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The Coast Guard in the Eighties
By Captain Robert G. Moore, U. S. Coast Guard “The Coast Guard's responsibilities have increased without a commensurate growth in its resources.
“The Coast Guard does not have enough vessels to carry out its missions, and some available vessels are in poor operating condition. The Coast Guard has too few people to meet its responsibilities and has experienced a low retention rate. ”
This preamble, taken from the recent General Accounting Office report entitled The Coast Guard— Limited Resources Curtail Ability to Meet Responsibilities, 1 forms an unsettling introduction to the decade of the 1980s. It strikes at the heart of the Coast Guard’s proud boast of Semper Paratus and is a sobering mark from which to take departure for the future. The year 1980 finds the Coast Guard in flux, with problems, and with the pressures of change molding the service into an altered shape. The changes have seldom before been as rapid or as hard to predict and, in consequence, there is an air of questioning and of seeking among Coast Guardsmen concerned with where the future’s altered shape may take them. As we address those problems, we find that there are marked differences between prediction and the planner s selection of the dominant trends that determine what the Coast Guard does and is. An organization needs time to plan for and procure the things it needs for the future; prophecy, despite the
In the decade just begun, one of the emerging roles of the Coast Guard may be to work in partnership with private industry and state and local governments to develop port areas such as the sprawling Los Angeles-Long Beach complex.
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have found release only in general war. It is poss> that we will be involved in one during this decade-^ Still, despite bleak projections, future prospe' are not all grim. Adjustments to our historic P1 j spective will be necessary but, fortunately, we ne£^ only to look about us for examples of success in SP , of similar problems. Germany and Japan are b° dependent upon imports to support their indusf^ and both are doing well. Their success should g've grounds for cautious optimism.
respectability gained from the futurists’ reasoned logic, simply will not serve. Yet the Coast Guard must define the future if it is to accomplish its job.
The GAO report, fortunately, is not the only aid by which to chart the course to the future. Of those available, a major one—perhaps the major one—is the history of the service. It is reasonable to argue that the Coast Guard will continue to serve the nation well and that its future will ultimately be shaped less by conscious planning than by the nation’s perceptions of where the country’s interests lie. The 1980s could be dominated by four basic concerns:
► Energy. We have depended for most of this century upon fossil fuels, and for the last 25 years petroleum has been the primary source of energy. This has driven, and unfortunately continues to drive, every facet of our economy. Given time, we can shift to other sources of power, and we may be able to minimize the economic shocks that such shifts will bring. For the 1980s, we must have oil, and while and until we develop alternatives or reduce our consumption, the satisfaction of that need must enjoy high priority.
► Technology is a key to the development of other sources of power and offers a means to partially shield us from the dislocation new power sources will entail. The power alternatives bring their own brand of difficulties such as environmental concerns, altered patterns of transportation, changes in the types of
materials handled, new wastes for disposal, and 51 on, through what appears to be an inexhaustible hst j
► The economy will be disturbed by all of these, ilfl every indication is that the disturbances will be se vere. Many things may be irrevocably altered, fr<,n! our recreational habits to the availability and cost basics such as housing. Our standard of living c°u be revised sharply downward, and it may be scare'1) that drives it there. Even less pleasant to c0<]^ template, the sociological consequences could br'n^ disturbance and upheaval.
► Defense offers an even less cheerful prospect." Scaf city, population expansion, and basic economic SLlf vival are increasing the pressures which in the P
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Each of these four concerns will touch the seas
U. S. interests upon them. While this partic1' treatment cannot examine all aspects of the nat'00 maritime concerns, there are some facets W1 ^ should be elaborated upon, if only because they ‘ frequently understated.
