America and the European War
Safety Zone Opposed.—In a note of January 15 the British Government presented in some detail its objections to the proposed American security zone, and its reply to the protest sent on December 23 by the President of Panama in behalf of the 21 American republics. The note advanced the points: (1) that under international law such a zone could not properly be created by unilateral action of the American states but only by specific agreement with the belligerents; (2) that assurance would be necessary that the zone “would not provide German warships and supply ships with a vast sanctuary from which they could emerge to attack Allied and neutral shipping”; (3) that acceptance of the zone should not constitute a precedent for far-reaching alteration of existing laws on maritime neutrality. As specific conditions for the working of the scheme the note held it would be necessary to exclude all German warships and supply ships from the zone and to lay up for the duration of the war all German merchant ships in American ports. Until further assurance of the satisfactory working of the scheme were given, the British Government held it necessary to reserve full belligerent rights outside territorial waters. A subsequent French note expressed a similar view, and drew attention to the friction that might result if by unilateral action the American governments adopted punitive measures, such as denial of their ports for refuge or refueling, against belligerent vessels not guilty of an infraction of international law.
The replies were taken under consideration by the Inter-American Neutrality Committee, with representatives of 7 nations, which met at Rio de Janeiro on January 15 and was to continue throughout the war as guardian of American neutrality and interests. It was suggested that neutrals had as much right to establish a peace zone as belligerents a war zone on the high seas, and that if the Allies promised to respect such a zone, Germany might be induced to do the same. Without acceptance by the belligerents, establishment of the zone presented a difficult problem.
Mail Search Defended.—A British note of January 16, in reply to United States protests against mail censorship, defended the practice chiefly on the ground that Art. Ill of the 11th Hague Convention of 1907 did not cover parcel post and applied only to genuine postal correspondence, which could be determined only by search to insure against contraband. It cited a United States note of May 24, 1916, as follows:
. . . the Government of the United States is inclined to the opinion that the class of mail matter which includes stocks, bonds, coupons, and similar securities is to be regarded as of the same nature as merchandise or other articles of property and subject to the same exercise of belligerent right. Money orders, checks, drafts, notes, and other negotiable instruments which may pass as the equivalent of money are, it is considered, also to be classed as merchandise.
The British note called attention also to the use of letter post by the Germans to transmit military intelligence, to promote sabotage, and to carry on other hostile acts. Supporting the British position the French Blockade Ministry presented figures showing that in the past 3 months some $8,000,000 worth of contraband had been taken from parcels and letters, and about $500,000 in currency and checks. In emphasis of continued censorship British authorities on January 18 searched the mail sacks of the Atlantic Clipper at Bermuda and retained about a ton of mail when the Clipper took off.
Shipping Delays.—Following up protests against delays and detention of American ships in British ports, a U. S. aide memoire of January 22 declared that British interference had “worked wholly unwarrantable delays” on American shipping to and from the Mediterranean, and that such action appeared “to have been discriminatory.” Data given showed that American vessels between November 15 and December 15 had been subjected to delays averaging 12.4 days, whereas Italian ships had average delays of only 4 days in the same period. These and other matters, including the shift of British tobacco, cotton, grain, and other purchases from the United States to other neutral markets to cut off Germany’s foreign trade, were the subject of discussions between the British Ambassador at Washington and the Department of State.
The War in Europe
Aid for Finland.—In mid-January President Roosevelt in a letter to the Vice President and the Speaker of the House formally suggested that Congress study methods of aiding Finland to purchase foodstuffs and other American goods, not including instruments of war. The resultant bill, increasing the lending authorization of the Export-Import Bank by $100,000,000 and thus paving the way for $20,000,000 additional loans to both Finland and China, was approved by the Senate Banking and Currency and Foreign Affairs Committees and appeared certain of adoption. Congressional action also favored expeditious handling of any Finnish Government bond issue offered to American private investors. Of the $10,000,000 credit already advanced to Finland only about $2,500,000 had been spent up to February 1, but the credits were expected to facilitate indirectly the purchase of much needed munitions and war materials in other quarters. From London came cabinet assurances that the British Government had taken steps to supply Finland with “war materials including aircraft,” and in France there were strong press appeals for “effective, complete, and total aid” for Finland, on the ground that the Baltic conflict could not be separated from the Western European war and that the continued occupation of Russia on the Mannerheim Line was the best safeguard against a threat to Franco- British interests in the Near East.
