakness are proper firefighting procedures which must be complemented by careful maintenance of damage control equipment. Here, of course, is the rub: i.e., DC on board many ships is everyone’s orphan, and the responsibility for this crucial aspect of shipboard defense is passed around the wardroom table like a hot potato. Historically, we discover the shortcomings of our damage control the same way the British and Argentines did, obviously too late to do anything about it. Damage control must get as much effort as lip service; the more you sweat in peace, the less you burn (or sink) in war.
The light tanks used by the British seem well suited to amphibious warBombing by the Beacon
By Captain Stephen S. Beitler, U. S. Army
Beacon bombing is the process of deploying a portable radar beacon transpohder for the purpose of targeting aerial bombardment. Unlike a traditional ground radar, which bounces a signal off an aircraft, the beacon transponder is interrogated by the aircraft, and a transmission from the beacon is sent back to the aircraft in response to the interrogation. The aircraft radar is then tuned so that only the coded beacon response is displayed on the radar scope.1 Using the offset bombing mode of the supporting aircraft’s on-board computer, the radar’s crosshairs are placed on the beacon while the aircraft attacks a target that is offset at the prescribed range and bearing from the beacon. If the offset mode is not used, the ordnance from the aircraft will be delivered on the beacon.
The beacon can be deployed on the forward edge of the battle area (FEB A), in a direct action/special operations (DA/SO) mission, or for use during unconventional warfare (UW). It is employed; when poor terrain features
fare. The British Scorpion’s ability to traverse the rugged Falklands terrain is noteworthy, particularly since our amphibious forces are likely to wind up in countryside just as miserable. In fact, the Scorpion may be the “right” armored support vehicle for the Marine Corps. This suggestion is not offered altruistically: i.e., naval personnel have a vested interest in the Marine Corps’ armor since we haul it, store it, and live with it on board our amphibious ships. A lighter, smaller tank than the M-60 offers the advantage of greater mobility, easier handling, and more vehicles per landing craft.
Overall, the Falklands War presented more ironies than surprises— i.e., the General Belgrano (ex-USS Phoenix [CL-46]) survived Pearl Harbor to die 40 years later in a “limited” war; the Sheffield's keel was originally laid for Argentina; many of the British vessels involved in the conflict were scheduled to be decommissioned to conserve defense funds. The public debate stirred up by the whole crisis is somewhat ironic, too. We have worried about antiship missiles for 15 provide inadequate radar returns for precise radar bombing; on targets which must be attacked within specific times during darkness or poor weather; with little mission planning or prior target study; so that radar scope interpretation is not required, eliminating misidentification of the radar aimpoint in the aircraft; and to facilitate the assignment of new targets to aircraft in flight.
Portable radar beacon transponders provide the armed forces with increased night/all-weather close air support (CAS) capabilities; serve as useful rendezvous aids between forward air controllers (FACs) and strike aircraft; and increase air interdiction capabilities and can be used effectively for air defense suppression.
Beacons can be employed in semifixed positions for preplanned targets and targets of opportunity, for aerial delivery, and in a mobile mode. Not all beacons, however, are compatible with all aircraft. Figure 1 depicts bea- con/aircraft compatibility.
The beacon is a line-of-sight transyears; now, every newspaper editor in the country has become an instant expert on the threat they represent. Consider, as well, our struggling amphibious forces, oft maligned and scarcely funded. Perhaps the Falklands episode will place them in the fiscal limelight long enough to upgrade their aging technology.
For naval professionals, the Falklands’ lessons are something to think about on quiet midwatches and dull duty days. Ponder, if you will, the grander aspects of global politics and naval strategy; you may even wonder how two nations today could come to blows over such an uninviting prize. But remember, above all, that the Falklands War was won and lost by contemporaries with the same professional responsibilities. This list is not all-inclusive, and each of us should add to this list of things to think about from a short, bloody war in a remote corner of the world.
Commander McKearney’s seagoing experience has included tours as an operations officer on two guided missile destroyers and first lieuten- ant/operations officer on an LSD.
ponder. Heavy foliage or anything else that can mask the beacon should be avoided when emplacing it. Heavy foliage can make a beacon system inoperative. Heavy precipitation also degrades the strength of the beacon transmitting impulse, concomitantly degrading beacon capability.
Beacons have explicit target area coverage limitations. In a low-threat environment, the maximum offset range is within a 15-nautical mile radius and the minimum aircraft altitude is 1,000 feet above ground level for an AN/PPN-18. In a high-threat environment, the maximum offset range for an AN/PPN-18 is within a five-nautical mile radius, and the maximum aircraft altitude is 1,000 feet above ground level.
