NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FROM MARCH 5 TO APRIL 5
Prepared by Allen Westcott, Professor, U. S. Naval Academy
PACIFIC TREATIES RATIFIED
Senate Ratifies Four-Power Treaty.—After extended debate the Four-Power Treaty regarding insular possessions in the Pacific was ratified by the U. S. Senate on. March 27 by a vote of sixty-seven to twenty-seven, twelve Democrats and fifty-five Republicans supporting ratification. The treaty extends for ten years, and indefinitely thereafter unless terminated by any power upon twelve months' notice; it pledges the participating nations to a joint conference in case of difficulties arising among themselves, and to consultation as to proper measures in the event of aggression by another nation. Thirty-one amendments and reservations were rejected. Only one reservation was adopted, that proposed by Senator Brandegee reading as follows:
The United States understands that under the statement in the preamble or under the terms of this treaty there is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense.
After ratification, the question was raised whether the supplementary agreement excluding the Japanese homeland should not have been ratified as a part of the original treaty. This difficulty was avoided by recalling the original treaty and ratifying both together. At this time the following reservation proposed by Senator Lodge was added to the resolution of ratification:
Subject to the following reservation and understanding which is hereby made a part of and condition of this resolution of ratification, and which repeats the declaration of intent and understanding made by the representatives of the powers signatories of the Four-Power Treaty relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean:
- That the Four-Power Treaty relating to Pacific possessions shall apply to the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean; provided, however, that the making of this treaty shall not be deemed to be an assent on the part of the United States of America to the mandates and shall not preclude agreements between the United States of America and the mandatory powers respectively in relation to the mandated islands.
- That the controversies to which the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Four-Power Treaty relating to Pacific possessions refers shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective powers.
Alleged Agreement with England.—During the discussion of the Four-Power Treaty Senator Borah raised the question whether there was not a secret unwritten understanding between the United States and Great Britain for mutual support in the Far East. He based his statement on a stenographic copy of remarks made by the New York lawyer, Paul D. Cravath, as follows:
Mr. Cravath—Now, to my mind a very important part of the achievement of the Washington conference is not recorded at all in black and white in that treaty, or in any of the other treaties that were negotiated, and that is the bringing about of what seems to be a sympathetic understanding between the United States and Great Britain regarding the Far East and Pacific questions generally. I quite agree that under the program produced by those treaties we have practically surrendered our naval position in the Pacific.
I assume that without further fortifications in the Pacific and that with the fleets and fortifications as agreed upon, we could not successfully compete with Japan in the Pacific alone, and certainly we could not compete with an Anglo-Japanese fleet in that region. On the other hand, and to my mind this is the much more encouraging statement based on the same facts, an Anglo-American fleet in the Pacific would dominate Japan, and it seems to me that we have substituted in place of the necessity for creating the greatest fleet the world has ever seen, with all the expense and temptation that involves, an understanding and basis for co-operation with Great Britain which gives these two powers the control of a combined fleet in the Pacific which will be large enough to dominate Japan and make her live up to the obligations she has assumed.
Mr. Davis—I want to know if you are making that statement as a fact, or is it just your own opinion of what would happen?
Mr. Cravath—I have been told by every member of the American delegation. I know definitely that the view is held by Mr. Balfour and I think by every other member of the British delegation, that the result of the conference has been not a formal agreement by any means, but an understanding, and such a degree of understanding and such a basis of sympathy has been created between Great Britain and the United States that both sides assume that in all future emergencies they can both count on having the very closest co-operation.
Mr. Davis—No, that isn't what I mean. What T mean is as to the agreements on fortifications and the Administration's naval ratio. Do you mean to say that both fleets would dominate the Japanese fleet?
Mr. Cravath—Of course, I have no independent knowledge of that. I am not a naval expert, and have no independent opinion on that point, hut I am informed that our technical advisers are satisfied that if the United States and Great Britain are on one side, and Japan on the other, the Anglo-American fleet and the entire Anglo-American naval position would dominate that of Japan in Japanese waters.