Prevention and control of pollution is one of The volume of potential pollutants carried in ships extracted from the sea’s floor could swell beyond £l^ day’s projections. The national goal of no pollutin'1^ not merely environmental good sense, it is the P‘ j upon which public acceptance of the exploitation , offshore resources turns. Unless it is allayed, feaf
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Mother related facet lies in the potential for an- vlsrns- All of the historic triggers for conflict be-
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nation-states remain but, unless an explicit re- °f law for the seas can be agreed upon, that
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t|j n Serves them, increases in direct proportion to VVaning of economic independence. Advancing trj. n°lo8y has forced a real interdependence of coun- f0 ' ®ur economy and very security belong to those ' ' natural or otherwise, which can modify the
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f>atter may be vastly expanded. The same general COastrn *s already apparent on the national level. Our intta Waters have become the domain of disparate cJla^estS’ including the weekend boater, the mer- rr)aSee^ing profit, and the concerned citizen de- tjQlnS protection for the quality of life. This situate fhe potential for everyone getting in
fC* else’s way, is a source of tension and of con- Th ttVVeen sPec‘al interest groups. jmiie rhird aspect which bears expansion is that the e of ports, and of the merchant shipping . - commerce to and from our ports. If the ecolaw boils down to trade or die, the ports may c0 ^e the controlling factor, and the reason beth S c^ear if one thinks of ports as a system having ^ ^ dements:
ne means for moving goods and people between
the ports and the supporting hinterlands ^ The medium by which goods and people are transferred between maritime modes of transportation and all other modes. (This of necessity includes storage space for goods and accommodations for people.)
) The means for moving goods and people between the port and other nations or other areas within the country via the maritime mode
Unilateral action affecting any single element may have widely varying effects, depending upon how much system thinking has gone into the action. Application of the systems approach to maritime commerce is particularly necessary today, because the growth of ships, changes in cargo and in trade patterns, and evolving cargo-handling technology combine to create both safety hazards and economic constraints in the absence of proper planning.
The elements of safety at sea are changing too, because the problems are different. Variations in technology and in trade patterns have increased the volume and types of hazardous materials shipped through the ports of the United States. In the 1940s, the hazards were preponderantly explosives and petroleum products; some relatively simple precautions could greatly reduce the threat of major catastrophe. Today, with materials such as liquefied natural gas, ammonia-based substances, styrene, and the like, simple measures are just not sufficient. In addition, ships have gained length, draft, and tonnage since
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rules now and in the future is the degree to they are espoused, and the way in which facilita of transportation is interpreted. Tomorrow’s mean
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the days of World War II, so maneuvering them requires nicer judgment and more coordination than did the earlier ones. Reaction times and traffic densities have changed, too, giving rise to a proliferation of support devices such as traffic separation schemes, vessel traffic systems, and computer-assisted radars. These and the larger sizes of the ships themselves have—coupled with more complex and automated engineering plants—altered skill requirements and manning levels.
It is from this background—the present state of the service as reflected by the GAO assessment, its historic roles, and the factors that will affect those roles—that we must draw our inferences about what the future demands of the Coast Guard. We must, I believe, give great weight to the world in which the service must function and avoid analysis of the possible futures in terms of hardware and personnel requirements. A reasonable approach is to seek overall themes. When they have been identified, the specifics of funding, people, and programs will follow. The assessment must also identify realistic goals, ones which it may be possible to achieve, something particularly important because compromise is a primary thread throughout the Coast Guard’s evolution.
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Theme One: The Coast Guard's role with respect to facilitation of transportation should be emphasized and panded upon.
The volume of cargoes put through our ports is UP dramatically in recent years, and the increase coupled with changes in ship design and car£0^ handling techniques, is forcing an unprecedente need to modernize our ports. I believe that the g°v ernment should actively encourage the rebirth or U. S. merchant fleet and improvements to our Potio Direct subsidies aside, that encouragement needs 1 be reflected in the day-to-day governmental invol^ . ment, supporting those goals while providing ^ safety and the protection of the environment. As ^ principal federal regulator involved, the Coast Gnar must ensure that it is not an obstruction to progresS This could be accomplished through continued aP : plication of several simple rules:
► The requirements imposed must be based UP'
legitimate and clearly perceivable needs. j
► Control measures and restrictions must not exccC
the minimum level required for the accomplishm1 of the intended purpose. j
► Formulation of requirements must involve the fected consumers.
► Federal involvement must not intrude into thing which can be achieved by other levels of governme and through responsible contributions by the in^u j tries concerned. (This is the basis for my sec°n theme, discussed below.)