To ensure the survivability of unconventional warfare teams in a UW environment, a time window has been established for beacon deployment in the on mode. For MC-130E, AC-130, C-130E/H, and C-141 aircraft, a beacon should be placed in its “on” mode ten minutes prior to time-on-target
Beacon! ANIPPN-18 & ANIPPN-I8A & UPN 25 AN/ SST-I8I-X ANITPN-23 Same AN! SST-201 X SST-124 SSDB
Aircraft SST-122 SST-122 MOD-1 UPN 34 TPN-28 SST-I8I-E ANITPN-26 Modified TPN-27 Mini-Ponder GAR-1 TEMIG-I
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(TOT). For tactical aircraft (with the exception of MC-130Es and AC-130s), a beacon should be placed in its on ■node four minutes prior to TOT through two minutes after TOT. For strategic aircraft, a beacon should be Placed in its on mode 15 minutes prior to TOT through five minutes after TOT. . To achieve maximum effectiveness, ■t is best to elevate the beacon. Election eliminates line-of-sight restraints and provides longer range.
Beacons are vulnerable to being triggered by any pulse-type electromagnetic signals transmitted in the beacon receive frequency band and which have sufficient power to be received by the beacon. Beacons should n°t be emplaced in the line of sight of Possible interfering sources.
Beacons are susceptible to radio direction finding (RDF). To minimize susceptibility to RDF in a UW environment, users must adhere to beacon windows and plan their mission so that the deploying team is not required to make voice contact with the mission aircraft.
Presently, beacons are deployed in terms of whether the aircraft will have to fly along the forward edge of the battle area or across the FEBA. However, in an unconventional warfare or a direct action/special operations environment there is no static, or fairly constant, line which can be drawn as a guide. All territory is open to the DA/SO or UW mission team. More than likely, the only governors on a DA/SO or UW mission will be en route air defense threats or terrain obstacles
to the enroute mission aircraft.
Having enumerated several points concerning the employment and deployment of beacons in conventional operations, it becomes necessary to ask what methods of employment and deployment are optimal for DA/SO or UW missions?
Currently, on an unconventional warfare beacon mission, a team (which may already be in its area of operations [AO]) receives an operation order locating the placement of the beacon and establishing the beacon code. The ground commander and his team then infiltrate into the AO, if they have not already done so, emplace the beacon at its assigned location, remain at the beacon sight and place the beacon into operation, then turn it off at the end of the beacon window, remove it upon the completion of the mission, and move to another sector of the AO.
This procedure leaves the ground commander’s team extremely vulnerable; particularly since for optimal beacon performance the beacon must be placed in an open area. Unfortunately, in this sequence, the ground commander is not given the opportunity to choose the location for emplacement of the beacon. The transmission of a preplanned beacon location is convenient for planners; however, the ground commander may be unable to emplace the beacon in the desired spot for a multitude of reasons. Perhaps the terrain has eroded, or the maps used for the map reconnaissance were outdated, or the location was not selected according to terrain but some other consideration, or perhaps enemy troops are located on the preselected beacon site. Beacon locations should not be established by higher headquarters. The ground commander should be knowledgeable of beacons, be aware of enemy air defenses, sources of emanations at frequency levels that might interfere with beacon interrogation, and the parameters of limitations of his beacon and its corresponding aircraft. It should be the ground commander’s decision as to where he will emplace the beacon.
Upon selection of a beacon site, the ground commander should withdraw from the selected site, leaving it under surveillance. He should then prepare a sheet (beacon) report : from the communications-electronics operating instructions (CEOl) in effect and transmit this report to higher headquarters. Upon receipt of the sheet message, headquarters should then be able to dispatch the aircraft. Just prior to the beacon window, the ground commander should instruct his beacon team (preferably as few soldiers as possible) to return to the site and deploy the beacon. The aircraft then flies the prearranged plan; there is no communication between the aircraft and the ground unit. Upon elapse of the beacon window, the beacon is removed, the site sterilized, and the team moves to another sector of the AO.
In explaining the preceding UW beacon mission and the subsequent DA/SO mission, aspects of one mission may be common to another. For example, on DA/SO missions, it is preferable to rig the beacon for automatic operation and self-destruction to allow the deploying team to be as far away as possible from the beacon during the mission strike which facilitates security of the beacon and exfiltration. This method of beacon deployment may prove prudent in a UW mission, provided the beacon is not required for future operations.
For a DA/SO mission, mission tasking remains similar to that of a UW mission. (In a UW mission, tasking is generally transmitted; whereas in a DA/SO beacon mission, a team is isolated specifically for that mission.) Because of the difference in duration of a DA/SO mission and a UW mission, the concept of operation is different. After tasking, the ground commander may decide to conduct a map and imagery reconnaissance to determine beacon location and prearrange beacon information (eliminating the need for radio communications during the mission). Although preplanning the beacon location is desirable in terms of reducing RDF susceptibility (except during beacon interrogation), it once again leaves the ground commander open to the possibility of emplacing the beacon in an untenable location, negating the validity of all prior arranged information and requiring radio communication anyway.