Political Pronouncements.—With continued inactivity on the war fronts, except in Finland and at sea, interest was attracted in January to the speeches of Allied and German political leaders. On January 20, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill made a striking, and apparently not officially sanctioned, appeal for neutral support on the ground that the war was likely to rage more widely, and that if at any time France and Britain, “wearying of the struggle, were to make a shameful peace, nothing would remain for the smaller states of Europe with their shipping and possessions but to be divided between the opposite, though similar, barbarisms of Nazidom and Bolshevism.” Chancellor Hitler on January 30, seventh anniversary of Nazi rule, extended his condemnation to France as well as Britain, and declared that, with the first phase of political and military preparation ended, the second, of aggressive warfare, was about to begin. Premier Chamberlain on the day following pleaded with neutrals to be tolerant of British war measures as those of a nation fighting for its life in defense of ideals to which the neutrals also subscribed.
Behind these belligerent utterances there were continued rumors of peace moves, which were strengthened by an announcement from Washington on February 9, that Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles would in the near future make a tour of European capitals. On February 6, the Danish press published the following reputed German peace terms, which, though not officially sanctioned, had an interest as suggesting possible lines of settlement:
- Neither side to claim any reparations.
- The colonial question to be settled immediately, with return of several of Germany’s 1914 colonies assured.
- Sudeten Germany to remain part of the Reich.
- The Polish Corridor, Danzig, and a few other German-speaking districts which were part °f 1914 Germany to remain German.
- A plebiscite to be held in Austria on the Question of Austrian unity with the Reich.
- A commission of the belligerents to discuss the possibility of establishing the Czechs, Poles, and Slovaks as small independent States with a guarantee never to take up arms against Germany.
Results of Balkan Conference.— The outcome of the conference of the Balkan Entente—Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey—in early February was on the whole a trend toward increased solidarity, with clear implication that aggression against any one of the group would be met by united measures of defense. The Entente was extended for another seven years beginning February 9, 1941, and the communique announcing the results of the conference carried an appeal to the other Balkan States, Hungary and Bulgaria, to enter into “friendly relations and pacific collaboration.” To neither of these states, however, were there definite offers of territorial concessions. In fact the phrase in the communique expressing “determination to maintain a common vigil over the preservation of each member state’s rights to independence and territorial integrity” was interpreted as a pledge to perpetuate the Trianon Treaty dispositions. Yet Hungary under Italian pressure, and Bulgaria as a result of closer relations with Turkey, were both expected to restrain their territorial claims and collaborate with their Balkan neighbors for the duration of the war. Further than this, the trends within the Entente itself were thus summarized:
- Yugoslavia toward co-operation with Hungary and Bulgaria under Italian leadership.
- Greece, in continued friendship with Britain, toward closer co-operation with Turkey as a Franco-British ally.
- Rumania toward closer co-operation with Germany, in expectation of Nazi protection and guarantees against Soviet or Hungarian aggression.
German good will toward Rumania, however, was wholly contingent upon Rumania’s willingness to reduce her domestic economy to that of a market for German goods and supply source for German demands in foodstuffs and oil. Rumanian oil exports to Germany in 1940 were expected to be stepped up to 1,560,000 tons as compared with 1,200,000 tons in 1939, and this in face of the fact that Franco- British capital controls 56 per cent of Rumania oil production, as well as the Danube oil fleet, and they are throwing every obstacle in the way of compliance with German demands. To facilitate rail transport of oil to Germany, Nazi troops were permitted by the Soviet Government to occupy the 170 miles of railway from the Rumanian border through Russian-controlled Poland to Silesia, over which, under favorable conditions, about 430 carloads a day have reached Germany.
Far East
Asama Maru Affair.—Prime Minister Chamberlain announced on February 6 that difficulties arising from the removal of German passengers from the Japanese liner Asama Maru were approaching settlement on the basis that 9 of the Germans would be released to Japan and that the Japanese Government would instruct Japanese steamship companies to cease carrying belligerent subjects thought to be in military service. On January 21, a British cruiser stopped the Asama Maru, en route from San Francisco to Yokohama some 35 miles from the Japanese coast, and removed 21 German merchant ship officers and seamen bound for Germany via Japan and Siberia. The boarding party had a complete list of men wanted and met with little or no resistance. Fifty-one Germans were aboard the liner but only technicians and skilled seamen were seized. The Japanese protest emphasized the injury to national dignity involved in the seizure so close to Japanese home waters, and took the ground that only belligerent nationals actually in the armed forces could be removed from neutral vessels on the high seas. The British reply cited British practice in the World War, in which enemy nationals were seized if of military age and subject to conscription, whether or not actually on the service list, and during which about 3,500 German subjects were removed from 64 neutral vessels. The German Prize Ordinance of 1939 was also quoted as supporting the contention that anyone traveling on a neutral ship to join enemy forces could be seized. Acceptance of this principle was vital to Britain in view of enemy efforts to get merchant officers and seamen back to Germany for sea service, including 512 sailors of the German liner Columbus now at San Francisco awaiting arrangements for their passage home. It was denied in Japan that the Asama affair was responsible for a renewal of sharp blockade measures against the British and French concessions in Tientsin, the blockade being applied to exports as well as imports and practically ending trade.