As I say, I have no independent opinion of my own on that. I am simply repeating what I have been told in Washington.
But, in all events, we are mutually better off, if I am right in assuming that underlying sympathy with Great Britain, than we would have been with as large a fleet as the one we have had in contemplation and on our building program, being opposed with the largest fleet that Japan would find herself physically able to build, and Great Britain being bound, as a matter of course, to keep pace with both. So, assuming that our theory of Anglo-American co-operation is well grounded, it does seem to me that our naval position, as against Japan, has been improved rather than weakened, and we have the great advantage in the reduction of our naval program and all that that means financially and otherwise.
Mr. Cravath afterward issued a denial that he had cited the authority of the American delegates; and the American delegates and President Harding declared that no such understanding existed, and that it would be "perfidious" in view of the open agreements of the treaty.
Other Treaties Ratified.—On March 29 the treaties for the limitation of naval armaments and regulation of the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare were ratified by the Senate without reservation, the first by a vote of seventy-four to one and the second unanimously. Senator France of Maryland was the sole opponent of the naval treaty.
The two treaties relating to China were ratified on March 29. The treaty stating international policies regarding China was accepted unanimously, and the one providing for revision of Chinese customs received only one adverse vote, Senator King of Utah expressing the belief that it was unacceptable to the Chinese. Senator Underwood, defending these treaties, agreed there was no obligation to use force in case any party to the treaty should violate its obligations; but he insisted that the moral pressure of the other signatories upon the offending nation would carry great weight.
France May Modify Treaties.—Paris, March 27—The treaty reservation habit is spreading. At the time they ratified the Treaty of Versailles the French did not know the game. It is different now.
Premier Poincare intends, when he submits the Pacific treaty to the French Parliament, to accompany it with a reservation analogous to that adopted by the United States Senate. He regards it as fair that one party to a treaty should not assume obligations, implied or otherwise, which another signatory does not assume.
As for the naval treaty, the French executive will present it as signed. But members of the Chamber of Deputies will propose changes. I am informed that the following reservations or amendments may be offered:
First, an amendment changing the French capital ship ratio from 1.75 to 2.5.
Second, a reservation declaring that France deems that the treaty does not bar her from protecting her independence on land or sea.
Third, a reservation stating either that France retains the full right to decide what is a merchant ship, which under the Root plan must not be attacked by a submarine, or stating that France does not regard any vessel carrying guns as immune as a merchant ship.
The last named reservation, which will come from the Chamber's Naval Affairs Committee, has excellent prospects of being adopted. As for the other two, recognized as being basic in character because they mean changing the treaty terms, it is difficult to say at this time what support they will receive.—New York Times, 28 March, 1922.
GERMAN REPARATION PAYMENTS
Reparations Commission Fixes Terms.—On March 22 the Allied Commission on Reparations, meeting in Paris, published its final proposals as to the amount to be paid by Germany during the year 1922, and the conditions to be fulfilled in view of the modified demands. The amount to be paid was fixed at $720,000,000 gold marks cash (of which 280,000,000 have already been paid) and 1,450,000,000 marks gold value in materials. The German government was given until May 31 to accept the Allied demands, with warning that failure to do so would involve the penalties provided in the Versailles Treaty.
The more important additional demands were as follows: (1) Measures to prevent exportation of capital from Germany and to secure return of capital already sent out; (2) full independence of the Reichsbank; (3) imposition before April 30 of all the new taxes and reforms proposed by Germany last January, and further taxation to yield an additional revenue of 60,000,000,000 paper marks; (4) an internal loan in some other form than treasury bonds, to meet the present budget deficit. The question of a foreign loan was left to be dealt with later.