If the ground commander plans to make a radio communication with the higher authority (under no circumstances should he ever communicate with the aircraft), then his mission should run something along the following lines. After tasking, the ground commander does a preliminary map and imagery reconnaissance and determines what type of terrain he will be operating in so he can ascertain what type of additional equipment he may require.5 After planning is complete, the team infiltrates into the area in which it will deploy the beacon. The beacon is then rigged for automatic operation and destruction.
Operation and destruction are achieved by having an engineer jury- rig the beacon so that it turns on at the present time and ignites itself upon the expiration of its window.4 The beacon must be camouflaged and fairly inaccessible to prevent discovery.
Once the team moves in and emplaces the beacon, it sets it to go off, for example, in 24 hours (depending upon the timer), and then it can either exfiltrate or move to another position and put surveillance on the beacon until time on target, particularly in a highly traveled or visible area.
A sniper team would be an excellent choice for a surveillance team. An antitampering device could be attached to the beacon to prevent accidental capture of the device.
The beauty of this mission is that this team can be long gone (if no surveillance is required) prior to activation of the beacon. Thus, if the beacon is detected through RDF, there are no personnel in the area of operations to compromise the mission. For example, if the beacon is in a tree, by the time the RDF effort produces a fix, it will be too late to find the beacon (the enemy force has the exact time of the beacon window to locate and disarm the beacon; but considerably longer to attempt to capture the team).
Unfortunately, our beacon concepts are not properly understood and remain underdeveloped. Having participated in exercises involving approximately 30 beacon missions, as ground commander I was never allowed to choose the location of the beacon nor given the opportunity to do the calculations necessary for offset bombing.5
The supporting aviation units from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps never flew at night. All their missions were conducted during the day and in good weather in easily accessible terrain with excellent radar return which eliminated the need for a beacon. There was poor prior coordination between the aircrews and the ground detachments. Pilots often disregarded the beacon and eyeballed their targets since the beacon was not necessary. On one mission, the aircrew had the wrong on-board computer calibration and could not even interrogate the beacon. On several other occasions, missions were planned for beacons and aircraft that were not compatible. Overall, Marine Corps air achieved the best results. I believe this is because the Marines have a strong ground orientation, which brings us to the next point. How does one establish a viable beacon training program to eliminate the multitude of problems and increase awareness of the technical and combat capabilities of beacons for their users?
At present, the Air Force conducts training on beacons at the Air-to- Ground Operations School (AGOS), in their forward air controller and combat control team training courses, and conducts informal unit training in units with beacon missions. The Army. Navy, and Marine Corps have no beacon training program nor even an approved training package to be presented at the unit level.
I believe it is necessary to produce a short but complete beacon course and to provide a beacon training package for formal unit training in aviation and ground units. These goals could be met by (a) enlarging the programs of instruction at the U. S. Army Infantry School Pathfinder Course, the Amphibious Warfare School, and the AGOS to include beacon training for deployment of beacons in a FEBA role;
(b) creating an intensive short course in beacon deployment in DA/SO and UW mission roles at the U. S. Army Institute for Military Assistance; and
(c) developing a beacon training package for integration with formal unit training, particularly in aviation units.
1 If more than one beacon is in the area of operation, and they are within the same frequency band and radar range, they will be displayed on the aircraft’s radar scope. Thus, beacons emit coded responses, decreasing area limitations and providing increased flexibility.
2 Proword: Sheet; Paragraph: A. Target Descrip' tion/B. Target Coordinates (latitude/longitude to the nearest degree)/C. TOT/D. Beacon Location/ E. Beacon Type & Beacon Code/F. Run-In Heading (Initial Point to Target, Magnetic Azi- muth)/G. Target Elevation (Feet)/H. Range (Beacon To Target, Feet)/I. Bearing (Beacon to Target, True)/J. Beacon Elevation (Feet)/K. Initial Point (Latitude/Longitude or Predesignated IP. i.e., IP A, B, etc.)/L. Abort Code/M. Restrictions.
3 Additional equipment might include an offset calculator and millimeter ruler, the beacon report format, wire cutters, an electrician's tool set, treeclimbing equipment, a hammer and nails, demolitions or WD-1 wire, BA 4386s (two each per 24 hours of operation), a saw, nylon rope, etc.
4 This entire assembly would be wrapped tightly around the beacon and in its container, ensuring that its antenna is not masked. It should be able to be placed into operation without removing it from its container, including the antitampering device.
5 To permit ease of calculation in the field, computer programs for hand-held computers should be developed as well as hard plastic overlay plotters. Presently, these devices are only locally produced for personal use.
Captain Beitler earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from American University in Washington, D.C., and is working on his Ph.D through the University of Chicago. He has served as an intelligence officer at Ft. Bragg, N.C., and spent one year in Saudi Arabia with the U.S. military training mission. He is currently attending the Defense Intelligence School in Washington, D.C.