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"CNO—Past, Present, and—Future?”
(See pages 32-43, August 1963 Proceedings)
Reginald Hargreaves, Major, British Army (Retired)—Mr. Baldwin’s penetrating article focuses timely attention on a problem of authority-allocation which is common to both the English-speaking democracies. In Britain, no less than in the United States, the authority, and with it the degree of responsibility, vested in the chiefs of the three fighting services has been progressively diminished, as has that of the ministerial heads of the respective Service Departments, for the sole purpose of enlarging the powers of the Minister of Defense.
In both countries, of course, it is accepted as axiomatic that ultimate responsibility for the formulation of policy rests with the civil executive. It would now appear that the direction of the steps necessary to carry that policy into effect is also to be assumed by the man in the gray flannel suit; the Chiefs of Staff being authorized only to “advise”— with no guarantee that their professional counsel will be given more than perfunctory attention. Thus the man with the lesser technical knowledge but the greater power will be in a position to ride roughshod over the man with the lesser power but the greater technical knowledge.
This dangerously anomalous state of affairs can only be accounted for when it is recalled that in both the United States and Britain there exists an extremely tough and apparently ineradicable thread of 16th century Puritanism woven into the fabic of the national character.
The Puritan was a product of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the earliest proponent of unbridled mercantilism. He really did manage to persuade himself that the “strait and narrow path” that led to salvation was also the road to commercial prosperity, that mundane success was clearly a sign of “God’s grace.” Anything that hindered, let alone
failed to contribute to, the pursuit of worldly wealth was therefore anathema. And the fighting-man “toiled not neither did he spin,’ while his upkeep, both in peace and war, imposed an intolerable drain on the profits accruing from successful commerce. Furthermore, the Puritan always regarded him with the deepest distrust as a potential “instrument of tyranny,” as a rival for that exercise of authority which to the Separatist was as heavenly balm to the nostrils. As John Winthrop, mid- 17th century governor of the Puritan Colony of Massachusetts, once sourly commented, “To erect a standing authority of military men might even overthrow the civil power”"" which, incidentally, he had been careful to concentrate in his own two hands.
This distrust and suspicion of the man in uniform—who, after all, is also a citizen-" still characterizes the general populace of both the United States and Britain, however subconsciously. Its dire consequences can plainly be seen in the egregious errors in policy for which the civil executives are invariably responsible at the outbreak of any war in which either nation is concerned. It is only when things become really threatening that the overwhelming pressure of public opinion—metamorphosed into that state of alarm which is politely euphemised as patriotism—compels the civil executive to give heed to the Service experts, not only in the formulation of policy, but also with regard to the best means of carrying it into execution.
The moment the “Cease Fire” has sounded, the man in the gray flannel suit once more eagerly snatches up the reins of power, and the service chiefs are again relegated to the background. Completely forgotten is the fact that in the first instance it was only due to the errors of policy of which the civil executives were guilty that the country found itself committed to war at all. “When my profession fails,” as Talleyrand once put it to Marshal Ney, “yours has to come to the rescue.”
Small Boat Sailing in the Navy”
pages 114-116, June 1963 Proceedings)
G. M. Hagerman, Captain, U. S. Navy— t the present time, there are no universal ^ganized boating and sailing programs in the . • S. Navy. Indeed, when a ship or station infrequently purchases even so much as a dory r use in its recreation program, the event 'Vl11 make headlines. Lieutenant (j.g.) Froth- 'ngham’s commentary on small boat sailing one of those rare attempts to get the Navy to sea in boats.
Within the past year, another such effort ias been the formation of the Norfolk Naval ailing Association, which has received wide Publicity in the Norfolk area. The Club al- !'ead>' has more than 400 members. Thus there evidence that people in the Navy are en- eavoring to bring back an integral facet of avy life that existed before World War II. ^general examination of the present Navy’s ^creation program in conjunction with the
r,eniendous growth of small boating in the mted States since World War II will show , at a boating and sailing program would be ^neficial to the Navy.
^ue Navy’s present recreation program
centers on softball, basketball, touch football, golf, tennis, and bowling. Yearly fleet tournaments are held in each sport. All of these sports are typically American and promote physical fitness. It must be pointed out, however, that some of these programs are fairly expensive to administer and to operate.
The other services have long recognized the need to sponsor recreational programs that are akin to the basic mission of the service. The Army sponsors rifle, pistol, trap, and skeet clubs, while the Air Force sponsors various types of aero clubs. Sky-diving clubs are also service-sponsored. Such clubs are sponsored in addition to athletic programs similar in most respects to the present Navy recreational programs.