Germany Declares Demands Impossible.—Speaking in the Reichstag on March 28, Chancellor Wirth declared that the German government would be unable to accept the demands of the Reparations Commission. He called attention in particular to the fact that the fall of German exchange as a result of the demands had at once added 28,000,000,000 marks to the German budget, and he considered utterly impossible the proposal for 60,000,000,000 paper marks of new taxes. In this position the government was supported by all parties in the Reichstag except the Communists.
In German circles the reparations demands were regarded as a victory for President Poincare over the British. The hope was expressed that further negotiations might lead to acceptable modifications.
United States Demands Share of Occupations Payments.—When Allied finance Ministers met in Paris on March 8 to consider the allotment of payments made by Germany to cover the cost of armies of occupation. Secretary of State Hughes sent a note requesting that the American army costs, amounting to about 1,000,000,000 gold marks, should be taken into consideration. In reply it was suggested that the United States should take up the matter directly with the Allied governments.
Accordingly on March 20 Secretary Hughes sent identical notes to each of the Allies setting forth the right of the United States to share in occupation payments on an equal footing with the Allied nations that had signed the Treaty of Versailles. Secretary Hughes based his claim on the provisions of the German Armistice. He assumed that if any technical objection were raised, it must be on the ground that the United States had not ratified the Treaty of Versailles; but since Germany by separate treaty had expressly recognized the validity of the American claims, such technical objection must rest "solely upon the refusal of the governments of the Allied Powers themselves to permit the discharge of an admittedly equitable claim and thus to seek to maintain in their behalf exclusively a first charge upon the assets and revenues of the German Government."
French Reply Recognizes Claim.—At the close of March the French Government sent a preliminary reply to Secretary Hughes' note stating that the French government had never questioned the right of the United States to payment and expressing confidence that a satisfactory settlement would be reached regarding the method of collecting the amount due. It was stated that the Allies would soon make a common reply to the American note. Speaking in the French Parliament, Premier Poincare pointed out that the only question at issue was whether the United States should collect through the Allies or directly from Germany.
Rhine Troops Ordered Home.—On March 20 the U. S. War Department announced the decision of President Harding to withdraw before July 1 all American forces in Germany. A previous reduction was ordered on February 16, so that on April 1 there were only about 2,000 American officers and men in the occupation forces.
American Ambassador to Germany.—Alanson B. Houghton, appointed American Ambassador to Germany, sailed from New York on April 1.
It was stated in Washington on March 28 that negotiations were in progress for a special treaty to adjust German and American claims growing out of the World War.
GENOA ECONOMIC CONFERENCE
Preparations for Conference.—Early in March the Italian government sent out invitations for the conference at Genoa to begin on April 10, the date agreed upon by the Allied premiers in their meeting at Cannes. It was expected that the conference might continue as long as three months, though a large part of this time would be taken up with committee work, while political leaders would not be present throughout.
Experts from the Allied nations met in London on March 20 to agree upon matters of policy and upon definite plans for concerted action in the conference. Among the problems considered was the regulation of credits to be apportioned to these countries offering adequate security.
United States Declines to Take Part.—In the following note to the Italian Ambassador, Secretary Hughes signified the unwillingness of the United States government to take part in the Genoa Conference, and at the same time expressed the attitude of this government toward the problems before the conference:
Washington. March 9.
Excellency:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note transmitting the invitation addressed by the Italian Government to the Government of the United States to take part in an "economic and financial" conference to be convened at Genoa pursuant to the resolution adopted on January 6, 1922, by the Allied governments in conference at Cannes.
I have also received your later notes with respect to American representation, the proposed agenda, and the postponement of the date of the conference.
Since the receipt of Your Excellency's first note the question of American participation in the proposed conference has had the most earnest attention. I am sure that you will realize that the Government of the United States must take a deep interest in any conference which holds promise of effective measures to promote the economic rehabilitation of Europe, since not only do we keenly desire the return of prosperity to the peoples who have suffered most severely from the wastes and dislocations of war but it is also manifest that- there can be no improvement in world conditions in the absence of European recuperation. It is with this sympathetic spirit, and with the utmost reluctance to withhold its support from any appropriate effort to attain this object, that the Government of the United States has examined he resolution adopted at Cannes and the suggested agenda for the conference.