Japan’s New Ministry.—The fall of the Abe Cabinet in Japan in mid-January was attributed chiefly to popular discontent over economic restrictions at home, the failure to end the “China incident,” and unsatisfactory relations abroad. It was at first thought that the military leaders must now assume full responsibility, with General Hata, retiring War Minister, as Premier. Instead, as a result of pressure from the Emperor’s immediate political advisers, the choice fell upon Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, 60 years of age, rated as a moderate, an advocate of friendly relations with the Western democracies, and a leader among those who opposed development of the Anti-Comintern Pact into a full alliance. No change was anticipated in China policy. General Hata returned to the War Office and Hachiro Arita came back to the Foreign Office which he had held in Baron Hiranuma’s cabinet early last year. At the opening of Parliament in February there were sharp demands for a clearer statement of war aims and peace terms, especially a definition of the “new order in East Asia.” The first task of the Yonai government was to push through the 1940 budget of almost $2,500,000,000, of which nearly half was for extraordinary military expenditures. Over the next 5 years Japan’s military program calls for the expenditure of over $2,540,000,000, divided about equally between the Army and the Navy.
Puppet Regime Proposals.—A Japanese offer for peace with Nationalist China was seen in a long telegram to Chiang Kai-shek sent in January by Wang Ching-wei, head of the proposed puppet regime in China, suggesting that Chiang end resistance and join in a nation-wide peace settlement with Japan. The terms would be: Chinese recognition of an independent Manchukuo; North China and Mongolia to be a special zone for defense and economic development for Japan; recognition of Japan’s economic predominance in the lower Yangtze valley and in islands off China; Japanese garrisons to be maintained; China forces reduced; and tariffs designed to promote commerce between Japan, China, and Manchukuo. Wang, busy at Shanghai with final arrangements for his new government, declared his regime would guarantee the just rights and interests of third powers and recognize foreign loans except those illegally contracted at Chungking.
End of Trade Treaty.—The Japanese-American trade treaty of 1911 ended on January 26, and Japanese efforts to secure a modus vivendi stabilizing further commercial intercourse were met by clear indications from the U. S. State Department that such arrangements were not immediately desired. It was indicated rather that betterment of trade and other relations with Japan would depend chiefly on Ambassador Grew’s success at Tokyo in securing adequate recognition of American interests and treaty rights in China. Pending the results of such negotiations the State Department suggested a preference that various Congressional resolutions restricting munitions and other exports to Japan should not be pressed for the present. The lapse of the treaty, however, left no legal barriers to such restrictions, and popular sentiment in this country indicated that they would have very general support. Following his retirement, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell accepted an honorary vice chairmanship of the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, and this committee circulated a letter to the New York Times of January 11 written by ex-Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson recommending legislation to prohibit war exports to Japan. According to figures cited in the January Amerasia, the United States in the war years 1937 and 1938 supplied Japan with from 63 to 66 per cent of her oil imports, the rest, 29 per cent, coming from Netherlands India and 8 per cent from British Malaya. Other figures sought to show “Japan’s extreme vulnerability to an oil embargo” and the “virtual impossibility of securing adequate sources elsewhere.”
In Japan the abrogation of the treaty was unofficially described as a “club to wreck the new order in East Asia,” and Premier Yonai stated in Parliament that while he did not wish to regard the American attitude with ill feeling, he would reconsider if the United States continued its “oppression and interference with Japan.” Prior to the treaty lapse, Japan increased her imports of American copper and scrap iron, and also entered into negotiations for purchase of Mexican oil.
Munitions Routes Attacked.—Japanese air raids on the Haiphong-Kunming Railway in South China and the killing of 5 French citizens led to French protests in early February and also to American representations against interference with legitimate American trade. Japan had given earlier warning against the use of the railway for transport of the large munitions stocks accumulated in French Indo-China ports. The air attack was accompanied by a vigorous Japanese campaign in Kwangsi to break up Chinese forces concentrated for the recapture of Nanning.