In spite of the fact that the sea is the very essence of a sailor’s being and offers excellent sporting and recreational opportunities, none of the Navy’s present recreational opportunities are nautical in nature.
A nautical recreational program offers advantages over present programs. For example, the crew of a sailboat battling the elements will develop a degree and type of cooperation and self-confidence not found in
other sports. This is the same type of co-operation and self-confidence needed aboard ship.
Next, consider the type of man who is entering the Navy. The Navy has one thing which the other services do not have and that is the sea. There can be no question that most men who join the Navy have been influenced by the sea in one way or another. The New York Times reports that 35,875,000 Americans— more than the population of Mexico—are engaged in recreational boating of one type or another. The National Association of Boat and Engine Manufacturers reports that there are 5,000,000 outboard boats, 760,000 inboard boats, and 500,000 sailboats on U. S. waterways. It seems obvious that many of the officers and men coming into the Navy today were at one time included in the boating enthusiast group of the general public.
After a man joins the Navy, what does the Navy do for him to develop or stimulate an active interest in the sea itself? The enlisted man, in boot training, may see a movie concerning small boats. By observation, he may even learn how to get in and out of one, but by and large, there are no boats available to him for drill or for recreation in the formative stages of his career. The same is true for officer candidates other than Naval Academy midshipmen. If the officers and men do not have a chance at boating in the early stages of their careers, they certainly will not get it after they join the Fleet.
Today’s Navy is highly complex and technically sophisticated. Officers and men by virtue of their training are engineers and technicians. When buried deep in an aircraft carrier for weeks on end, a man is far removed from a sailor’s natural element of salt, sea, and spray. No one will claim that going to sea in a large modern man-of-war in any way resembles a cruise in a small boat and yet, to satisfy the sailor’s urge for the sea, both types of cruising are necessary. Today, officers and men of the Navy have only half of the sailor’s life available to them. An adequate boating and sailing recreational program would complement the serious side of going to sea and could have a very real effect on re-enlistment in the case of frustrated sailors.
Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to discuss other aspects of the 36 million Americans who sail more than six million
boats. Many of them are young men interested in the sea and are potential naval officers and enlisted men. In fact, as a group, these young men would probably make excellent career men, as they are already motivated toward the sea. It only remains to interest them. A most effective way to accomplish this would be for U. S. Navy boating and sailing clubs or squadrons to sail with or compete with their civilian counterparts. This would also have another most significant fringe benefit—it would allow the Navy to meet civilians, in all walks of life, who are interested in the sea. With this common meeting ground and a well-organized “people-to-people” program, this group of civilians might become Navy boosters. The effects of such a program could be far-reaching. There is no question that civilian boat and yacht clubs would welcome naval boating and sailing activities. Even such clubs as the New York Yacht Club now make special provisions for naval officers on active duty. And while discussing a “people-to- people” program, it must be remembered that U. S. Navy ships and units are in daily contact with foreign navies and foreign communities. Many of these, particularly the NATO countries, have strong maritime traditions manifested in their large numbers of small craft. Here is another excellent opportunity for the U. S. Navy to make friends.
If a good boating program is to be established in the Navy, there is one ingredient above all others that must be present: command attention. If command at all levels backs such a program it will succeed. On the other hand, it would be very difficult for a handful of enthusiasts, no matter how dedicated, to succeed without such backing. It is self-evident that funds in the Navy are flexible enough to support this additional program if command wills it; in the past the Navy has not only provided the funds, but has also made
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited t° write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication otl these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
.(e) To sponsor the organization of groups 'v,thin the scope of the objectives of the Associ- atl°n, f0r participation in particular activities lUch.as a Sailing Squadron, Power Squadron, stung Club or such other groups as the Membership so desires.
(0 To encourage and promote liaison be- een members of this Association and other M'litary and civilian recreational organiza- tl0Us.
available sailing whaleboats. Many foreign countries believe in this type program, and uey build and fit out large square riggers for training purposes. The program envisioned ere for the U. S. Navy is much more modest, command believes in the potential value of oating and sailing to the Navy, funds and acuities will become available. For example, naval stations located on the water, have, for lc most part, small boat basins which are not used to capacity. These could be expanded at very little cost.
There are many ways in which such a pro- §ram could be organized and administered. The objectives of the Norfolk Naval Sailing ssociation, listed below, provide an admira- e start. It only remains for this movement 0 father momentum and spread.