I regret to inform Your Excellency that, as a result of this examination, it has been found impossible to escape the conclusion that the proposed conference is not primarily an economic conference as questions appear to have been excluded from consideration without the satisfactory determination of which the chief causes of economic disturbance must continue to operate but is rather a conference of a political character in which the Government of the United States could not helpfully participate. This government cannot be unmindful of the clear conviction of the American people, while desirous, as has been abundantly demonstrated, suitably to assist in the recovery of the economic life of Europe, that they should not unnecessarily become involved in European political questions.
It may be added, with respect to Russia, that this government, anxious to do all in its power to promote the welfare of the Russian people, views with the most eager and friendly interest every step taken toward the restoration of economic conditions which will permit Russia to regain her productive power, but these conditions, in the view of this government, cannot be secured until adequate action is taken on the part of those chiefly responsible for Russia's present economic disorder.
It is also the view of this government—and it trusts that view is shared by the governments who have called the conference—that while awaiting the establishment of the essential bases of productivity in Russia, to which reference was made in the public declaration of this government on March 25, 1921, and without which this government believes all consideration of economic revival to be futile, nothing should be done looking to the obtaining of economic advantages in Russia which would impair the just opportunities of others, but that the resources of the Russian people should be free from exploitation and that fair and equal economic opportunity in their interest, as well as in the interest of all the powers, should be preserved.
While this government does not believe that it should participate in the proposed conference, it sincerely hopes that progress may be made in preparing the way for the eventual discussion and settlement of the fundamental economic and financial questions relating to European recuperation which press for solution.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.
(Signed) Charles E. Hughes.
His Excellency,
Senator Vittorio Rolandi Ricci,
Ambassador of Italy.
Vote of Confidence for Lloyd George.—On April 3 the British House of Commons supported Premier Lloyd George by a vote of 372 to 94 on the motion that "this House approve the resolutions passed by the Supreme Council at Cannes as the basis of the Genoa conference and will support His Majesty's Government in endeavoring to give effect to them." On the same date M. Poincare was supported in the French Chamber by a vote of 484 to 78.
Speaking in the House on the motion quoted above, Premier Lloyd George outlined British policies for the conference, including restoration of trade, stabilization of exchange, reduction of land armaments, and limited recognition of Russia. On this last point he justified his policy by calling attention to the partial abandonment of communism in Russia, as shown by a speech of Lenine, and by citing the example of Pitt in dealing with revolutionary France.
Struggle for Russian Oil Fields.—Paris, March 13 (Special Cable).—Undoubtedly a big struggle for the possession of the Caucasian oil fields is in preparation. The prospect of the conference at Genoa brought the matter to a head and at present great interest is taken in Caucasian naphtha by Russia, France, England, and America, or at least companies belonging to these various nationalities. The Standard Oil Company is naturally getting ready to put up a fight inside or outside the international gathering.
For the moment it is Royal Dutch, through the affiliated company Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappy, which appears likely to obtain concessions which, according to the French, would constitute a monopoly. This Netherlands company is actually in negotiation with Soviet delegates, notably Leonid Krassin. But recent developments of Russian policy making for a repudiation of the method of parceling out the country make the situation doubtful.
As for the French, their view is simple. They are already at the mercy of great rival oil companies and have neglected to assure themselves of the oil sources in the world. They are opposed to any British monopoly and would be opposed to any American monopoly. They will not be left out of the Caucasus. At the meeting of experts in London next week this problem will probably be the chief problem, though it will not be treated with publicity. Should there be any secret agreement, France will consider that her interests have been jeopardized.—Christian Science Monitor, 16 March, 1922.