The difference between the application of
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should, perhaps, include an advocacy role the Coast Guard is the strong voice supp°rl needed change. By way of example, consider ports. The lack of a general policy for port devel°P ment has been keenly felt by those engaged in grading port facilities to meet tomorrow’s reql,'ft ments. Proposed measures that would address trans portation needs, satisfy local concerns, and general!/ result in improved safety, efficiency, and envir0' ^ mental conditions are delayed or defeated by sPeCU( interest groups. There is a vacuum, and the C° ^ Guard could fill it by helping to rationalize the ptcS web of rules and by articulating a common policy-
Theme Two: Progressively, and in an orderly fashi°h1 ^ as not to leave a vacuum, the Coast Guard should ^ draw from involvement and operations in areas in u’ht1 j combination of the general public, industry, and state T1 local authorities can adequately fill the need.
I think this is a realistic objective, because I
ers the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Extended sup-
0Uar° SUcb efforts could ease the active-duty Coast leav- 0ut °f “bread and butter” search and rescue, b(-Ca forces to respond on those occasions when, CatejSe weather or other circumstances, sophisti- shlPs and aircraft are required. thetntere are some broad implications associated with [Wo. This particular approach should direct
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^°Und W °Ca^ autbor‘t‘es and private enterprise— deal W^ere necessary by clear-cut rules—can best the 1^ocal concerns. The approach is based on bjjj ea. tbat c^c maritime industries share responsi- SafetWltb government and can be responsive to both thjs ^ and ec°logical concerns. Their incentive for m0rcertainly not altruism, but something much industry clearly understands that its of jtIn tbese matters will determine the magnitude In ^r°^ts and 'ts public support. agen3 Partnership involving the Coast Guard, other be aICS government, and industry, each should tesU|tSl^ne^ wbat it can do best. Ideally, this would a^L !n tbe Coast Guard continuing to exercise its inter-)rit^ ^°r and tabing action on matters entailing y0ric| ^10nal or interstate concern, or which lie beta)^ a e caPa^*bties of the other partners to underdo^ cbis philosophy to the prevention, detec-
Sejf. 3nd cieanup of oil spills, for example. Industry ^acke^U^at'0n’ Prevent*on’ and cleanup would be and ^ Port authorities and, as the area of interest f(.tt ,°ncern expands, by local and state agencies. Di- ited nVo^Vernent by the Coast Guard would be lim- offs[l ° °ffshore matters such as damaged ships or ivbid^ f'^S bey°nd tbe 3-mile limit, or to those of ^'ght require concentration and pre-staging f0r ‘Pment on a scale far beyond that reasonable p ny but the federal government to assume.
this theme would alter some of the c0n;nt e^ernents of the Coast Guard. The individuals a^d nec would require a broader understanding agen m°re detaded knowledge of the governmental prjrt*'les and the industries involved. As dealers nUrnbn ^ W't*1 Pr*vate and public managers, their be ^ ers would be fewer, and they themselves would as sre senior than today’s average. Operations such off^ Veulance, detection, and response would shift and °re and tb‘s would affect platform, manpower, c tra*n‘ng requirements.
Wit^ reotientation seems to be already occurring of thresPect to search and rescue. Response to many weach ^ote minor cases, under reasonable sea and boatstr conditions, does not require all-weather bfjrj and professional crews. Assistance is already au^ Pr°vided with increasing frequency by local untelnties> other boaters, and by the dedicated vol- hort
U. S. COAST GUARD (LANCE JONES)
Law enforcement, such as the capture of drug smugglers, will continue to be an important duty. In this case, crew members of the Panamanian freighter Don Emilio are removed from their ship after she was seized by the cutter Sherman.
the focus of the Coast Guard’s operational forces toward blue water. If this proves correct, it follows that the percentage of Coast Guardsmen who are deep-water sailors will increase. As a result, their credibility with the maritime industry should improve. Statistics support the perception that the general seagoing experience within the Coast Guard is low and, some will maintain, unacceptably low for the industry supervision with which it is charged. In 1940, 48% of Coast Guard officer billets were in ships. In 1976, that percentage had dropped to 14%! We need to reverse that trend.
Theme Three: The Coast Guard's missions as an armed force should he clearly delineated and its military capabilities restored.