The Objectives of the Norfolk Naval Sa.il- ln§i Association are:
(a) To encourage recreational boating and c°ropetitive sailing throughout the services.
(b) To promote seamanship, piloting, n;ivigation, and water safety.
(c) To arrange with local authorities to Provide, if practicable, berthing, launching, ' 0rage, and repair facilities for members’ Yachts in naval ports and at other armed forces activities.
(b) To organize opportunities for members . take part in all forms of yachting and boat- !nS and to furnish members with advice and formation.
(g) To encourage the organization and operation of sailing associations at suitable Rations and in the Fleet with the ultimate Jectives of the formation of an organization ® be known as the “U. S. Naval Sailing ssociation” with organized Branches in <, aval Ports, at Naval and Marine Corps ations and Activities and in the Fleets.
False Economy in Manpower
N. H. Scawthorn, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy—During the period 1954-1956, the first term re-enlistment rate in the regular Navy was in the neighborhood of five per cent. As a result of this extremely low re-enlistment rate, recruiting quotas were extremely high. In order to compete with our sister services, and in particular with our keenest competitor, the Air Force, we increased our recruiting service field personnel almost 100 per cent. Recruiters who had completed regular tours of duty as recently as a month earlier were ordered from sea duty back to the sub, branch, or main station to which they had formerly been attached. New recruiting programs such as the Fligh School Graduate Training Program, Special Company Program, Junior College Graduate Training Program, and Buddy Program, were developed and placed into effect. Our recruiting standards, particularly in the mental category, were lowered in an effort to aid us in filling our astronomical monthly quotas.
In spite of our efforts, we were forced to resort to the Selective Service System (draft) in late 1955 and early 1956. During the months of November and December of 1955, and March of 1956, we inducted 28,000 men into the naval service. Our original need had been for double the number—56,000. However, because of the increased recruiting effort coupled with the upswing in the re-enlistment effort, we were able to hold down the number of draftees required.
In the final analysis, the obtaining of inductees in lieu of recruits only compounded the Navy’s personnel problems. The increase in the recruiting tempo, coupled with resorting to drafting, cost the taxpayers a pretty penny. It has been conservatively estimated that it costs the Navy approximately $22,000 to recruit, train at the “boot camp,” and further train at the Class A school level, each recruit. This cost multiplied by approximately 100,000 men per year gives one a general idea of the enormity of the procurement-training phase of a recruit’s early months in the naval service.
Although our recruiting quotas are now below those of the critical 1954-1956 era, we still need to recruit hundreds of men monthly, with the emphasis at present being placed on
obtaining quality rather than quantity.
The foregoing illustrates the tremendous cost involved in procuring personnel from civilian life, as well as the quality of recruits procured, when the first term re-enlistment rate is low. This past year, the Navy discharged approximately 47,000 first-term personnel who were recommended for re-enlistment but who chose to not re-enlist. What a tremendous loss of talent, effort, petty officer potential, and possibly career potential, the Navy suffered.
Of the 47,000 men who decided to return to civilian life, how many were thoroughly aware of the advantages of a naval career? How many were aware of the highlights of tuition aid, NESEP, OCS, NROTC, the Naval Academy, the Coast Guard Academy, N A VC AD, ACO, STAR, SCORE, and the nuclear power program? How many men who left the service were aware of procedures for change of rates, advancement in rating, assignment to new construction, Seavey/Shor- vey, inter- and intra-type transfers, assignment to Class A, B, C, or functional, schools, assignment to overseas duty, flight training, UDT, and submarine training? How thoroughly were they career-counseled during their minority four-year or six-year cruise? The majority of these men probably had received a 90-day, 60-day, or 30-day perfunctory re-enlistment interview and may or may not have received information concerning one or more of these programs or incentives.
We spend thousands of dollars in an effort to acquire untrained, raw, civilian youths for the Navy; we spend thousands more training them, but spend little time or effort in an attempt to retain these men after they have become trained either through formal or informal processes. This is false economy.
How can we alleviate this false economy? The following plan is proposed:
Assign to each ship or activity that deploys (such as Beach Jumper Units, Assault Craft Units, Service Squadrons, etc.) a dedicated career petty officer (E-5 through E-9), well schooled in all facets of career counseling. This would be essential as most first-term men are attached to seagoing forces.
The career counselor must be the personification at the ultimate in the career petty officer—he must be “Mister Navy.”