League Not to Take Part at Genoa.—Paris. March 28 (By the Associated Press).—The chances of the League of Nations participating in the Genoa conference were reduced to a minimum today by the action of the Council of the League in simply referring to the general secretary Italy's invitation to send to Genoa technical experts from the League organization for consultative purposes.
It is known that Sir Eric Drummond, the League's general secretary, regards such partial and vague participation as is proposed in the invitation beneath the dignity of the League, and it appears probable he will find it inadvisable to take the League's technical men away from the work they are already engaged upon.
The Council today increased the membership of the mixed committee on disarmament, adding Lord Robert Cecil of England, Gustave Ador, former President of Switzerland; Francisco Nitti, formerly Premier of Italy; M. Lebrun, formerly French Minister of Marine; Senor Gonzales Hontoria, formerly Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Sefior Urrutia, Colombian Minister to Switzerland, and Prince Sapieha, formerly Polish Foreign Minister. This step was in response to a resolution passed by the committee on disarmament at its last meeting in Paris to the effect that the committee should be strengthened.
The Council also urged the committee to resume as soon as possible the active work of preparing a basis for the general disarmament plan which the Council will submit to the Assembly of the League next September.
Smaller States at Genoa.—London, March 17 (Special Cable).—The conference of Little Entente and Polish statesmen at Belgrade has concluded and a program has been agreed upon for presentation at Genoa. The Cannes proposals are to be adhered to generally and the common line of economic action agreed upon is intended to facilitate international trade, while leaving each state completely free politically. No state will interest itself in any question not directly affecting itself.
The Tzech legation here points out that the Belgrade agreement, contrary to report, does not constitute an alliance with Poland. The existing military alliance between Poland and Rumania in no way commits the little entente any more than the proposed Finnish-Polish military alliance will compromise the Baltic entente.
A conference of the latter states and Poland is to take place within a few days at Warsaw, when the Belgrade program will be proposed by the Polish representative for acceptance. If agreed upon, as expected, a powerful group will be formed that can act in conjunction with the allied group of Italy, France and Great Britain for the common good of Russia.—Christian Science Monitor, 18 March, 1922.
NEAR EAST
Armistice for Greeks and Turks.—On March 22 the Allied Foreign Ministers, meeting in Paris to reach a settlement in the Near East, sent telegrams to Constantinople, Angora, and Athens proposing a three months armistice between Greek and Turkish forces, with a ten-kilometer zone between the two lines, and with the promise of ultimate Greek evacuation of Asia Minor. Both the Greek and the Constantinople governments accepted this proposal, the latter on the condition that the term of the armistice be limited to one month. Up to April 5, however, the Angora government had accepted only "in principle," and there appeared little prospect that it would submit unconditionally to the terms proposed by the western powers.
Proposed Peace Terms.—Forced to recognize the break-down of the Sevres Treaty and the failure of the Greek offensive in Asia Minor, the Allied Foreign Ministers at the close of March presented a solution of the Near Eastern question on terms far more favorable to Turkey than had previously been proposed. These terms were submitted to the Greek and Turkish governments with three weeks for consideration and reply. The chief features of the Allied proposals were as follows:
- Perpetual freedom of navigation in the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, with international control of the straits under the supervision of the "League of Nations, and the Greeks in possession of the Gallipoli peninsula.
- Turkish sovereignty throughout Asia Minor, while France and Great Britain retain all the former Turkish territory in Syria, Palestine, and Mesoptamia at present under their mandates.
- Smyrna to be evacuated by the Greeks, but with adequate protection for Greeks in the city proper.
- Armenia to be under Turkish sovereignty, but with the population under the protection of the League of Nations.
- Turkish control of Constantinople and an extension of her boundaries westward, though Greece holds Adreanople, the Gallipoli peninsula, and a part of Thrace.