It is a frequently stated conceit that the U. S. Coast Guard is the sixth largest navy in the world. Numbers and tonnages can certainly be manipulated to support that contention, but the truth lies elsewhere. The service’s newest major ship is an unarmed icebreaker, and its best and most modern “frigates” operate with sensors and weapons that are more than 30 years old in design and capability. In fact, even the navy of the Sultanate of Oman, with its seven Exocet-equipped patrol craft, possesses more offensive capability and is better able to defend itself than is the Coast Guard’s fleet. The combat readiness of the Coast Guard is further degraded by the general condition of its ships. To quote again from the GAO report:
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“Limited funding reduced the Coast Guard’s ability to improve and renovate the existing cut-
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increase, so will the law enforcement issues an quirements. There is potential for marine-orie terrorism and the concurrent matter of protect offshore assets. The list is long and challenging-
Theme Five: The Coast Guard must become competitive in the job market to be able to attract and the people it requires. ^
The Coast Guard, like the other armed forces,
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ters and adequately maintain the fleet as repairs become needed .... Our analysis also showed that the Coast Guard does not have sufficient OE [operating expense] funds to perform maintenance and repair work.
“Of the [51] cutters we reviewed, 24 had major maintenance problems, including a lack of qualified cutter maintenance personnel, lack of sufficient funds to complete necessary repair work, and problems getting replacement parts.”
The problem is not just one of hardware. That one can be and is being dealt with through the budgetary process, but the root cause, much more basic than money, is the absence of a clearly defined mission for the Coast Guard as an armed force. The general principle embodied both in law and in custom is that the Coast Guard will, in wartime, function as a part of the Navy. Accordingly, Coast Guard assets will be employed by the Navy as needed and in accordance with their capabilities. At the same time, the service will continue to accomplish its statutory activities through a chain of command which excludes the Chief of Naval Operations. As unorganized as it may sound, it is a system which has functioned well in the past. The question is “Will it function as well tomorrow?” I think not, if only because naval warfare is not as simple as it once was.
Fortunately, there are signs that the absence of definite missions is recognized and is being addressed. One of the most encouraging of these signs is the Coast Guard-Navy interplay concerning the Bear class, the Coast Guard’s new 270-foot medium endurance cutters. Right from the inception, there has been coordination between the two services concerning the wartime role of the new ships. Joint action led to incorporation of a rather impressive combat suite in these ships. Even given their conservative speed of 19 knots, they should be effective against enemy submarines, aircraft, and surface ships. Four of the class are under construction, and the Coast Guard will award a multi-year contract for nine more. The eventual number which will be procured is, at the moment, speculation, except to say that current forecasts show requirements for an additional 25 medium endurance cutters by the mid-1980s. Assuming that the requirement is accurate and & with the Bear class, the conceit of being number may be well on the way to becoming reality.
Theme Four: The Coast Guard should enhance tts enforcement capabilities and expand its activities tn field.
For the foreseeable future, the major law en
gling. That industry is a major one, estimate' as being, after oil and automobiles, the third larg^ category of U. S. imports! Moral issues aside, lost revenues and fiscal imbalances this trade rep sents work to undermine the country’s economy- j The “enemy” is intelligent, capable, and posse of financial resources that the government has v j reluctant to match. The intelligence, sensors, ^ coordination required equate directly to classic n interdiction. To date, the only real difference tween this game and combat has been that the c at the point of contact is less deadly. Irnproveme in skills and equipment are required if ^ Guardsmen are to make significant inroads int0 ^ waterborne drug traffic. Drugs are not, of course, only law enforcement problem that will involve Coast Guard over the next ten years. As aCt*Vl^
dthin the coastal zone and outer continen
collected its share of personnel problems. An eClLl ble pay scale is certainly vital, but it alone W* f suffice. As an employer, the Coast Guard is °u
ifjc . Serv*ce. This would be bad enough if the qual- rcr f>nS were only to operate and maintain ships, t* boats, and systems. However, the Coast
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aPpear to find most rewarding those jobs that
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spann understand, learn, and perform well. The Pe0pi^ Coast Guard activities is too great for its Mij^ t0 as multi-mission as the platforms in they serve. To expect that today’s utility boat
a re soc*ety- The American dream encompasses ^ards0^^ arnount le*sure time as one of the re- qu , or ^abor, and too large a percentage of Coast f srnen are excluded from that part of the dream.