The petty officer should receive from the Bureau of Naval Personnel all of the up-to- date publications and aids pertinent to career counseling, and he should be kept abreast of all changes.
The career-counselor petty officer should be assigned no other duties except military duties such as assignment to a General Quarters station and other emergency drills and bills, and such duties as OOD, JOOD, and shore patrol.
In ships with complements in excess of 450, the counselor should work directly under the executive officer. However, to add impetus to the program, in smaller ships the commanding officer should provide direct guidance and supervision. It is imperative that leadership in this important endeavor emanate from the top.
Periodic presentations by the counselor to small groups of men may be appropriate and beneficial, but it is believed that individual discussions with personnel will prove more effective. It is important that information concerning the pros and cons of civilian life be examined to the fullest while the advantages and disadvantages of a naval career are being presented to each individual. This will enable the re-enlistee to have more facts when he makes the decision concerning his career.
In the absence of a career counselor being assigned to a ship by either BuPers or one of the EPDOs, it would behoove a commanding officer to take the initiative and create his own career counselor billet, a selected responsible man from his crew. Once the counselor is selected he could be educated in the career counseling field by enrollment in one of the currently established courses of instruction-
If each career counselor was instrumental in causing one man to re-enlist who otherwise would be lost to the service, the resultant advantage equated in monetary value would outweigh the pay and allowances of the counselor a hundredfold.
"The Selected Reserve—Problem in Readiness”
(See pages 100-102, August 1963 Proceedings)
W. H. Kersting, Lieutenant, U. S. Navy (Commanding Officer, USS Middlesex County, LST-983)—Lieutenant Stempel’s article leads
the reader to believe that the current Reserve Program has been of little use in the past and ls of little use now. As an officer-in-charge of a Group II escort ship during the 1961 mobiliZation, I take exception to this theory.
It was anticipated that the ships involved In the 1961 mobilization would require some Maintenance and training before assuming eet duties. Lieutenant Stempel has over- ooked the most important point: The Fleet received some 40 escorts and destroyers complete with crews in the shortest possible time. n an emergency, these ships would have turned in a very creditable performance. The time delay in 1961 was not because the nips were being made seaworthy, but beCause they were being brought up to the current high standards of the Fleet.
Concerning the attitude of the personnel Vvh° were recalled, it is difficult to believe hat they had been informed that the Selected eserve units would be the last units called, he very name, Selected Reserve, indicates his group would be one of the first to be railed. The crews were directed to keep their ^nbilization cards in their possession at all trrnes. The Group II crews maintained sea- jags and lockers on board ship. The active nty personnel maintained up-to-date service records and health records on the crew.
Reserve personnel were continually cau- h°ned to keep their personal affairs in good s rape. With all these facts well known, only •re most naive of the Selected Reserve crews j0l)ld have believed that they would be the ast called. The crews were not “sold out,” tcy were recalled to do a job that they had Rained for. The fact that a greater emergency m not materialize is something for which we shouId all be grateful.
As for the “2-by-6” and 8 -year reservists eing the backbone of the program, there was ncver a doubt that they were not. These men are the junior petty officers and non-rated
men. The backbone of the program is the 100-odd men of each crew who show up early for each drill, and spend many hours between drills, helping the active duty crew maintain their ship. These are the men who did not complain or offer excuses when notified of their mobilization. The complaints came from the young “0-by-8” men, not the senior petty officers who were being recalled, some for the second and third time. One petty officer whose small business demanded his personal attention, and whose wife was expecting their fourth child, did not complain. His only comment when notified of the mobilization was, “What can I do to help?” Men like these are the backbone of the Selected Reserve.
The living conditions in the ships which were recalled were not the best, but they were hardly primitive. They were comparable to those found in a great many fleet units today. My present ship is all too rapidly approaching her 20th anniversary. These are facts that we must live with out of necessity, not choice.
Recruiting is a serious problem in the Selected Reserve, and I agree that the reserve crews need assistance in this area. Recruiting must be accomplished between drill periods. Drill periods should be devoted to training and not administrative details. For this reason, officers and senior petty officers must devote extra time to the program. The Active Duty crew can be of great assistance in recruiting. With very little effort, one ship in the Third Naval District recruited 56 men during a 90-day period in 1951. Every member of the reserve and active duty crews must be enthusiastic if the program is to succeed.
Patriotism and leadership are two words which can never be overused, or become shibboleths. They are the foundation upon which our great Navy has been built. With these foundations, the Selected Reserve will succeed; without them, it will fail.
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