India Supports Turkish Claims.—A sensation was caused in England by the publication of a despatch from the Government of India to Edwin Montague, Secretary of State for India, urging the need of a revision of the Sevres Treaty favorable to Turkey, as a means of placating Mohammedan feeling in India. The publication of this despatch, without consultation with other members of the British Cabinet, resulted in Mr. Montague's forced resignation. While the note itself was not resented, its publication in this manner was regarded as an effort on the part of one dominion to dictate the foreign policy of the British Empire.
Egypt an Independent Kingdom.—On March 15 Sultan Ahmed Fuad Pasha assumed the new title of "King of Egypt," and issued a proclamation declaring the end of the British protectorate. Great Britain, however, retains control of Egyptian foreign relations, and reserves the power to protect British communications in Egypt, defend Egypt against foreign aggression direct or indirect, and guard foreign communities and interests, in the country.
ITALY
Fiume Problem Unsolved.—Following the overthrow of President Zanelli in Fiume, the Jugo-Slav government on March 6 despatched a protest to Italy. The Italian government had already sent representatives to the city and assumed temporary control, forcing the resignation of Signor Giuriati, d'Annunzio's former chief of cabinet, who had taken charge of affairs. In reopening the Italian Parliament on March 16 Premier Facta emphasized his desire to carry out loyally the terms of the Rapallo Treaty. Up to the close of March, however, no solution of the Fiume problem had been reached. Zanelli at this time was in Jugo-Slav territory near the city with thirty-six members of the Fiume Assembly, the majority of which insisted upon his restoration.
GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND
Compact Between Ulster and Irish Free State.—Following increased religious and partisan warfare in Belfast city and along the Ulster boundary, the political leaders of both Ulster and the Free State agreed to a meeting with members of the British Cabinet in London on March 29-30. At this meeting a compact was signed embodying in brief the following terms: (1) A declaration of peace and pledge of co-operation to restore peace in disturbed districts; (2) organization of special police in mixed districts of Belfast, to consist half of Protestants and half of Catholics; (3) trials for serious crime in Northern Ireland, if so requested by either the accused or the prosecution, to be before two judges with no jury; (4) a committee of inquiry in Belfast, half Protestant and half Catholic, with an independent chairman; (5) another meeting, during the month after Free State has ratified its constitution, to consider the possibility of Irish union, or, failing this, a settlement of the boundary problem; (6) the British Government to submit to Parliament a bill providing £500,000 for relief work in Northern Ireland, to be distributed one-third to Catholics and two-thirds to Protestants, the Northern government endeavoring to secure the restoration of expelled Catholic workers; (7) release of political prisoners, and avoidance of inflammatory speeches.
British Parliament Ratifies Irish Treaty.—The Irish Treaty was ratified by the British Parliament and signed by the King on March 31. Amendments inserted by the House of Lords were finally eliminated, and the treaty was ratified in its original form save for one clause. This, suggested by the government, provided that the period of one month during which Ulster was to consider entrance into the Free State should begin upon ratification of the Irish Constitution by the British Parliament.
UNITED STATES
Austrian Loan Extended.—Special to The New York Times, Washington, March 15.—The Senate by unanimous vote today passed the Lodge joint resolution for the release of America's lien upon Austria's state assets so as to enable the latter nation to raise a new foreign loan for the relief of women and children facing starvation in that portion of the former dual monarchy. Other creditor nations of Austria are ready to do likewise, but the delay on the part of the United States was holding up the whole plan for international relief for Austria and creating a most dangerous situation.
The resolution was:
The Austrian obligation held by the United States Grain Corporation for $24,055,708.92, principal amount, is dated September 4, 1920, bears interest at six per cent payable semi-annually, and is due January 1, 1925.—New York Times, 16 March, 1922.
Recognition of Mexico Nearer.—It was stated in Washington on March 19 that letters exchanged between President Harding and President Obregon had reduced the question of recognition of Mexico to a matter of time. The chief difficulty was as to whether formal guarantees for the protection of American oil and mineral rights in Mexico should accompany or follow after formal recognition.