1 Guarc]0 rePort clearly spells out . the Coast t'on | S resources have not increased to meet addi- l0r)an<^ expanded duties.” This translates into ays and longer weeks for many:
' ' ‘ 'n fhe Thirteenth District [Pacific I |0rthwest] search and rescue personnel at 8 out of w ^0astal units average between 80 to 90 hours a ^ e ' in the winter (October to April) and 110 sUrs a week in the summer. During the summer LestaS(>n ^eave is not permitted.” a *e ^ecide that the case cited is an isolated ex- 2 j2q’ cons*der that the Coast Guard estimates that vv0rk a4ditional billets are needed to reduce the per of SAR personnel to an average of 68 hours
appeee f>er man. That number of people does not ^arSe—until we compare it with the 39 j Uar<^ s authorized fiscal year 1980 strength of
acer^e ^'rect strain that workload introduces is ex- Suate<^ by the Coast Guard’s tendency to view funtPt°rt funct*ons as subsidiary to operations. Those art tp°ns therefore are frequently understaffed and The ff^rst t0 b'ft vacant when shortages occur. erf0rects °b this include unacceptable delays and fatc 'n pay, and in a degradation of key services ran.aS ^0us'ng assistance and transportation ar- 0vt(. tnts- The effect of an error in pay upon an ice • ^rbed sailor’s motivation to stay with the serv- pS devastating.
tnisrS°nnel turnover also devastates capability and ItVel °u'e^eCtiveness’ because of the low experience CoaS(;t at results. Today, more than one half of the years' ^Uafd s enlisted personnel have less than two
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le^ r c*0es more than that. The severity of the prob- comes into perspective only when one ex- S^°ul<j r^e level of knowledge and experience which stanxaccrue to regulators, law enforcement officers.
Rs °C^er Part the job satisfaction issue has its A '*! t^le ^°ast Guard’s multi-mission philosophy, gijj^ ° concept when applied to hardware, the ar- P,)Nnt ^°r *ts application to people is unpersuasive
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coxswain will move tomorrow to the deck of a buoy tender and then look forward to a future tour as a marine pollution investigator—and be comfortable, competent, and proud of his performance in each role—is to expect too much. At some point that person will find his or her niche, and today’s rotation policies do not offer the opportunity to stay in that niche once it is found.
The themes outlined above should combine to take the Coast Guard back into deeper waters and away from the unattractive potential for becoming a uniformed bureaucracy. Selective phasing out of functions that others can do will help alter the workload balance and, at the same time, improve performance of the regulatory functions which are required. Reemphasis of the original law enforcement role of the Revenue Cutter Service should both fill a major national need and, because of the multi-mission capabilities of its platforms, enhance the naval power of the United States. And that can be done without building one ship solely for the purpose of naval warfare. We see reconfirmed, I believe, that the Coast Guard exists to serve the nation at sea in three major areas—facilitation of transportation, enforcement of laws, and as an armed force.
There is room for optimism that, having felt about in the shoals, the course for the new decade will once more give the Coast Guard sea room and that by 1990 its bicentennial will see the service once more “Always Ready.”
Captain Moore is a 1952 Coast Guard Academy graduate. He has served in a number of ships and held command of the buoy tender Hawthorn, the high endurance cutter Owasco (WHEC-39), and the icebreakers Burton Island (WAGB-283) and Polar Star (WAGB-10). His shore tours have included service as advisor to the Somali Republic on matters of maritime law enforcement, deputy commander of U. S. Coast Guard activities in Europe, chief of the Military Readiness Division of Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, and his current assignment as chief of stafT to Commander 11th Coast Guard District in Long Beach. His Professional Notes on the Polar Star appeared in the October 1978 and December 1979 issues of the Proceedings.
'Comptroller General of the United States, The Coast Guard-Limited Resources Curtail Ability to Meet Responsibilities (Washington, D.C.: U. S Government Printing Office, 3 April 1980).
2See R. G. Moore, "The Coast Guard's Role in Future Wars" Sea Power Magazine, August 1977, pp. 24-31.
3GAO, pg 27.
“GAO, pg 23.